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Abstract
As wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are becoming ever more prevalent, the runtime
characteristics of these networks are becoming an increasing issue. Commonly, external
sources of interference make WSNs behave in a different manner to that expected from
within simplistic simulations, resulting in the need to use additional systems which monitor
the state of the network. Despite dependability of WSNs being an increasingly important
issue, there are still only a limited number of works within this specific field, with the
majority of works focusing on ensuring that specific devices are operational, not the ap-
plication as a whole. This work instead aims to look at the dependability of WSNs from
an application-centric view, taking into account the possible ways in which the application
may fail and using the application’s requirements to focus on assuring dependability.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are networks of small, embedded, battery powered wire-
less devices, called motes. Motes consist of a low power, general purpose microcontroller,
paired with a radio and a number of external sensors. These networks are commonly used
for data collection over a large spatial area, ranging from a few metres to several kilome-
tres [6]. Within a typical network there are a small number of hard-wired motes called
sinks to receive the data, and a large number of strictly wireless motes called sources,
generating data from sensor readings. When the distances involved are large, and to avoid
the need for high powered radios, messages are typically relayed via intermediate motes
towards a sink. This relaying of messages is referred to as multi-hop communication.
Due to WSNs general purpose nature, they are easily interfaced with a range of sensors
allowing them to show promise in a wide variety of applications such as: The Ferriby
Road Bridge deployment [56], where five devices were deployed, one to act as the sink,
three to monitor the size of cracks in the road bridge, and one to measure the incline of
the bearings; Humber Bridge [57], where one sink, ten humidity and temperature devices,
and one inclinometer were deployed to monitor the status of the suspension cables; and
monitoring occupants within assisted living facilities [162], where motion, pulse oximetry,
and ECG readings have been obtained from a single WSN device attached to an occupant,
with a number of relay nodes providing connectivity to a sink, amongst many others covered
in Section 2.4.
WSNs are also being used in ever increasing numbers due to the recent trend towards
Smart Homes [23,144], where many traditional home features, such as lighting [135], Heat-
ing [99], and even appliances [42] are gaining network functionality. Primarily, the goal of
the Smart Home is to allow data from multiple devices to be aggregated, and the devices
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themselves to be controlled, thereby enabling new applications and adding functionality
to traditional applications. With a vast quantity of generated data, together with control-
lability of devices, users are able to precisely control and monitor their environment, such
as detecting intruders [105], reducing lighting when there are no occupants present [109]
or even just monitoring of consumed power [14].
One primary attraction of using WSNs over other embedded solutions, is the reduced
cost of deployment in terms of both money and effort, as WSNs require no existing infras-
tructure due to the motes being battery powered and wireless. Other factors contributing
to their use are ever-decreasing hardware costs and a reduction in power consumption
compared to earlier devices [111]. This allows for larger numbers of devices to be deployed
and for the deployment to remain operational for a greater network lifetime.
Some of the main concerns surrounding the deployment of Wireless Sensor Networks
are as follows: the ad-hoc nature of the deployments, the reliability of cheap hardware,
the use of batteries which may become depleted, and radio interference (possibly from
external devices) on the communications [102]. In addition there have also been a number
of documented cases where WSNs have failed to perform as expected [119]. All these issues
raise concerns about the reliability of WSNs, especially when their proposed use includes
the monitoring of humans. Here, failure of the system could, in the worst case, put lives
at risk.
This thesis will attempt to take a systematic approach to reliability by primarily focus-
ing on the overall topic of dependability. This includes reliability together with a number
of additional factors, such as, availability, safety, integrity and maintainability which will
be discussed in detail within Section 2.5.
1.1 Dependability
When looking at the dependability of WSNs it is important to acknowledge that failures
of the system need to be acceptable under certain conditions, as ultimately ensuring no
failures of any devices within a WSN cannot be achieved. In these circumstances it is nec-
essary to investigate how these failures affect the network, and how they can be mitigated.
Failures cannot be avoided as ultimately devices always fail once all batteries have been
depleted, or whilst the batteries are being replaced, possibly leading to the failure of the
system. For instance, applications such as carbon monoxide monitoring cannot function
while the device is not powered. Ultimately, it is necessary to plan for failure, as in the
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extreme case external interference in the form of radio jammers could cause system fail-
ures that cannot be avoided by operational procedures. For these reasons, the following
definition of dependability by Avizienis et al [11] is used within this work.
The ability of a system to avoid service failures that are more frequent or
more severe than is acceptable [11]
This definition accepts that service failures may occur, however to remain dependable we
need to have bounds on the frequency and the severity of the failures. This raises the first
issue, that dependability must be analysed with a focus on a particular service or applica-
tion. To focus this work, a common application will be used throughout all the chapters.
The application chosen for this work is assisted living, where regular monitoring of the
environment and the occupant is required [7, 162]. Figure 1.1 shows a typical deployment
of the application. In this deployment there are a number of static, multi-function de-
vices placed around the building. Each static device takes sensor readings for one or more
environmental factors such as temperature or light, whilst additionally providing message-
relaying for surrounding devices. These readings can be used for a number of functions,
such as occupant tracking and fire detection. An additional static device, hard-wired to
the mains and the internet, is also included as the sink node for the network. A small
number of mobile devices are also present which allow for direct monitoring of occupants
as they move about the building. These devices record movement through the use of an in-
ertial measurement unit (IMU). Movement information together with specific sensor data,
such as Electrocardiogram (ECG), Electromyography (EMG) and Galvanic Skin Response
(GSR) readings, are then relayed from the device to a sink.
Having outlined the dependability in terms of network failure, and the context in which
the application will be operating, it is important to consider how the dependability of a
network might be systematically analysed. This can be achieved through the systematic
evaluation of the network against predefined attributes. Avizienis et al [13] defines five
dependability attributes which are as follows.
Availability Readiness for correct service. In the context of assisted living, will the net-
work be able to support both the static and mobile monitoring applications?
Reliability Continuity of correct service. Will the monitoring system continue to support
the applications and what could cause this to stop?
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Figure 1.1: Typical WSN deployment in the home
Safety Absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environment. Can
the applications fail in such a way that people and / or the environment are at-risk?
Integrity Absence of improper system alterations. Will environmental factors such as
interference cause the system to fail, and can attackers cause failures?
Maintainability Ability to undergo modifications and repairs. How can device failures
be handled and systematic replacement be achieved?
Availability and reliability are similar, with both being equal in the case of no failures.
In the presence of failures the availability can be viewed as the aggregate uptime of the
network, whereas the reliability my be the longest period of uninterrupted uptime. From
this definition it can be seen that a network with ms-duration failures every minute may
be highly available, however the reliability is particularly low.
These five factors are looked at in more detail within Chapter 3, which looks in detail at
the static motes and their operation when communications are event-triggered, for example,
fire detection. Events are raised based upon sensor readings, however this may be after
a long period of inactivity during which time some devices may have failed due to power
loss or hardware failure. For this reason, it is important to assess the Maintainability of a
network using systematic tests, a main component of Dependability Assurance (DA). By
analysing these test results, an effective heath monitoring system is derived, which uses
low network resources to provide assurance in the state of the network at run-time.
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Static motes are further considered within the context of data-streaming based appli-
cations, such as climate control, within Chapter 4. In these applications, data is constantly
sent to the sink for oﬄine analysis, resulting in high levels of network traffic and depletion
of battery life. By taking the application timing requirements into account, this thesis pro-
poses Dynamic Duty Control (DDC), which dynamically adapts the WSN duty-cycle to
the environmental characteristics surrounding the network. This has the effect of reducing
power consumption whilst still achieving the desired timing requirements, increasing the
availability and reliability of the network.
Finally, the work introduces a number of mobile devices to track the movements of
occupants in Chapter 5. To keep power consumption as low as possible, a mode-based
approach is used to adjust the volume of data generated and transmitted, depending on
whether the occupant is stationary or moving. These modes have strict timeliness require-
ments, which are met by using DDC, however the introduction of possible changes between
modes requires an additional system called Mode Change Windows (MCWs). MCWs allow
the timeliness requirements to be met when the system changes between modes, whereas
traditional approaches frequently miss these requirements, resulting in data which has ex-
ceeded its deadline arriving at the base node. These three components: event-triggered
communications, streaming, and mode changes are shown in Figure 1.2.
Assisted Living
Static Mobile
Events
Fire Detection
Reliability
Streaming
Climate Control
Efficiency
Mode Changes
IMU Tracking
Timeliness
Figure 1.2: Overview of main contributions
1.2 Hypothesis
When taking a systematic approach to analysing the applications running upon a WSN
the Dependability can be increased by considering the possible failure modes and the
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application’s requirements. Additionally by taking the application requirements and using
feedback, reliability and efficiency can be improved whilst still ensuring application timing
requirements are met.
1.3 Outline
This thesis will be structured as follows.
Chapter 2 provides a review of the current state-of-the-art. This covers the theory be-
hind WSNs, including power consumption and radio communications. Following this, case
studies on real-world deployments of WSNs will be reviewed and issues noted. Literature
on dependability will be reviewed with particular emphasis given to those cases involv-
ing WSNs. The literature review continues, looking into ways of mitigating known issues
through the use of approaches such as health-monitoring and adaptive network adjustment
and how reactions to these issues can be performed. Finally a review of Operating Systems
and Simulators is performed..
The first technical chapter, Chapter 3, will define Dependability Assurance (DA) in
detail and how this can be applied to our example application. This section will outline
how DA can be applied to meet the dependability attributes defined by Lepris et al, leading
to the generation of Dependability Tests (DTs). The second part of this chapter looks
in detail to the run-time checking of the DTs, with in-depth emphasis on Maintenance
and Failure Rates of the devices and how this affects the dependability. This section
concludes with requirements as to the failure times of WSN devices, showing how larger
failure periods allow DA to perform more optimally, a requirement that will be met in the
following chapters.
Chapter 4 aims to meet the failure requirements generated by DA, by taking the tim-
ing requirements extracted by DA and using these to reduce power requirements and thus
increase the availability and reliability of the motes. This is achieved through the creation
of Dynamic Duty Control (DDC), which takes the application timing requirements and
information from the existing network traffic at run-time, and uses feedback to control the
duty-cycle of motes within the network. DDC is analysed using numerical simulation, to
compare it with current state-of-the-art approaches, and to estimate the power consump-
tion. This raises questions about the effect of other MAC protocols and routing layers on
the power and responsiveness of the application. For this reason analysis using Contiki
is performed in order to analyse the performance of the network under Contiki’s de-facto
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standard MAC and routing layers.
Chapter 5 looks at data-driven applications which change timing requirements depend-
ing on the current mode of the network. When changing between modes, deadlines in either
mode may be missed, invalidating the application requirements. To address this, the no-
tion of Mode Change Windows (MCW) is introduced which allows the network to perform
mode transitions sooner, and with careful scheduling allows deadlines to be met. This is
demonstrated though the use of the UPPAAL model checker. The basic form of MCW
requires the application developer to provide suitable network values to ensure deadlines
are not missed, however this requirement is removed by introducing DDC to dynamically
adapt to the network conditions, automatically providing the appropriate values. Finally,
it is shown that by applying DA to MCW the requirement for additional data messages
can be met, allowing for dependability and low power consumption to be provided within
this scenario. Analysis of the application is performed on the current state-of-the-art MAC
and routing implementations with further analysis to ensure the timing requirements are
being met and power consumption is reduced.
Chapter 6 concludes with the results of the previous chapters, Dependability Assurance,
Dynamic Duty Control, and Mode Change Windows. These are analysed with respect to
the Dependability Attributes as detailed in Section 2.5.1, summarising how dependability
is improved against the current state-of-the-art. Finally, suggestions as to possible further
works are outlined.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This literature review presents an overview as to the current state-of-the art in WSNs,
with focus tending towards dependability by the end of the chapter. Initially an outline
as to current hardware is provided with an overview as to the common software stack
on these devices. A detailed overview of the communication stack, including the various
protocols commonly used on these devices is then presented. This is followed by an analysis
of WSN deployments and any issues that were identified such as power and unreliable
communications. A formal definition of dependability is provided, along with a number
of algorithms that cover various attributes of dependability. Towards the end of this
chapter a brief overview of WSN operating systems and simulators are provided to inform
any implementation which is required. In addition an overview of reactive approaches is
provided to assist the work in Chapter 4. Finally the conclusions drawn from the literature
review are presented, which outline the outstanding research challenges that this thesis aims
to address.
2.1 WSN Overview
Wireless sensor networks are collections of small embedded devices called motes. The
primary purpose of these devices is typically to sense the environment in which they are
deployed using a large variety of possible sensors, and report these readings to a central
location for analysis. More advanced systems may take action based upon this data, or
may analyse it within localised areas before sending summarised data to a central location.
The main differentiation between WSN motes and traditional monitoring techniques are
that motes have been designed to be small, low cost, battery powered, and wirelessly com-
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municate [149]. These factors allow for large numbers of devices to be deployed within a
specific location, requiring no existing infrastructure to support the devices, whilst provid-
ing high levels of redundancy in the case of individual failures. In addition to redundancy
the greater number of devices allows for large amounts of data to be generated over a
wider area. This larger area allows previously expensive applications, such as forest fire
detection [85], pollution monitoring [65], and precision crop monitoring [32,86], to provide
more utility as the locality of the readings has a large impact on the value of the data. For
example, 3 high accuracy stations, whilst providing precise readings, may be less useful
than 40 less precise sensors over a larger area. In addition large numbers of imprecise
readings could also be used to obtain high precision values [65].
Communication is a fundamental difference between WSNs and traditional sensors, as
the small physical size of the devices, restricted availability of power, and possibly large
geographic area, makes direct communication over large distances relatively expensive, or in
some topologies such as through the ground, impossible [82]. For this reason WSN devices
use multi-hop communication to communicate over large areas by relaying messages from
the source of the data, though intermediate devices to the destination, commonly called
the sink. This not only allows the network to be deployed over a larger range than the
transmission distance of individual devices, in addition the relaying of messages adversely
effects the relaying nodes, as power and bandwidth is consumed on the relaying nodes.
In the case of a single sink this means that the nodes closer to the sink experience more
traffic [171], leading to a higher chance of failure. This increase in traffic and decrease
in power as the sink is approached is referred to as the energy hole problem. The most
promising standard for WSNs is the 802.15.4 specification, due to it having the lowest
power requirements out of the three most popular alternatives, Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE), ANT, and 802.15.4 [20, 33]. In addition 802.15.4 has been proposed as part of
the 6loWPAN protocol [101], allowing devices to be addressed using IPv6 [147], making it
suitable for our assisted living scenario, and therefore has been chosen for this thesis.
These features make these devices attractive for a large number of scenarios where
installing infrastructure would be expensive in either cost, such as freight monitoring [126,
127], or time such as in time-critical environmental disaster response [25, 125]. Another
attraction of these devices is the low impact on the surrounding environment, for example
in wildlife habitat monitoring [92] or forest fire detection [85,139]. A more detailed overview
of previous WSN deployments is given in Section 2.4.
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Whilst WSNs can include actuators to physically react to their surroundings, these
types of WSNs are deemed outside the scope of this thesis due to the additional safety
related effects that this causes, however the work presented within this thesis could be
extended to support this type of application.
2.1.1 Devices
Wireless sensor networks are heavily constrained by the hardware upon which they operate.
These constraints cover a variety of factors from power consumption, processing power,
size, and weight. To better understand theses constraints an overview of common WSN
platforms is presented, along with the current state-of the art. The end of this section will
present a summary of the most important constraints that need to be considered.
The de-facto standard hardware in the majority of the WSN literature is the TelosB
mote [118], which is also known under the SkyMote name. This device replaced the
previously popular MicaZ [29], with both devices having the same architecture consisting
of separate Radio and Microcontroller. Newer device such as the OpenMote-CC2538 [151]
have begun to integrate the radio and microcontroller onto the same chip. Table 2.1 gives
an overview of the three devices.
Device Year Processor Speed Flash RAM
MicaZ 2001 8-bit ATmega128L 8Mhz 128KB 4KB
TelosB 2004 16-bit MSP430 8Mhz 1000KB 10KB
OpenMote-CC2538 2014 32-bit ARM 32Mhz 512KB 32KB
Table 2.1: Performance for the three mote types
From this table it can be seen that the word size of the processors is increasing with
the newer processors, including the size of the RAM, and the clock speed on the newest
processor. This implies that more intensive processing can be performed on these devices,
lowering the performance restriction on WSN-class devices, and is especially true on the
ARM-based variants due to higher performance of the processor [103]. This increase in
compute power may indicate that more computationally expensive pre-processing of the
data on-device may be a good approach to save power. Care must be taken however as
none of these devices contain floating point units, meaning that any computation using
larger size integers than the word size or floating point arithmetic must be re-written by the
compiler, making computation slow, and therefore should be avoided. Another feature of
these newer devices is the greatly increased size of the ROM. This allows for computation
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/ space tradeoffs as lookup tables may be advantageous over computationally expensive
mathematical functions such as exp().
All three devices are powered by two AA batteries located on the underside of the
device. Table 2.2 shows the power draw for each of the devices.
Device TX Power RX Power Active Sleep
MicaZ 25mA 27mA 8mA 20uA
TelosB 19mA 22mA 2mA 5uA
OpenMote-CC2538 24mA 20mA 7mA 1.3uA
Table 2.2: Power consumption of the three mote types
This table shows that radio communications are not showing much change in power
consumption between the generations of devices, an observation that has been supported in
the literature [69,165]. This issue means that the radio-on time is still the most important
factor in device lifetime, as it has the highest power consumption, and therefore should be
minimised as much as possible.
2.1.2 WSN Stack
Figure 2.1: Seven Layer OSI vs Four Layer WSN
Typically networks are described in terms of the seven layer OSI model [173] as shown
in Figure 2.1. This model is suitable for the desktop environment where applications are
more abstracted from the underlying hardware, however for WSNs this model is overly
complex. The 802.15.4 specification defines a four layer model as shown alongside the OSI
model, and defines the implementation of the Physical and MAC layers. These four layers
are defined as follows:
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2.1.2.1 Physical
The physical layer in the 802.15.4 specification is the same as that used in the 7 layer OSI
model. This layer deals with the management of the physical RF transceiver, including
modulation of the physical signal, management of the channel selection, transmission en-
ergy levels, and signal management. Within this thesis the original 802.15.4 specification
will be used, in particular the 2.4Ghz PHY. Since 2003, numerous additions have been
made to add further PHY frequencies, channel hopping schemes, and other modulation
schemes, however as the 2.4Ghz PHY is the most common it will be assumed for the rest
of this thesis.
2.1.2.2 MAC
The MAC layer is responsible for the transmission of MAC frames through the physical
channel. In the 802.15.4 specification for the largest size of a MAC frame is specified as 127
bytes [106] which must also include the appropriate headers as defined by the standard. For
802.15.4 devices Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) with Collision Avoidance (CA) is
used, specifying that devices should sample the radio channel before attempting to trans-
mit, with backoffs being applied if the channel appears busy [15, 75]. 802.15.4 specifies
two modes of communication, beacon enabled and non-beacon enabled modes [172]. In
non-beacon enabled modes nodes have no restrictions on when they can transmit, rely-
ing on the Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) with the
backoff periods to handle contention. The beacon enabled mode however used the concept
of WPAN coordinators to organise transmissions into superframes, which are delimited by
beacons broadcast by the WPAN coordinator [24]. These superframes contain active and
inactive regions, which define the periods in which devices can enter lower power sleep
modes. The active region is split into two further regions, the contention access period,
where nodes must complete to transmit as with non-beacon mode, and the contention
free period, which uses guaranteed time slots allocated to individual nodes for transmis-
sion. Further details of other MAC protocols are covered in more detail within Section
2.2. Another important classification is between contention-based protocols which employ
CSMA/CA, which compete over the right to transmit, causing latency issues [174], and
reservation-based TDMA protocols, which use pre-calculated time slots to communicate.
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2.1.2.3 Routing
The MAC layer deals with single link communication, however one of the advantages of
WSNs is that communication can occur over multiple hops to get from the source to the
sink. To support multi-hop communication the routing layer is used. There are a number
of different classifications of routing protocol [5, 134], however there are two main classes,
static protocols and ad-hoc protocols. Static protocols have a fixed topology, typically
specified by the system designer, whereas ad-hoc protocols adapt to the surrounding en-
vironment as required. Static protocols are useful within networks when the topology is
well-known, and the designer does not want the overheads associated with Ad-hoc proto-
cols. Ad-hoc protocols add additional complexity, however this allows them to be used in
environments where the correct topology may not be known at design time, or where the
topology may change depending on factors from the surrounding environment, such as in-
terference. Ad-hoc protocols can be further classified into proactive and reactive protocols.
Proactive protocols constantly maintain routing topologies regardless of the behaviour at
the application layer. This allows for low latency initiation of communications as routes are
already established, however at the expense of maintaining the routes even when they may
not be required. Reactive protocols build routes on-demand, as required to support the
application, which may require the route to be discovered if one does not exist, or repair-
ing of the previous route if it has degraded since last use. Another class of protocol which
is sometimes mentioned in routing protocols are Time-Division-Multiple-Access (TDMA)
based protocols, which calculate global fixed schedule for nodes to transmit messages.
Whilst TDMA protocols are strictly MAC protocols, they are commonly implemented
as cross-layer solutions, and therefore have impact at the routing layer. There are also
location-based protocols are a special class of static protocol where messages are sent to
locations, with all nodes knowing their current location (possibly calculated during ini-
tialisation) making routing more efficient [157]. A brief overview of these will be given in
Section 2.3.
In addition to the underlying routing protocols there are a number of additional features
that can be added to further change the behaviour of the network, the first of which is
clustering [1,148]. Clustering approaches use logical groupings of nodes to create a singular
virtual node, which can then communicate using standard routing protocols. These clusters
use the notion of elected cluster heads which take responsibility for communicating on
behalf of the cluster. The second feature that is frequently used is the addition of dynamic
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information when discovering or updating routes [28]. The information used may include
a number of QOS factors such as battery power levels, interference, and number of alive
nodes, and can be used to add positive or negative pressure to certain nodes [58, 62, 169].
These additions are outside the scope of this work as we are focusing on dependability,
and therefore are not discussed further.
2.1.2.4 Application
The application layer is the level at which the end application is located, with the support
of the operating system to manage the underlying layers. At this level the raw information
is collected from attached sensors, processed, and transmission of the data requested to a
specific destination. The destination may be a single node as in the case of a sink, or the
entire network as in the case of a broadcast. At this level data aggregation, compression,
and analysis can be performed depending on the individual application [51]. This is es-
pecially true of data collection where the application does not require all the data, but a
summary of the data in terms of a sum, average, min / max, as these operations can be
performed easily in-network.
Support frameworks can also be provided at this level to make collection and analysis
of data easier. These frameworks may support the execution of queries upon the network
[49, 59, 90, 91], where the operator specifies a SQL-style query which is distributed across
the network accordingly. Results from these queries are then collected in an energy-efficient
manner, and aggregated back at the base node [83]. Other queries may allow events to be
be detected and alarms raised at the appropriate time.
2.2 MAC
In addition to the 802.15.4 MAC specification there are also a large number of alternative
802.15.4 MAC protocols that have been developed within the literature. Most of these
protocols are compatible with the official specification, using the same header structure in
the MAC frames and the non-beacon enabled mode. As the non-beacon enabled mode fails
to specify any restrictions on the radio states of the devices, specific MAC protocols are free
to apply additional duty cycling features. For these reasons popular MAC protocols such
as Low Power Listening (LPL) [100] and ContikiMAC [36] are both 802.15.4 compatible,
but have issues interoperating due to their differing duty cycling behaviour [70]. This
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section will describe a number of MAC protocols, however TDMA protocols will not be
described in this section due to their strong relationship with the routing layer, instead
both the MAC and Routing layers of TDMA protocols will be described in Section 2.3.1.
The most basic approach, commonly referred to as nullMAC [18], keeps the radio in
a constant listening state, waiting for the start of an incoming data packet. If a node
wishes to send a packet it switches into the transmit state, sends the packet, and then
returns to the listening state. For the majority of the time with this approach the nodes
are idle listening. Idle listening is when devices are listening to the radio with no devices
transmitting at the same time, in effect wasting time in the relatively power expensive
radio-on state.
The advantages of this mode is that sent messages are never missed by the receiver
being in the sleep state, and this is the method used for 802.11 base stations [31]. This
mode however consumes a high amount of power, therefore the radio should be in the off-
state by default, with the radio periodically woken up to perform communications, referred
to as duty-cycling. Whilst duty-cycling typically reduces the power consumption of mobile
devices it introduces the need for larger buffers to hold packets generated whilst the device
is oﬄine, ready to be sent at the next awake period. In addition to the required buffers,
any time that a packet has been generated, but can’t be sent due to the radio being in
the oﬄine state, leads to increased delay in the packet reaching the destination [93]. This
delay could be unacceptable for certain applications if it became too large.
In Sensor MAC [168] (S-MAC) all nodes share a common duty cycle between neigh-
bours, defining the period of the duty cycle and the amount of time the device remains alive
in the awake period (active period). The active period is further split into two sections, the
time synchronization period and the data transfer period. The time synchronization period
is used for nodes to exchange duty cycle information, allowing neighbouring nodes to use
the same duty for communication. This synchronization is performed at the start of every
active period so that clock drift does not become a significant issue. The active period can
be extended in the case that transfers have not completed by the end of the active period,
however the active period cannot be reduced in size. This MAC protocol reduces the idle
listening time, but due to the minimum active period size it is not fully minimised, and
with the addition of a synchronization period some overheads are introduced.
Timeout MAC [154] (T-MAC) aims to remove the limitations of S-MAC, mainly the
requirement for a minimum awake period. This is achieved by defining a fixed period at the
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start of which the radio is turned on, accepting the transmission of all data packets. When
the radio is activated a timer is enabled which counts down for some time T, whereby when
the timer expires the radio is turned off until the start of the next period. To provide the
dynamic sizing of the transmission window the timeout is reset every time a packet is sent
or received, effectively extending the active radio time. Care must be taken to ensure that
T is large enough to ensure that a single packet sent by any other node has time to be
received, however a large value adds to the idle listening time at the end of the transmission
window.
Berkeley Media Access Control [116] (B-MAC) is one of the first algorithms to reduce
the idle listening time of all the nodes by making the sender node consume more time
transmitting. B-MAC operates with receivers periodically probing the channel, assessing
if there are any messages being sent, and if this is not the case, quickly returning to the sleep
mode. If a message transmission from another node is detected the receiver stays awake
and attempts to receive the message. Unlike previous MAC protocols the sender cannot
assume that the receiver will be awake when the message starts transmitting, and instead
a preamble is initially broadcast. This preamble allows receiver nodes to wake, detect a
transmission, listen to the radio, and at the end of the preamble, receive the message. This
protocol ensures that at no point are the sender receiver pair both awake and idle listening,
whilst waiting for the end of a transmission period as in the previous algorithms. Instead
the idle listening is reduced to the time to check for channel activity, with wasted radio
time being relocated to the time to transmit the preamble and the length of time receivers
listen to the preamble. It has been shown to be more efficient than T-MAC in the majority
of scenarios [133], and forms the basis of the remaining MAC protocols.
X-MAC [22] improves on B-MAC by reducing the amount of time that the preamble is
both transmitted and received by the sender and receiver respectively. This is performed
by replacing the long preamble with a repeating short preamble containing the destination
node and the number of remaining preambles, with a small break between each repeat. The
size of this break is calculated to be large enough to receive a simple acknowledgement from
any receiver nodes, halting the transmission of the preamble and beginning the transmission
of the data. Receiver nodes periodically wake, sample the channel for longer than the
acknowledgement window size. If a preamble is partially received the node stays awake to
receive the next complete preamble, compares the destination with its own ID, and in the
case of a match, sends an acknowledgement. This protocol reduces the preamble time in
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addition to providing a rapid way for listening nodes who do not match the destination ID
to return to sleep. This method does however increase the size of the listening period for
the receivers, but drastically reduces the preamble time.
Both TinyOS and Contiki operating systems use similar methods as their default MAC
protocols (TinyOS LPL [100] & ContikiMAC [36]). These protocols operate in the same
way as X-MAC, however the data packet is used as the preamble instead of a specially
formatted preamble packet. This allows the received acknowledgements to signal the full
reception of the data message, and the end of the sender’s transmission. In this mode the
data packet is repeatedly transmitted by the sender, with a pause between each transmis-
sion that is sized to be large enough for a receiver to acknowledge the receipt of a message.
Listening nodes periodically wake up and sample the radio for a duration longer than the
pause interval between two packets in which they sample the radio. If a message is de-
tected the receiver stays awake to receive the next complete message. When the whole
message has been received an acknowledgement is sent to inform the sender that message
has been received and that transmissions may stop. In the case of ContikiMAC further
sleep is performed by the receiver around the pause, instead of sampling for the entire
pause duration. This is done by sampling for two short periods, separated by the size of
the acknowledgement pause, ensuring that if one sample was to fall inside the pause, the
other would hear the message if one exists.
ContikiMAC also provides another couple of optimisations to reduce the time spent
waiting for communication. The first is the concept of phase synchronisation between the
sender and the receiver node, whereby upon a successful transmission between a pair of
nodes each node remembers the transmission time of the other device. When these two
devices wish to communicate for a second time they wait for two preamble periods before
the receiver is due to awake before starting transmission, reducing wasted communications.
The second optimisation is when the sender has multiple messages to send. In this instance
a special flag is set on each message that is not last in the queue, informing the receiver
that more messages are pending. When the receiver notices this flag on the first received
packet it does not sleep for another period, instead waiting for the next data message to
arrive. Once the queue has been reduced to a size of one the flag is omitted, allowing the
receiver to sleep once communications are complete.
Both TinyOS and ContikiMAC allow the operator to specify the duty cycle that should
be used by the nodes in the network, which in turn specify the responsiveness of the network
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and the upper limit on the power savings. Further guidance is not given on how to specify
these duty cycles, with TinyOS defaulting to 10Hz and ContikiMAC defaulting to 8Hz.
2.3 Routing
As stated earlier there are a number of Dynamic and Static Routing protocols. Dynamic
protocols include Proactive and Reactive protocols, with Static including TDMA based
approaches. A sample of representative protocols for each of these three categories is
provided, with the original work being reviewed instead of any enhanced versions, which
themselves will be summarised.
Flooding [84] is the most basic form of communication within WSNs. Flooding is
performed when a node broadcasts a message to all neighbouring devices, which in turn
broadcast the message. Nodes remember the last broadcast message, and therefore will
not re-broadcast the message. This ensures that the message covers the entire network,
however at the expense of power on all devices. Time To Live (TTL) values may be used
to restrict the number of hops which the message may take [52]. Each device reduces the
TTL by one, and should an incoming message be received with a TTL of 0, the message is
no longer forwarded. Whilst this reduces the impact on the network it shortens the range
which the message travels, which may be useful for localised activities [110].
2.3.1 Dynamic - Proactive Protocols
There are a number of routing protocols which constantly maintain routing information for
the network. These protocols require constant maintenance to compensate for the dynamic
environment in which the WSN operates, with some protocols requiring maintenance to
ensure various QOS factors are maintained.
Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector Routing [115] (DSDV) uses routing information
gathered periodically by all nodes to ensure that a message reaches its destination. When a
message is generated the destination is looked up in the local routing table on the sending
device to identify the next node in the route to the destination. Once the next hop has
been identified the message is forwarded and the process repeated until the destination is
reached. This protocol requires that all devices know all routes to all valid destinations
within the network, with these routes being contained in each nodes’ routing tables. To
ensure constant information between devices each device periodically broadcasts its routing
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table to its neighbours, which in turn increment the distance to the destination, and if the
distance is smaller than any existing record to the same destination, the old record is
replaced with the sender being recorded as the next hop in the route. This ensures that
once all tables have been fully propagated, all nodes know the next hop on the shortest path
to all possible destinations. There are many optimisations that can be used to reduce the
overheads of updating this information, such as sending only updates to the local tables or
adjusting the frequency of the updates over time [67], however these are outside the scope
of this review.
There are also a number of protocols which operate in a similar manner to DSDV,
however using different cost metrics. Where DSDV uses hop count as the deciding factor
as to which route should be prioritised, other protocols may incorporate factors such as
battery levels, age of records, communication quality and other QOS factors.
Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks [2] (RPL) is a relatively new
routing protocol (2011) which uses the concept of Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) rooted
at a single node called Destination Oriented DAGs (DoDAGs) to route packets around
the network. These graphs are created in an iterative nature similar to DSDV, with the
route node sending out DoDAG Information Objects (DIOs) identifying the sender and
their current rank. When DIOs are received the sender’s rank is compared to the current
parent of the receiver, and if it is a higher rank it is selected as the new parent, its rank
is calculated and a new new DIO message is broadcast. This method ensures construction
of loop-free DoDAGs, with messages being sent up the tree to the route node.
RPL differs from similar tree-based algorithms by supporting downward links through
the use of Destination Advertisement Objects (DAOs). DAOs allow nodes to broadcast
their presence and that of all known child nodes to parent nodes in the tree. When a DAO
message is received, information about the child and any grandchildren are stored. DAOs
allow point-to-point communication by sending messages up the tree until a route to the
destination exists, in the worst case at the route node, before traversing back down the tree
to the children. Point-to-point communication however is relatively expensive in terms of
hop count due to routes navigating the DoDAG [164]. Other differences include the support
for arbitrary ranking functions, with support for multiple simultaneous DoDAGs routed at
different nodes, with each possibly running different ranking functions. However RPL as a
whole, whilst supporting many different features takes a large amount of Flash and RAM
space making it unsuitable for devices with limited resources.
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2.3.2 Dynamic - Reactive Protocols
There are another class of protocols which do not attempt to maintain any routing infor-
mation until transmission is requested by a node in the network. When a transmission is
requested routes are discovered before the data is sent to the destination, thereby removing
the need to constantly maintain routing information.
Destination Sequenced Routing [64] (DSR) is a routing protocol which discovers routes
between the source and the sink when transmissions are attempted and there are no pre-
existing routes. If a source has never attempted to send a message then no routes will
currently exist for this node. Routes may also no longer exist if previous routes between
the source and the sink have expired due to inactivity over a period of time, or if the
previous route was detected as failed. New routes are discovered by broadcasting a route
request (RREQ) across the network, with each hop appending the ID of the relaying node
to the packet. Once the RREQ reaches the sink a unicast reply (RREP) is sent back along
the path contained within the packet header. Once the source receives the RREP the route
is extracted from the packet header and inserted into all future transmissions to the same
destinations so that the message can be relayed appropriately. Should any hops in the
transmisssion path fail, a route error (RERR) is sent back to the sending node, which in
turn removes the path from cache and re-initiates route discovery accordingly.
Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Routing [26] (AODV) is similar to DSR in the use of
RREQ, RREP and RERR messages, however instead of storing the route to be taken inside
the packet, which may consume a large amount of space if the route has many hops, the
route is cached in the relaying nodes. The caching of routes is performed when the RREQ
message is relayed by intermediary nodes, with the RREQ creating the backwards path and
the RREP creating the forward path (as only the sender ID’s are known). When receiving
a RREQ message the source is recorded with the previous hop ID, and the message re-
broadcast. At the sink the RREQ is sent back along the same route using the cached source
and previous hop ID at each node in the route, with each hop also storing the source of
the RREP and the ID of the hop ID.
All AODV implementations use the same method of route discovery, however imple-
mentations differ in their handling of both the timeout and route error cases. In some
implementations if a route has not been used for a set period of time it is removed from
the routing table, some other implementations however do not use a timeout and instead
use an evicted policy where the least recently used route is evicted from the routing table
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should a new route need to be established and the table is full. Other variations exist
whereby routes are never evicted, instead waiting for an error to occur on one of the hops
before attempting recovery. Some implementations attempt local repair using a localised
broadcast [110], returning a route error (RERR) if the repair fails, whereas other imple-
mentations return the RERR immediately [77].
2.3.3 Static Protocols
Whilst Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) protocols are strictly MAC level protocols,
they are typically used with a different set of routing layer protocols, and therefore are
both described in this section. TDMA protocols use the concept of a superframe, which
is a periodic schedule split into a number of slots, with each slot defining which devices
are allowed to transmit at that point in time. As a strict transmission schedule is defined
collisions between devices in the network are mitigated, with the behaviour of the network
being strictly defined. Whilst such approaches can remove intra-network interference,
external interference may still exist, and as such a device may still fail to transmit in its
allocated time slot. Initially this scheme looks like only one node can transmit within
the entire network at one time, however some protocols may allow multiple nodes to be
assigned to the same time slot which, should the nodes be sufficiently spaced apart within
the network topology, should not interfere with others.
There are a number of TDMA protocols that could be analysed, however we will only
analyse WirelessHART in the interests of conciseness as it is the industry De-Facto TDMA
approach. Whilst WirelessHART [140] uses the same concepts as standard TDMA schemes,
with superframes being split into 10ms transmission slots, it also allows more freedom when
specifying the schedules of the devices in the network. Primarily the number of superframes
can be greater than one, allowing different superframes to co-exist for different purposes.
Another enhancement that WirelessHART introduces is the concept of each slot having an
associated channel, allowing network schedules to implement channel hopping. Finally the
method used to populate the schedules is left undefined, allowing the network managers
to schedule communications as desired [78]. This allows for tree-based communications to
be scheduled easily, or any other approach.
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2.3.4 Summary
There are a much wider variety of routing protocols within WSNs [4], including combina-
tions of existing protocols [27], and frameworks to support multiple routing protocols [117].
This section has reviewed a number of the more common protocols, and from this review
AODV has shown itself to be the most suitable solution for the broad array of applications
that this thesis targets, and therefore will be used within this thesis. This suitability is due
to its good average-case performance [98, 152] and minimal management overhead when
compared to static routing topologies or TDMA-based approaches [21].
2.4 Deployments
Wireless sensor networks have been used in a large number of different scenarios, with the
majority of deployments being monitoring applications without the inclusion of actuators,
serving as purely information systems. This section will categorise these applications,
firstly into event driven systems where the devices only inform the sink when an event
has been detected from the sensor readings, and secondly into periodic systems where the
applications sense the environment and report it to the sink at regular intervals.
2.4.1 Event Driven
The first class of systems to be reviewed are event driven systems. These systems typically
monitor the environment waiting for a specific external event to occur, detected through
some form of classification on the device itself or a cluster head in cluster based systems.
Once an event has been detected the sink is informed, typically consisting of just the event,
or in some cases including the data that caused the event to occur [104]. These offer higher
power savings than periodic systems, and with the inclusion of hardware support to wake
on events [53], power can be reduced further.
Events may be generated in a variety of ways within the WSN mote. These could
be raised directly due to some external event such as a PIR sensor sending a "detected
movement" signal to the mote, or they may be the product of more complicated processing
of raw data. Processing of the raw data can be performed using a variety of methods which
can be viewed as having some model from input signals to event classifications [34]. In the
basic case this could be simple thresholding of data, where the data being over a set value
indicates the raising of an event. More complicated models may also be used, taking into
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account time, multiple signals, and other factors, These complicated models may cause less
false positives for the same level of accuracy, however they introduce the issue of creating
and updating the internal models on the devices. Some specific examples are discussed in
greater detail below.
Solutions such as CollECT [132] perform event detection through the use of multiple
types of sensors in a distributed and heterogeneous network. CollECT aims to locate the
source of the event through triangulation with other sensors, and continues to track the
event as it moves. To do so it assumes that the location of all devices is known, and
therefore can be used to compute the location of the event. Unfortunately evaluation was
performed within a custom simulator, with no regard to anything beneath the application
layer such as routing, making analysis limited, since factors such as collisions and timeliness
are omitted.
Application-specific event monitoring applications have been proposed, such as auto-
matic monitoring of car parking [76]. SPARK [141] is one of the approaches that use real
WSN devices within a car park test bed. In this application car parking spaces are mon-
itored for occupancy using light sensors, with the occupancy information being used to
direct new cars to free spaces. Whilst this application was performed on a small test bed it
demonstrates that useful information can be derived from small numbers of event-detecting
devices. Further tests have been performed by Lee et al [76] using range sensors to detect
vehicles entering and leaving a multi-storey car park. As with the previous example event
information is only sent once a car is detected, dramatically reducing the amount of radio
traffic considering the high sample rate of the sensor which would require a message being
sent every few seconds.
Other methods may change modes depending on events being detected. Mercury [87]
identifies that the rate of data from sensors can be read faster than they can be transmitted
to the sink. For this reason the Mercury protocol has a classifier on-device to assess the
readings, reporting events to the sink should they occur. An additional feature of Mercury
is the ranking of sensor data, with only data of high interest being sent to the sink to
conserve power. This identifies that there may be some situations where the application
may change what is reported to the sink depending on the apparent utility of the data and
the current operating conditions.
There are also additional methods that may be used to control the flow of data within
the WSN to decrease power consumption. Simple methods may indiscriminately remove
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parts of the data, such as down-sampling performed by removing every Xth reading. This
is the most basic approach, however depending on the application it may also be degrading
the quality of the data, especially where the data contain features of interest that only occur
for a small number of samples. Other more complex schemes may attempt to compress the
data, either through lossless or lossy schemes [136]. Lossless schemes involve using more
efficient encodings of the raw data, I.e. compression algorithms such as Lempel-Ziv-Welch
(LZW) and derivatives [50].
2.4.2 Periodic
There are a number of applications where periodic sampling of the environment is per-
formed, with the raw information being relayed back to the sink. Raw data may be useful
in a number of scenarios: when cross-correlation with other devices is required; analysis
of the data is computationally expensive to perform on the devices themselves; or off-line
analysis is to be performed.
One popular example of this periodic reporting is in structural health-monitoring, due
to the lack of infrastructure required to deploy a network. This monitoring typically uses
microelectromechanical sensors (MEMS) to detect vibrations in the structure being mon-
itored, with the readings being sent to the sink for analysis. The sample rates of these
sensors can vary from 100Hz up to the kHz range [39, 89], indicating a large variation in
the amount of data that may be relayed to the sink. Other typical periodic systems can be
found within assisted living scenarios [53,155], where a number of factors such as motion,
location, and vital signs may be monitored, with single sensors undertaking multiple roles
depending on their location. There are also a large number of opportunities within the
agriculture and food industries [128,145,158], where applications such as monitoring green-
houses, animals, and food, can all benefit from the low installation costs due to the lack of
required wiring. Finally any traditional scientific monitoring use cases such as monitoring
glacier movements [108] also show promise for WSNs due to the higher number of readings
that can be collected compared to manual measurement.
Due to the large amount of data periodic sampling provides there are a number of
approaches that can be used to reduce the volume of data within the network, and thus
increase the lifetime of the network. These can either either be simple approaches which aim
to reduce the amount of data by dropping "less important" data, or in-network aggregation
or processing of data. Simple rate-limiting can be implemented by ranking the incoming
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data and then prioritising the delivery of the data based upon this ranking [94]. This
requires that some metric of data importance is used, which may be difficult depending on
the use of the data. In-network aggregation and processing requires that the data must be
exposed to the application layer at each hop, with the application performing some actions
upon the data before forwarding to data to the next hop in the network. One method
that supports automated aggregation of data is Maximum Lifetime Data Aggregation
algorithm [66] (MLDA), where queries are constructed and broadcast across the network.
Based upon the type of query and the routing topology, specific operators can be processed
as the data moves towards the sink. An example of such operators are MAX and SUM,
where it is trivial for a routing node with a number of messages to aggregate these into
one message. More complex schemes can also be used, for example if an application must
detect an event based upon the data from a number of nodes, once the data being sent
from the nodes to the sink has can be used to make a decision, the raw data can be dropped
and the event message substituted for the rest of the hops [68].
Where lossy data compression is used there is an explicit trade-off between the quality of
the data and the lifetime of the network, leading to a clear accuracy-dependability trade-off.
This work focuses on improvements to dependability with no information on the contents
of the application data, instead focussing on delivering the data in a timely manner whilst
improving network lifetime. This however does not reject in-network data aggregation, as
a reduction in the network traffic allows DDC to reduce the power consumption further,
making data aggregation a complementary approach to this work.
2.5 Dependability of WSNs
Within the WSN literature there have been a large number of works which look at the
reliability of WSNs, specifically the communications between devices. To mitigate commu-
nications issues various mechanisms have been used, such as coordination between nodes
to identify and avoid faulty nodes, and channel hopping to avoid specific sources of inter-
ference. The majority of these works focus on reacting to faults as they occur, however a
small subset of approaches use fault injection to simulate errors before they occur, taking
appropriate action to reduce the likelihood of network errors should a real error of the
same type occur [129].
The issue with these works is that focus is only given to a single type of failure, known
as failure modes, typically the case where messages that were sent are not received (omis-
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sion) [8]. There are however a number of other failures that could occur, with current
works selecting a subset of possible failures [30, 130], however systematic analysis should
be performed to ensure that all failure modes have been accounted for [88].
2.5.1 Failures, Hazards, and Dependability
Historically Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) [114] provided a systematic method
for performing failure analysis. This is done by analysing the target system to identify the
various failure modes, which in turn are used to identify the associated causes and effects.
These causes can then be addressed to ensure that the chance of their occurrence is as
low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) [97]. ALARP acknowledges that the complete
removal of a specific failure mode is extremely difficult, instead the chance of the failure
mode occurring should be reduced such that it is either of lower probability of occurring
than some other equally damaging failure mode (which can be analysed using fault trees),
or it has been reduced such that it is highly unlikely to occur. FMEA however provides
little guidance on the discovery of failure modes, and therefore a process called hazard
and operability study (HAZOP) can be performed under certain circumstances to aid in
the identification of failure modes [35]. HAZOP requires the decomposition of the target
system into a set of distinct subsystems or functions, which are then analysed for deviations
from their normal behaviour using a set of keywords such as More, Less, Part of, Reverse.
The effects of the deviations are recorded and any hazardous states are identified to be
reasoned about in terms of probability of occurrence, or methods of mitigation. Whilst
this approach provides more guidance than FMEA, its application to the software domain
still requires guidance. For this reason Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution in Design
(SHARD) was developed to provide a systematic approach, not only to the application of
a HAZOP approach to the software domain, but to analyse the results and suggest actions
to rectify the identified faults [96]. HAZOP requires that the system be decomposed into
a number of individual components connected with flows of information. These flows can
then be analysed by applying a set of keywords such as Omission, Commission, Early, Late,
to obtain the possible failures to be analysed further.
Whilst HAZOP ensures that suitable exploration of the failures modes is performed, it
typically only concerns the reliability and availability of the network. To encompass relia-
bility, including other factors that are deemed by some to make a system reliable, Avizienis
chose the term dependability to serve as the encompassing term [12]. By using the term
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‘reliability’ the vague limits of traditional ‘reliability’ can be categorised. Dependability is
defined by the following dependability attributes.
• Availability - Readiness for correct service
• Reliability - Continuity of correct service
• Safety - Absence of catastrophic consequences on the users and the environment
• Integrity - Absence of improper system alteration
• Maintenance - Ability for a process to undergo modifications and repairs
The items that can affect the dependability of the system are as follows:
• Faults are the defects that can occur within the system. Faults may not lead to
failures, however this would depend upon how the faulty part of the system is used
and the way in which is it used.
• Errors are differences between the intended behaviour of the system and its current
behaviour and they occur due to faults. Errors, much like faults, may not cause
failures, as the error could be detected and corrected before it had a chance to
propagate into a failure.
• Failures are when the system exhibits external behaviour which is different to that
originally intended, and can be caused by unhandled errors within the system.
To reduce the chance of failures there are four methods that can be used to increase the
dependability of a system, these are as follows: Prevention, Removal, Forecasting, and
Tolerance.
At the time of writing there is limited literature on dependability with respect to wire-
less sensor networks, with many works focusing on small subsets of availability and relia-
bility. These works are categorized into three sections, health-monitoring, fault injection,
and power conservation, and are summarised in the following sections.
2.5.2 Availability & Reliability - Health-Monitoring
With most of the literature it is assumed that node replacements cannot be performed, and
so once a node dies, the service that it provides is permanently lost. In some circumstances
knowing when the system has degraded beyond being useful is an important factor, as the
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system can no longer be relied upon, leading to the requirement for health-monitoring of
WSNs. In some circumstances however it may be possible to replace nodes once they have
failed, either by repairing the node (replacement of batteries or hardware), or the equivalent
by deploying another fully functional node at the same location. This replacement of nodes
is referred to as maintenance and also requires that the current state of the network can
be measured using health-monitoring.
2.5.2.1 Heartbeat
Heartbeat [3] (HB) is one of the most basic forms of health-monitoring systems. The main
component behind HB is the periodic broadcast from a node to its neighbours, informing
them that it is still operational (a heartbeat message). When a heartbeat is detected by
a neighboring node it is recorded with the current time as a watched neighbour. If the
neighbour is already present then the time is simply updated. Periodically all the records
are checked to ensure that no neighbour has failed to be detected, and if so, an alert is sent
to the sink node with the ID of the node in question. This method ensures that no ahead-
of-time information is required about the positioning of neighbours, with the broadcasts
being single-hop so as to minimise network traffic. The timeout for the heartbeat can also
be set to greater than twice the sending period of the heartbeats to provide tolerance to
network fluctuations, however this is not analysed within this paper. Not only does this
method check that a node is still powered, but also that the communication links remain
stable, with an alert being raised if this is not the case.
2.5.2.2 Run-time Assurance
Run-time Assurance (RTA) [163] is one of the first works that looks at ensuring the avail-
ability of the application, as opposed to ensuring the availability of all devices and com-
munication links. The authors note that in the vast majority of cases a number of failures
may be permitted as long as the overall application can continue to provide service. The
example provided is that of a fire detection system, where the temperature is used to de-
tect fires within a building. In this example should there be multiple nodes within a room
then failures can be tolerated until no nodes are operating within the room, leaving fires
undetected.
To detect when the application fails to meet its requirements RTA first requires that
the application is modelled using a Sensor Network Event Description Language (SNEDL)
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diagram. This diagram models the data flow between devices, capturing the dependencies
between readings [63]. Using this model the application is automatically analyzed, pro-
ducing a series of online tests which must be periodically performed. These tests ensure
that the data flows captured in the model are still achievable, and when they are not an
alert is raised. RTA ensures that only the minimal number of tests to meet the application
requirements are performed, reducing unnecessary overheads.
In effect this system runs simulations of the application, and upon the failure of a
simulation, an alert is raised. This system however only raises alerts once the system has
failed, unlike HB which informs the user when the system has degraded, and therefore
requires that maintenance to solve the failure is undertaken in order to quickly minimise
the time-at-risk.
2.5.3 Fault Injection
There have been a number of works that use fault injection to check if the network can
tolerate specific types of failure [8]. These works aim to simulate a specific failure case and
check if the networks’ normal operations are disrupted by the injected failures. Unlike RTA,
which generates failures from a model of the system, many of these works are developed to
target a specific failure case [112]. Whilst this makes the approaches application-specific
it does however allow degradation in service to be measured, allowing maintenance to be
requested before failure of the system occurs.
These approaches provide an attractive way to measure the degradation of the system,
however the features to test are not derived in a systematic manner such as that used by
RTA to devise its tests. For this reason it may be prudent to use fault injection as a method
to ensure any dependability requirements are met at run-time, and to take preventative
action before the system fails.
2.5.4 Availability & Reliability - Power Conservation
In addition to monitoring the availability of the network, the overall reliability of the sys-
tem can be increased by decreasing the power consumption of the network, and therefore
increasing the amount of time nodes can operate without power failure. Energy consump-
tion in WSNs has a large amount of literature due to the increase in power consumption
growing faster than the available battery power, the so called “battery gap” [73]. The
majority of works to date have focused on power savings at the MAC and Routing levels
48
2.5 Dependability of WSNs
of the network stack. As this field is under heavy active research, and has a number of
de-facto solutions such as ContikiMAC and AODV / RPL, and with active research into
power reduction at the lower levels, for example varying transmission power [123], it has
been decided to focus on the conservation of power at the application level.
The application level can only save power by reducing the number of messages that
it requests to be sent, and therefore requires that it can interpret the application data
to realise appropriate power saving techniques whilst ensuring that the application can
continue to operate uninterrupted. An example of this would be data compression, where
the application has been analysed to deduce that only the maximum value of all sensor
readings is important for the application. Using this example each node on the route from
the sources to the sink could relay only the maximal value from all child nodes, reducing
the number of messages sent whilst ensuring the application operates as intended. Further
data reduction examples can be found in Section 2.4.2. Another factor that can be used
at this level is the timing requirements for messages to reach the sink, as higher latency
tolerances allow for data to remain in-network for longer, possibly allowing higher levels
of data compression to be achieved.
In addition to power conservation there are also a number of additional techniques that
may be used to scavenge energy from the surrounding environment, commonly referred to
as energy harvesting [61]. These techniques range from using solar panels to obtain power,
even within indoor environments, to harvesting power from vibrations in the surrounding
environment. These typically only provide a small amount of power and therefore are
unsuitable when communications are frequently required.
2.5.5 Safety, Integrity, and Maintenance
Whilst other works exist on factors such as integrity, the two factors with little literature
are safety and maintenance. Safety focuses on the safety of humans, specifically how the
WSN may directly harm humans. The core WSN devices are safe, due to their low power
and lack of actuators. In some circumstances the data provided by the WSN may be used
in safety related scenarios, however in these cases the WSN itself cannot harm humans,
instead it is inappropriate reliance on the WSN data that is the concern. The only way a
WSN can cause direct harm is with the inclusion of actuators, for example controlling high
power loads, operating machinery, or other such scenarios. Within this thesis it is assumed
that the WSN is only used to gather information and therefore does not have any physical
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actuators which could harm humans, and therefore safety is not a concern for this work.
The other attribute that is commonly omitted is Maintenance, with the common view
that once the WSN has been deployed the network is fixed, and will continue operating
until power is exhausted. This work assumes that this is not the case, as more nodes can
be deployed inexpensively, and in some circumstances the replacement of batteries within
devices, as long as it is not too frequent, is acceptable. Where the data produced by the
network is used in a safety-related context the use of the data is safety relevant, however
the network itself is still not safety relevant as it cannot directly cause harm.
2.6 Reactivity
Wireless sensor networks are deeply affected by their surrounding environment due to
a number of external factors such as communications interference, changes in topology,
and even temperature (which can affect battery performance). For this reason a number of
applications require that WSNs react to the changes in their environment in order to handle
these fluctuations, whilst ensuring that these reactions are stable (free from oscillations),
so that battery power can be conserved. A number of approaches aim to analyse these
factors before the deployment of the network, using simulations to assess the robustness of
the network to possible environmental changes, to optimise the deployment of WSN nodes.
These can involve genetic algorithms [46, 74], simulated annealing [16, 137], reinforcement
learning [131], and other search-based methods. As these approaches require candidate
solutions to be evaluated, simulations are required, which are computationally expensive
to perform on-line.
As battery power is an issue, a method needs to be used that can rapidly decide what
action to take in a specific situation. For example if packets are taking longer to reach the
sink than desired, how should some internal variable such as transmission rate be modi-
fied? Simple conditional control with predefined rules leads to undesirable oscillations, and
therefore an approach that reduces the change in a variable as the output gets closer to the
desired value is required. These approaches can be summarised by proportional, integral,
differential (PID) controllers which can be configured to provide the same behaviour and
can be further configured to provide additional control. More advanced techniques may
use learning-based protocols to either classify values into discrete groups, or to provide
continuous output values. Whilst there are many approaches that may be used, we will
focus on two distinct methods, PID loops and neural networks (NNs).
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2.6.1 Control Theory - PID Loops
PID loops are commonly used within industrial control systems as a method of closed-loop
control, a process where the output value of the process is used as an input to the control
loop, allowing the system to modify its behaviour until the output value is as desired [10].
PID loops operate on the principle of error to a target value, known as the setpoint. This
error is calculated as the difference between the input value and the setpoint, before being
used within the three internal components of the loop, in order to generate a new output
value. The three internal components are as follows:
Proportional The proportional component takes the error value, multiplies it by the P
component, and uses this value as the output. This component ensures that as errors
increase, the output value is varied such that the error should be decreased. As this
value has no internal state, and so is always at a fixed ratio of the input, it may
stabilise away from the desired setpoint, and therefore other components must also
be used.
Integral The integral component uses the input error and adds it to the cumulative error
over time. This cumulative error is then multiplied by the I component before being
sent as the output. This component ensures that whilst the output is not equal to the
setpoint, the output will be constantly varied so that it approaches the setpoint. Due
to the setpoint being the cumulative error any systems that do not have instantaneous
evaluation of the output may overshoot, due to the increase in pressure whilst the
setpoint has not been reached. The buildup of the integral value whilst the controller
is far from the desired setpoint is called windup [113]. Windup can be mitigated with
various techniques such as varying PID values, limiting the maximum accumulated
integral factor, and resetting the I component at specific points.
Derivative The derivative component is used to dampen the responsiveness of the PID
loop and operates by taking the error and subtracting it from the previous round to
compute the change in error. This change is multiplied by the D component before
being output. This ensures that a sudden change in the input does not create large
fluctuations in the output values, helping smooth the behaviour of the controller.
These three components are finally summed and output as the result of the PID loop for
the respective input value. The selection of appropriate P, I, and D values is a widely
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researched area [146], with a number of techniques ranging in complexity that are suitable
under different conditions. When simulations can be performed it has been shown that
search based methods for identifying good PID values can be used [47,120], however when
compared to traditional tuning methods these take substantially more time to compute.
Whilst there are more advanced methods of industrial control, such as model predictive
control, these methods typically produce worse results than a naive PID approach for
poorly understood models [19]. For this reason they will be omitted from this review.
2.6.2 Learning - NNs
In addition to reacting to network state it may be required to assess the current state
of an individual mote, or multiple motes, and take action based on the result. A simple
example of this would be location tracking of WSN devices based upon the known location
of a number of other WSN devices, as envisaged for the assisted living scenario. This
example requires a complex relationship between the messages that a node receives, the
strength of the signals, and the location of the current device [9]. Basic linear classification
could be performed to deduce a simple metric, however with a large amount of error in the
results [71]. A more accurate method is to use neural networks [124] as these algorithms
have the ability to approximate any smooth function between the input and output values,
given a suitable number of neurons [55]. In this example the input values would be the
RSSI messages sent from fixed-location nodes that have been received at the mobile node.
The output of the NN could either be a location, such as a room, or more precise values
such as coordinates.
For all learning-based algorithms an amount of training data is required to set up
the algorithms, with greater amounts of data typically yielding greater accuracy from the
algorithms. Not only is a large amount of data required, but training algorithms such as
neural networks requires a large amount of computational power, making training of these
algorithms expensive in terms of both memory space and computational power [161]. For
these reasons it is envisaged that readings will be reported to the sink, which as specified
earlier is typically a higher power device, which in turn can train the appropriate classifiers.
Once the classifiers have been trained the configuration values can be transmitted to the
leaf nodes allowing classification to be performed.
52
2.7 Time Synchronisation
2.7 Time Synchronisation
For a number of protocols time synchronisation is required, this may be either global
time [95], or a relative point in time common to a subset of devices [72]. Global time
synchronisation requires that some definitive time source is defined as the reference start
time. These are commonly measured either from the start time of a specific node, or from
some external time source such as a networked sink node. The issue withWSNs is that there
can be large latencies with communication, making time synchronisation difficult [122].
Another issue is the clock drift between devices due to the small manufacturing differences
between crystals on each device, in the extreme case leading to time differences of 54ms
every hours [153]. Other external factors such as power and temperature can also affect
the speed of the clock [48,167], however by much smaller margins than the original skew.
These differences can be compensated for by using clock skew compensation [138],
measuring the relative differences and then compensating accordingly. This method how-
ever only prolongs the time to become desynchronised, with periodic re-synchronisation
ultimately being required [143]. Depending on the complexity of the synchronisation algo-
rithm, times accurate down to the microsecond can be ensured between devices [40].
2.8 Operating Systems
To support development for these WSN microcontrollers there are a number of WSN
specific OSs that can be used. These OS’ have a strong focus on minimising the size in
both RAM and ROM of the OS to support the limited resources of the target architectures,
whilst also focusing on communications, and the ability to interface with other hardware
devices [45]. Within WSNs there are two commonly used operating systems which will be
described in detail.
2.8.1 TinyOS
TinyOS [54] is an operating system developed in 2000, with a kernel which fits into 400 bytes
of program space, and uses a variation of C called NesC to provide a modular approach
to constructing applications. TinyOS provides a large number of components, which must
be explicitly used by the end user’s application, with interfaces between these components
being connected together (‘wired’ in NesC terms) to achieve the desired behaviour. These
connections provide the links between events which may occur, such as timers being fired
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or message receive events, and the logic to process these events. This abstraction into
components, along with the supporting NesC language allows the resulting binaries to
be as small as possible in both code space and data space, as unused components can
be omitted from the build unlike alternative operating systems [80]. TinyOS comes with
support for a large number of common WSN platforms like Shimmer, TelosB and MicaZ
devices, however it lacks support for newer devices such as the ARM-based OpenMote-
CC2538. TinyOS also includes a number of common WSN MAC and routing protocols,
such as LPL at the MAC level and DSDV, AODV, Directed Diffusion, and more for the
routing protocols [81].
2.8.2 Contiki
Contiki [37] is another popular operating system used for mote-class devices which was
released in 2002, with the core kernel taking 810 bytes of program space. Contiki differs
from TinyOS in that standard C is used for programming the devices, lowering the learning
curve required to begin using the platform [142]. Contiki uses the notion of protothreads
which encapsulates the ideas of both multithreading and events. Multiple Applications
can be defined, each of which is waiting on a set of events. When an event which is being
waited upon occurs, one of the tasks waiting on the event is executed until it either returns
to wait on events, or it actively yields, at which point the next waiting task, if any, is
executed. Should a task have yielded instead of waiting on an event, it is repeatedly called
in a round-robin manner with any other yielded tasks until all tasks wait upon an event. In
this way cooperative multischeduling can occur, without the overheads of preemption [38].
Contiki also supports a large number of devices, like TinyOS, however it also has
support for more recent WSN platforms like the ARM-Based CC2538. In addition to the
large number of supported devices, Contiki also supports a variety of MAC protocols such
as ContikiMAC, X-MAC, LPP, in addition to a number of Routing protocols such as Rime-
Mesh (an AODV-like multihop protocol) and ContikiRPL [150] (IPv6 implementation).
For this work initial experiments will be conducted with TinyOS as there is existing
expertise with this OS, however later experiments will be conducted with Contiki in order to
use their implementation of the ContikiMAC protocol, and support of additional hardware
platforms.
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2.9 Simulators
There are a large variety of simulators that are either specifically developed for WSNs or
simulators that are used for traditional wireless networks which have been extended to
support WSNs. These can be summarised as follows [60].
Accurate simulators: These simulators aim to either simulate the internal workings of
the devices as accurately as possible, and or the communications as accurately as possi-
ble [156]. Accurate execution can be provided by emulating the physical hardware and
executing the actual binaries, or through targeted compilation of the original source code
to a simulation target . Accurate radio communication can be simulated through the use of
various radio-propagation models, which model the interactions between radio messages at
different strengths and phases to calculate the effective message received at the destination
node. These simulators tend to be computationally expensive and therefore only a limited
number of devices can be analysed in a reasonable time frame [160].
Fast simulators: Another class of simulators exist for analysing the large-scale prop-
erties of WSNs, such as emergent behaviour, and therefore require that large numbers
of devices can be simulated [170]. For this reason these simulators either abstract away
some of the execution logic and/or simplify the radio communications model to reduce the
computational complexity, allowing more devices to be simulated. A selection of the most
popular simulators is presented below.
2.9.1 NS-2 & NS-3
Network Simulator 2 (NS-2) was traditionally developed to simulate wired networks, with
the first release being in 1996, with the later support of 802.11 and 802.15.4 [166]. This
simulator provides an event-based programming environment using a combination of TCL
and C++ and is specifically designed for communications research. This focus allows the
physical, MAC, Routing and application level to be defined as part of the simulation script,
providing the ability to easily swap layer implementations. As part of this simulator an
accurate two-ray-ground physical model is provided, which can be used in conjunction
with the 802.15.4 MAC and AODV / DSDV routing layers. As the simulator is relatively
old much documentation exists detailing how to set up experiments and how to analyse
the results. This simulator also provides the Network Animator (NAM) which allows the
simulation logs to be visualised. This allows rapid inspection of overall network behaviour,
allowing easy identification and diagnosis of dropped packets.
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2.9.2 TOSSIM
TinyOS has an associated simulator called TOSSIM [79] which allows TinyOS applications
to be compiled for the simulated MicaZ platform. This compilation replaces some of
the TinyOS components, such as the clock, with simulator implementations allowing the
majority of the application to remain unchanged. Within TOSSIM the radio model is
relatively simplistic and has two modes, simple and lossy. Simple radio assumes that the
the radio PHY can be modelled as a logical OR of all signals within range, with lossy
communications modelling the network as a graph, with edges between nodes containing
a packet success rate. As with NS-2, simulations are controlled with scripts, in this case
written in Python or C++, which allows the simulation to be controlled including the
connectivity graph, injecting messages, and physical device interaction.
2.9.3 Cooja
The default installation of Contiki comes with its own simulator called Cooja [107] which
is intended to be used for evaluating WSN applications. Cooja is a graphically controlled
simulator (with some limited support for non-gui scripting) which allows the simulation
to be easily set up and configured. The logic of the devices cannot be abstracted to the
same levels as provided in NS-2, instead the program must be written either within Contiki
and compiled for the simulation target, or a binary provided for the real WSN hardware,
for example a TelosB binary. When the target is the Cooja simulator an instance of the
binary is created for each of the nodes, with the simulator receiving or sending events to
the instance depending on the appropriate radio traffic. In the case of a TelosB binary
MPSIM is used to emulate the WSN processor, with the WSN radio being emulated as a
simple state machine which in turn sends and receives data over the Cooja PHY layer [41].
The Cooja target ensures that the logic of the program remains the same on both the
simulator and the physical devices, where the TelosB binaries also ensure that any target
specific issues, such as overflow conditions, remain consistent in both the simulator and the
physical devices. A number of PHY models are supported, such as the detailed two-ray-
ground model, allowing the computational complexity of the simulation to be controlled
as in NS-2.
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2.10 Summary
The literature review has identified that WSNs are being considered for a variety of ap-
plications, however the issue of reliability is an ongoing concern. By viewing reliability as
one component of dependability and analysing the remaining dependability attributes it
has been identified that there is a lack of research into dependability within WSNs. When
assessing the dependability attributes it can be seen that Safety, Integrity and Maintenance
have minimal levels of literature in WSNs. Current works focus on Availability and Relia-
bility, with this literature review identifying that there is a substantial amount of research
into power saving within wireless sensor networks. These power savings are through many
levels of the network stack, with the majority of works focusing on the lower MAC and
Routing levels. There has been some level of work at the Application level, however there
have only been minimal works looking into using application’s soft real-time requirements
to realise further power savings.
This thesis proposes taking an application-centric view to WSNs, with an application
being defined in terms of both functional requirements and also timing requirements. By
using this specification of an application this thesis proposes the following objectives:
Obj 1 - From an application-specification, a systematic method for ensuring the depend-
ability of a specific WSN application should be derived. As the environment is
dynamic and the devices themselves vary in performance over time, a method for
monitoring dependability throughout the runtime of the system should also be
defined.
Obj 2 - From the same application-specification, a protocol should be defined for improv-
ing the power savings of the WSN by taking an application-centric view of the
network. This protocol should work with the current state-of-the art in MAC and
Routing level protocols to ensure that savings are in addition to that provided by
these protocols.
Obj 3 - To ensure that the previous objectives can be met not only for a particular
application-specification, but for applications which may change their timing re-
quirements at run-time in response to changes in the environment. This should
also support the coexistence of multiple applications within the same network,
each with possible variances in timing requirements.
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As identified within the literature, there are many ways in which a WSN may fail due
to a large number of possible factors which include external interference, environmental
conditions such as temperature, or actions undertaken by external actors. These failures
are difficult to predict off-line, with any such prediction being extremely pessimistic due
to the inherent variability in the environment. To allow reliance on the information pro-
vided by these networks, online monitoring of the network must take place to identify and
report, within reason, all possible forms of failure so that appropriate corrective actions
can be taken. Not only must failures be detected, but also replacement of devices must be
considered. All these issues are covered in the topic of Dependability, and therefore the
Dependability of the WSN will be analysed.
3.1 Overview
As identified within the literature review there is minimal literature on analysis of WSN
applications with respect to Dependability. The vast amount of literature focuses on pro-
viding generic solutions to availability and reliability that can support a wide variety
of applications. Objective 1 of the literature review states that through the use of an
application-specification which defines the functional specification in addition to the tim-
ing requirements of the application, focused analysis of the dependability of the application
should be performed. Once this analysis has been performed, Objective 1 states that a
method for ensuring that the dependability is met at run-time should be derived.
It is proposed that to ensure maximum coverage of possible failures, a systematic
approach to analysing the dependability of the application is undertaken. This need for a
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systematic approach is evident from the literature, as the few works which are relevant to
dependability typically select only a single aspect of dependability upon which to focus.
From the literature objective, in combination with the need for a method which ensures a
good coverage of possible failures, the goals for this chapter are as follows.
DaObj 1 - Demonstrate a methodology for systematically analysing an application from
its functional and timing requirements in order to derive a number of depend-
ability requirements that must be met at run-time to ensure the application is
dependable.
DaObj 2 - Demonstrate a method for transforming the run-time requirements into a num-
ber of tests which must be constantly evaluated at run-time, to ensure that
the application is dependable even in the presence of changing environmental
factors.
DaObj 3 - Ensure that the run-time tests do not adversely affect the performance of the
network in terms of both network efficiency and power.
To perform the analysis this chapter will define a methodology for analysing applica-
tions which can be applied to a large variety of scenarios. This analysis can be used to
systematically derive a number of requirements that must be checked at run-time to en-
sure that the dependability of the application is being met. The second half of this chapter
will then follow this methodology and perform the analysis upon an example application,
showing the derivation of the run-time requirements, leading to a worked example running
on both simulation and physical platforms.
The target applications for this chapter are multiple source - single sink scenarios, as
these represent the most common form of WSN deployment. Whilst this chapter focuses
on this specific type of application, the methodology is generic enough to support other
types of scenario. Secondly this chapter assumes that the application is event-triggered,
and therefore does not send any data until an event of the specified type is identified.
Similarly the methodology is not restricted to this type of application, as streaming-based
applications which constantly report readings to the sink can be visualised as similar to
event-triggered deployments when events are being simulated.
Dependability assurance will however only ensure that the application requirements
can be met, or that a failure to meet these requirements can be successfully detected (in
effect ensuring the system never fails-silent). Whilst DA shall ensure that the failures can
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be detected, it is not required to provide enough information to diagnose the cause of
the fault, which would require extra messages to be generated and cooperation between
devices to take appropriate action. As failure identification is a related, but separate topic
it will not be covered within this work, however further work may investigate extensions
to support failure identification.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 Problem Definition
As the application in question is being evaluated with regards to dependability, it is impor-
tant to address the individual dependability attributes, which are Availability, Reliability,
Safety, Integrity, and Maintenance. To reduce the complexity of the problem, the devices
being considered are assumed to be safe. This is firstly because they have no physical
actuators and thus cannot affect the external environment in which they operate, elimi-
nating the possibility of catastrophic consequences occurring as a direct consequence of the
devices themselves. Secondly, the motes will be certified to the appropriate safety stan-
dards to ensure that they themselves cannot unintentionally cause harm. To further reduce
complexity, it is assumed that radio communication integrity will be handled separately by
other layers of the protocol stack such as the MAC layer, thereby simplifying the analysis
to either successful or failed communication. This simplification is reasonable, as there is
currently extensive active research in this area, with much work focusing on routing and
MAC layer approaches. Finally, the integrity of the network will be assumed to be handled
by other approaches as failures due to malicious activity are another active research topic.
This reduces the analysis to consideration of only the remaining three attributes, Avail-
ability, Reliability, and Maintainability. As these remaining attributes depend on the spe-
cific application they must be systematically analysed to derive the safety requirements
that the resulting system must meet in order to be deemed dependable. In the case of DA
the safety requirements do not only cover the safety of the system, but the dependabil-
ity of the system. The term safety requirements has been kept to be consistent with the
literature.
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3.2.2 Deriving Safety Requirements
The first stage of Dependability Assurance (DA) is to identify, in a systematic manner,
what parts of the application need monitoring in order to identify failures and schedule
Maintenance accordingly. As identified within the literature review Section 2.5.1 there are
a number of existing techniques that can be used to systematically analyse software, with
the most suitable being Software Analysis and Resolution in Design (SHARD). As SHARD
is being used the application must be decomposed into a number of communicating compo-
nents, with an information flow connecting each component. As DA is not evaluating the
software within each WSN, but the interactions between the software and the surrounding
devices or actors (i.e. the operators of the network or the people being monitored), the
smallest level of decomposition is the individual WSN, Sensor, or Actor. In this scenario
the information flows are the exchange of data between nodes, any exchange between the
nodes and external sensors, and exchange between a node and an actor (the network op-
erators in this case). Once this decomposition has occurred the SHARD process can be
applied. An outline of the SHARD process is given in Figure 3.1. As part of this process
the application designer applies a set of ‘guidewords’ to each individual information flow
between the individual components of the software, in order to analyse possible deviations
from the intended behaviour of the application. Should any of these behaviours be unsat-
isfactory, these are noted as part of the SHARD process, and are known as hazards. The
guidewords to apply as part of the process are given in Table 3.1. From these hazards, de-
cisions can be made as to the potential disruptions to the application and the requirements
that must be met to ensure that this hazard is unlikely to occur. These requirements are
called derived safety requirements (DSRs), and are necessary to ensure correct operation
of the application. [121].
Guideword Effect Example Cause
Omission No Data Battery Failure
Commission Extra Data Frequent External Stimulus
Early Sent Early Incorrect Time Synchronisation
Late Sending Delayed In-Network Delays
Value Subtle Incorrect Data is slightly incorrect Sensor ADC Drift
Value Coarse Incorrect Data is largely incorrect Corruption of Data
Table 3.1: SHARD Guidewords
Figure 3.2 shows the proposed methodology for DA. Initially the system must be split
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Figure 3.1: SHARD Process
to form components connected by information flows. These information flows must then
be analysed using the SHARD keywords to generate a list of possible failure modes that
may occur between each pair of communicating components. These failure modes are then
turned into a number of safety requirements, the derived safety requirements (DSRs).
3.2.3 Defining Dependability Tests
Having generated a list of DSRs it must be ensured that they are met throughout the
operational lifetime of the network. As identified earlier, however, the environment in
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Figure 3.2: Dependability Assurance Process
which they operate is highly dynamic and thus oﬄine analysis does not ensure that these
requirements can be met. To ensure that the DSRs are met a number of Dependability
Tests (DTs) are derived to ensure the status of the DSR at run-time, with each DSR having
one associated DT. Each DT consists of two parts, a physical implementation which checks
the DSR at runtime, and a run-time test which aims to violate the DSR to ensure that any
such errors can be detected. Without the run-time test to violate the DSR no confidence
can be obtained that an error will be detected. One example would be a DSR specifying
that at no point should event X be detected. In this example the associated DT would be
some logic on the sink node which raises an error if event X is detected, and a corresponding
test which raises event X. As the DTs are specific to the individual DSRs, which in turn are
application-specific, no single solution exists for all DTs. For this reasons the assessment of
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the DTs may take many forms, such as assessing the quality of service provided, injecting
failures into the network, or halting specific communications to ascertain the system’s
responsiveness.
As identified within the literature review, there are a number of systems that can be
used to monitor the state of a WSN at run-time. These vary from basic health-monitoring
(HM) solutions to simulated applications (RTA). In addition to monitoring the application,
there are a number of approaches that inject faults into the network, however these are
typically performed on an ad-hoc basis. By injecting faults and monitoring the response
of the system, valuable dependability data can be collected, however its usefulness relies
on systematically identifying the correct failure modes. DA aims to use systematic fault
injection, together with simulated events, based on requirements derived from HAZOP.
By providing monitoring of a wide range of WSN failure modes, faults can be detected as
and when they occur and maintenance scheduled. This focus on Maintainability is the key
to maintaining the underlying Availability and Reliability of the network throughout the
application’s lifetime.
Once DTs have been defined for all DSRs these must be periodically executed on the
network to ensure the DSRs are being met. This periodic execution of tests however
represents wasted network resources, as battery power and bandwidth are consumed in
running the tests which could be used for supporting the primary application for a longer
period of time. To reduce these overheads the DTs are analysed to identify overlaps,
allowing these tests to be reduced into a single test, which covers multiple DSRs. This is
commonly the case with timing requirements, as a single message may be used to check
multiple timing requirements (i.e. messages that take no longer than X to arrive can be
checked on any existing data packets from the sink). Reductions can also be achieved
where the data required by a DT is already being supplied by the application within its
normal operation. This allows for the conditions of a DSR to be satisfied without the need
to request additional data from the network. Once a reduction of all the tests has occurred,
the final set of tests must be run to ensure the original DSRs are being met.
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3.3 Case Study
3.3.1 Dependability Assurance
To validate Dependability Assurance, an initial event detection system based upon static
devices around the home will be investigated. Having analysed a generic event detection
application, this will be refined in Section 3.3.2 where a fire detection system is considered.
3.3.1.1 HAZOP
Initially it is important to perform analysis of the proposed system, identifying the system
components that communicate, and then analysing these communication channels in a
systematic manner using HAZOP. Figure 3.3 shows a simplified view of the four main
components of the system and the communications between them: the sensors reporting
readings to the device; the device where readings are processed and analysed, possibly
sending event information to the sink; the base station where event readings are collected
and decisions to raise alerts are taken; and finally the operators who receive system alerts
and take appropriate action. These four components have three clear communication
channels to be analysed: readings from the sensors arriving at the mote; events sent from
the mote over the multi-hop network to the sink device; and alerts raised at the sink being
reported to the operators. It is important to note that the communications, whilst being
shown as a single hop, may be over multiple hops across the network.
Source Mote Sink Mote OperatorSensor
Figure 3.3: Simplified view of end-to-end WSN data flow.
SHARD
From Figure 3.3 the three communication channels are analysed using the SHARD
keywords identified earlier. The results are given for the sensor communication in Table
3.2, the radio communications in Table 3.3, and the operator communication in Table 3.4.
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It is important to note that this is not an assessment of how to prevent the devices failing,
as this is outside of the operators control, instead it analyses how failures may be detected
and what actions could be taken. Therefore any processes that improve the quality of the
components are outside the scope of this work.
Guide-
word
Meaning Hazard Mitigation
Omission Sensor fails to
report data
Event will go undetected Easily detectable by host device,
raise notification
Commis-
sion
Sensor is reporting
too much data
Possible overload of
receiving device
Easily detectable by host device,
disable sensor or call for urgent
maintenance
Early Data is sent from
the sensor before
required
Value may be out-of-date
when used
Re-request the data, compensate
for time differential
Late Data is sent from
the sensor after
required
Events may be detected
later than required
Raise alert, faulty sensor, requires
maintenance
Value
Subtle
Incorrect
Data is slightly
incorrect
Un-noticed if subtle, events
should still be detected
correctly
Generally undetectable
Value
Coarse
Incorrect
Data is largely
incorrect
Events may be falsely
detected (False Positive)
Replace faulty sensor
Table 3.2: SHARD Guide words applied to sensor readings
Guide-
word
Meaning Hazard Mitigation
Omission Radio fails to send
message
Event detected but
cannot be reported to
other devices
indistinguishable from lack of
events, periodic message to test
radio correctness
Commis-
sion
Device sends messages
even when no detected
event
Possible overload of
communications network
or receiver
Detectable, flag device as failed,
isolate if possible, call for
maintenance
Early Event is reported
before it is detected
Cannot occur (is
commission if event is
never detected)
N/A
Late Message reporting
event arrives late
Could be too late to
respond to event
Specify a maximum delay for
messages, check / enforce this at
run-time
Value
Subtle
Incorrect
Discrete Events,
cannot occur
N/A N/A
Value
Coarse
Incorrect
Discrete Events,
cannot occur
N/A N/A
Table 3.3: SHARD Guide words applied to communication between devices
The hazard and mitigation columns from the three tables are finally collated in Table
3.5 to provide a final list of safety requirements, which mitigate the possible hazards. These
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Guide-
word
Meaning Hazard Mitigation
Omission Base station fails to inform
operators despite receiving
the message
Event will go
undetected
Undetectable. Traditional
safety approaches to base
station software
Commis-
sion
Sensor is frequently reporting
false positives
Operators may
begin to ignore
some readings
Cross-check reported fires
between multiple devices in the
same location
Early Event is reported before it
occurs
Not possible N/A
Late Event is raised much later
than detected
Events may be
acted to later than
required
Delay would be on the base
station only, and thus unlikely.
Value
Subtle
Incorrect
Raised events when close to
threshold
Likely event is
about to occur
Acceptable
Value
Coarse
Incorrect
Incorrectly reported events
(False Positives)
Operators may
begin to ignore
some readings
Flag faulty nodes and disregard
messages
Table 3.4: SHARD Guide words applied to operator interactions
will be referred to as the derived safety requirements (DSRs).
Hazard Safety Requirement
Failure of nodes may lead to events occurring
without detection.
Events must be guaranteed to be detected as
long as Y nodes are operational.
Events are detected too late for the operators to
react accordingly.
The WSN must ensure that an event is reported
within X time.
Failed sensors may raise false events, reducing
the advantage provided by the WSN
Failed sensors must be reported to the operators
for maintenance.
Interference from external sources may raise false
events or cause events to go unreported.
The integrity of the messages must be
maintained throughout the WSN.
Failure of the system would cause no events to be
detected.
Failure of the WSN must be reported to the
operators so appropriate action can be taken.
Table 3.5: Derived Hazards and Safety Requirements
3.3.1.2 DSRs
DSR Description
1 Detect event when greater than Y nodes are operational
2 An event is reported within X seconds
3 Larger errors and implausible values from sensors are detected
4 Network is tolerant to anomalies
5 Monitoring failure is detected within W seconds
Table 3.6: Summary of DSRs
From these five DSRs the DA process in continued by producing five DTs, one for each
DSR.
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The first DT to be reduced is DT4. This tests that the network is tolerant to anomalies.
By making the assumption that the underlying stack will make a best-effort attempt to
send data to the destination and in the process perform checks on the integrity of the
data through the use of cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs), (as required to conform to the
802.15.4 specification), it is assumed that the communication will either succeed or fail.
With this assumption, successful communication has encountered no anomalies and failed
transmissions are not initially an issue as long as DT1 holds, that is, an event is detected
when there are greater than Y nodes available.
The second reduction is the coverage of DT2 by DT1 due to the realisation that the
timing of the event detection can be checked using the same data generated by the checks
for application correctness. These two reductions leave the application with three DTs that
must be checked at runtime as shown in Table 3.7. An overview of the process is given in
Figure 3.4.
Final Tests To
Be Checked
At Run-Time
HM &
RTA
Application
DSR3DSR2DSR1 DSR4 DSR5
DT3DT2DT1 DT5
DT3DT1 DT5
Test at
Run-Time
Safety Analysis
Requirements Re-
duction (DSR4 Han-
dled by MAC)
Test Reduction
(DSR2 Merged into
DSR1)
Figure 3.4: Overview of DA applied to the fire detection scenario
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DT Description
1 Detect event when greater than Y nodes are operational within X seconds
3 Larger errors and implausible values from sensors are detected
5 Monitoring failure is detected within W seconds
Table 3.7: Summary of reduced DTs
When these tests are being executed at run-time, a number of actions can be performed
based upon the DT that has failed. Figure 3.5 shows the combination of actions that may
occur and the resulting outcome.
3.3.2 Fire Detection
Initially, to validate Dependability Assurance, a fire detection system is envisaged based
upon the static devices around the home. A fire detection system has been chosen as it is
the same building fire detection application as proposed by Wu et al [163]. By choosing
the same application as proposed by Wu et al a direct comparison to Run-time Assurance
RTA can be performed under the same scenario. Another advantage is that the TelosB
motes used for the physical testing also contain a temperature sensor which avoids the
need to simulate real readings. As Section 3.3.1 describes a generic event detection system
a specific example must be chosen for the remainder of this chapter. In this case a fire
detection example has been chosen, with the event being a detected fire. The proposed
system consists of four rooms, with each room containing three nodes. To detect a fire,
each mote has a single temperature sensor, which records temperatures over a set threshold
(arbitrarily set to 100℃ in our trials) which then sends a fire alert to the sink node within
1 minute. If any fire alerts are raised on the sink node, then this is an indication of a fire
and the appropriate action taken, such as evacuating the building. From this definition,
we can see that Y is defined to be 1 and X is 1 minute. The value for W is not defined,
and therefore as 5 minutes has been deemed acceptable for the fire detection deadline, it
will also be used for this variable. To further appreciate how the DTs cover the original 5
DSRs, each DSR will be analysed in turn with direct reference to the fire detection system.
3.3.2.1 DSR1 - Detect event when greater than Y nodes are operational
This DSR is concerned with the standard operation of the fire detection system and states
that provided there is at least one node within a room then any fires should be detected.
This is performed though the use of DT1 which simulates fires within a room. It is
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Figure 3.5: Detected failures and the resultant actions
important that the sensor readings are simulated instead of merely injecting packets at
the radio layer to fully test the software on the motes themselves. To simulate fires as
accurately as possible the values returned by the sensor are intercepted, in order to return
values higher than our 100℃ threshold. To differentiate between real and simulated fires,
an additional sim flag is appended to all fire messages, real or simulated, to avoid any
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possible differentiation at lower network levels. This flag is simply set to the motes current
sim flag.
3.3.2.2 DSR2 - An event is reported within X seconds
The timeliness of fire detection is important and as such this DSR ensures that when a fire
has been detected it will be reported to the base station within 1 minute for our example.
This DSR would require generation of additional packets as the event-driven nature of our
application provides no data to measure, however as identified earlier DSR1 generates such
additional data that can be used. Therefore the only requirements for DT2 are that the
generated data contains the timestamp when the detection occurred and is enforced by
checking that this timestamp does not exceed the 1 minute deadline when it is received at
the sink node.
3.3.2.3 DSR3 - Larger errors and implausible values from sensors are detected
Within traditional embedded development devices can be designed to fail in a predictable
manner such as full-scale-deflection or may simply return random values. Full-scale deflec-
tion allows for simple detection of failed devices using a simple threshold mechanism. The
advantage of thresholding to detect failures are that failures returning random data will
also be detected by the same system. To check that this mode is indeed detected additional
messages are generated in the same manner as DT1 generates messages, instead returning
erroneous readings. Further checks are performed to detect stuck-at faults, as the preci-
sion of the temperature readings on our target hardware is very high, causing constant
fluctuations in the lowest precision of the readings. Should any sensor readings remain
exactly the same for over x seconds then this is identified as a stuck-at fault, and reported
as a DSR3 failure. Failures constantly returning plausible readings cannot be detected by
a single test and must instead be covered through cross-checking readings between devices
in the same spatial region. Care needs to be taken to understand the possible differential
that can be allowed between devices as a fire in one region of the room may cause a large
difference between motes in the same room. As this failure mode is unlikely we do not
check for this form of error.
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3.3.2.4 DSR4 - Network is tolerant to anomalies
This DSR is not tested for as it is assumed to be handled by other areas of the network stack
or to be detected as a different form of error. Modification of radio data from sources such
as external interference are assumed to be handled by the lower levels of the network stack
in the form of CRC checks with the resultant packet being dropped. Dropped packets, and
the blocking of transmitted packets by severe interference are handled in the same way,
they are detected by DT1 and detected as a DSR1 failure. The only difference between a
full mote failure, as handled by DSR1, and interference, is the possibility that interference
may be transient. For this reason when such motes become functional, they should be
noted as a caution on the operators console. Direct attack by an adversary is not handled
by this DSR as such attacks vary wildly and are a research field in their own right.
3.3.2.5 DSR5 - Monitoring failure is detected within W seconds
To detect complete failure of the monitoring system DSR5 must be checked through the
use of DT5. This DT is provided by checking that any DTs have been received at the
operators console in the last minute. Should no DTs arrive then a failure of DT5 is raised.
This DT does not generate data, but instead halts all other DTs for over a minute, catching
the DT5 failure, passing the test. This ensures that in the worst-case scenario where DT
messages are failing to be received, indicating possible total communications failure or
other wide-spread failures will be detected and appropriate action taken. Total failure
should never occur as maintenance should maintain a level of service for our scenario, but
if it was to occur then complete building evacuation would be a possible cause of action.
3.3.2.6 Failure Modes
From these DSRs there are a number of failures that can be detected as follows.
Permanent Failure DT1 detects when individual motes have failed, and as such perma-
nently failed motes will continue to raise an error until they are replaced. The cause
of the permanent failure is not revealed and as such could be due to power failure,
hardware failure or permanent communications failure.
Transient Failure Should a device which has failed a DT1 test successfully pass DT1
later in the systems execution, without being replaced, this is an indication of tran-
sient failures. These failures are commonly due to interference and could still cause
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a maintenance request if they become too severe.
Total Failure Total failure of the system can be detected by DT5, indicating that the
WSN can no longer function. This could be due to all devices failing (if no mainte-
nance has been performed), or by communications to the sink being blocked, Total
failure cannot be fixed easily and as such in our example the appropriate action would
be the evacuation of the building until the cause has been found.
In our example there is only one sink node from which the operators function. Ideally
there would be multiple sink nodes spatially separated around the network allowing for
communications failures around one of the sinks without a total failure being raised. These
spatially separated nodes would be hard-wired in terms of power but also for communica-
tions to assess the risk level in a specific room.
3.3.2.7 Time Synchronisation
As DTs need to be executed by all motes in the network at similar times, some form of time
synchronisation is necessary. Primarily DT5 requires that all messages be suppressed at
the same time. This time synchronisation does not need to be precise as it is only required
to allow tests to be scheduled within the same minute, and as such synchronisation to
within a second would be ample. To meet this requirement a variation on Cristian’s algo-
rithm is used to provide basic synchronisation between the devices, with nodes performing
synchronisation upon joining the network. When powering up, motes synchronise to the
base station mote’s time, which is set from the hard-wired device. Synchronisation is per-
formed on an iterative basis until the time difference between the new mote and the base
station is less than one second, which is deemed acceptable. The benefits of performing
such loose time synchronisation is given in Section 3.3.3.2, with no additional benefit being
provided by increasing the precision. As identified in the literature review Section 2.7 the
time within each mote is prone to drift due to manufacturing defects. For this reason time
synchronisation is repeated when the timestamps on received messages are more than 10s
different than the base node.
This algorithm relies on the notion of Round-Trip-Time (RTT), measured by sending a
packet to the source, which is then echoed back immediately. The time difference between
the packet being sent from the source, to the echo being received at the source is recorded
to calculate the RTT. This RTT is halved to naively calculate the uni-directional delay.
74
3.3 Case Study
When the base node replies to the source it also includes a timestamp for the source to
use as its local time, which is calculated as its current source time plus the uni-directional
delay. This algorithm is extended to include a final time acknowledgement from the source
device. This final acknowledgement is checked for accuracy by removing the stored uni-
directional delay, and should the value be outside of acceptable bounds, possibly due to
routing or MAC issues, the time synchronisation process is repeated.
This approach allows for devices which have been replaced, due to maintenance, to
directly request time synchronisation when they re-join the network, and is used for all work
within this thesis. Flooding-based time synchronisation algorithms could be used, however
these would require the new device to wait for the next time time-flood. Alternatively, if
devices are allowed to request time-floods, this could become expensive if many nodes are
replaced, or the network size is especially large.
3.3.3 Evaluation
In this evaluation we will check that the DTs that have been defined are enough to meet
the DSRs. This will involve both simulated tests and physical test where appropriate.
To ensure that the tests are performed fairly the base station logic was programmed for
interoperability between both the simulated motes and the physical motes.
For simulations NS-2 was chosen as it allows for larger-scale and faster simulations than
Cooja or Tossim, with some loss in fidelity. This scale and speed was required for two main
reasons. Primarily, speed is required for the long-duration tests of mote failures and mote
replacement, which requires simulations to run over many simulated months. Secondly
the scale was required to assess the theoretical limits to the number of motes that may
cause timing issues when many motes transmit in the same location. The intuition behind
timing issues with many motes in the same proximity is due to carrier sense causing larger
backoffs between motes, possibly causing our timing constraints to be invalidated. NS-2
was configured for a typical WSN application, with 802.15.4 as the MAC layer and the
in-built AODV used as the routing protocol. Physical testing was performed using TelosB
motes with TinyOS 2.1.1. TinyOS’s default MAC layer was used with NST-AODV as the
routing layer.
The layout for the simulated devices was a row of rooms, with each room being within
communication distance of the neighbouring rooms. The connectivity between rooms can
be seen in Figure 3.6, where the devices are WSN nodes and the dashed line represents
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Room 1 Room 3Room 2
Figure 3.6: Layout of nodes in the simulations.
the transmission distance of the nodes. There are four rooms, but one has been omitted
from the diagram for conciseness. For the physical experiments the closest to this layout
we could achieve is shown in Figure 3.7. In this image, the nodes are the same purple icon
as in the simulation layout. The transmission distances cannot be easily calculated and so
are not shown on this diagram. However, it was checked that nodes within each cluster
can communicate with the neighbouring clusters.
Both the simulated and the physical motes communicate to the same operator-console
software, through the use of co-simulation for NS-2 and through a serial bridge device for
the physical motes. This ensures that the management and detection of DTs is common
between all the experiments, improving consistency. All of the simulator code for the source
devices was written in Python, allowing automatic generation of data packet handling code
for the physical devices and requiring only the data processing stubs to be written in C.
The layout of the devices for both types of experiment will be covered in the appropriate
sections.
For the evaluation, comparison will be made between this solution and Heartbeat (HB)
and Run-time Assurance (RTA) which are representative of the two alternative approaches
to health-monitoring within WSNs. HB will be implemented as a simple periodic broadcast,
with the same frequency as the DA run tests. If any device receives a HB message, it simply
records the senders address, if it does not already exist, and then increments the received
HM message count from that mote. When a mote sends a HB message, it checks to see if
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Figure 3.7: Layout of nodes in the physical experiments.
any of its counts for neighbouring devices is 0, in which case the neighbour has failed to
send a message and is reported for maintenance. RTA is implemented by motes sending
a HM message to the sink device every HM period. When the base node receives a HM
message it looks up the room that the mote is assigned to and increments a counter for
that room. If the base motes HM period is reached and any room has a counter of 0, all
devices in the room are scheduled for maintenance.
3.3.3.1 DSR1
To test that failures can be successfully detected, maintenance requested and nodes repaired
in a timely manner, we will evaluate the fire detection system under both simulation and
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physical tests with motes failing at random. To generate failures of the devices, failure
times was picked from the survival function. The survival function, or reliability function,
returns the probability that a system will survive beyond a specific time given a mean
and variation. To generate a failure time the inverse survival function is used to map a
uniformly random real number between 0 and 1 to a specific time at which the WSN mote
will fail. It is important to pick the failure times from a distribution that is similar to
those experienced in real life, as the wrong distribution, such as uniform, will remove the
chance of any common failure times between devices, providing the most optimistic failure
distribution. By picking a low deviation, a pessimistic scenario is created where all devices
fail at similar times, which has been demonstrated to be the case when common factors
such as batteries are included. For this reason a pessimistic set of values is initially chosen,
with a mean of 30 days and a deviation of 3 days for the failures. HM is performed every
6 hours, with maintenance occurring every week.
The deployments were constructed so that four rooms, each containing three nodes,
could only communicate to neighbouring rooms. This was achieved in the simulator by
ensuring that each node of three devices were only in range of the neighbouring groups.
For the physical experiment, the connectivity of rooms was measured empirically before
selecting rooms that met these criteria. The selected rooms from within the building can
be seen in Figure 3.7. For the simulation, the base node was chosen to be in the end room,
whilst room CSE/123 was chosen for the physical test as it contained the base station
PC. All three of the health monitoring systems, HB, RTA, and DA, were configured to
ensure that all rooms are checked simultaneously at the specified HM period. This ensures
that all algorithms should provide the same level of coverage when all nodes are alive
in all the rooms, with no particular algorithm having an advantage by checking only a
subset of devices. The underlying routing and MAC algorithms also remains the same for
all three HM systems. In this section the relative performance of HB, RTA and DA is
dependant on the individual parameters such as the mean time between failures and the
monitoring period. The relationship between these parameters, the time at risk, and the
number of maintenance requests are studied in more detail within Figures 3.8-3.11 and the
accompanying descriptions.
The criteria used to measure the performance of each approach is as follows.
Number of Packets This is the performance criteria most commonly found within the
literature. Whilst it provides some emphasis on efficiency of the HM systems it
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does however have a side-effect, namely that it also favours networks which allow
a large number of failures to remain failed as these devices no longer contribute to
the message count. For this reason we include two additional criteria, Number of
Maintenance Requests and the Time at Risk.
Number of Maintenance Requests As a maintenance request requires a person to en-
ter the building and replace the failed devices it is one of the most expensive parts
of the system and therefore needs to be minimised. A single maintenance request is
the replacement of all failed devices, and a count of how many devices were replaced,
and since the failure rate for all devices is the same, should remain constant. Due
to the cost, this is seen as the second most important factor of the HM system, with
the most important being time at risk.
Time at Risk Time at risk is the cumulative time that any rooms have been left with
no devices covering the room, potentially leading to an undetected fire if one was to
occur in the same period. Individual rooms all contribute to the total time at risk,
and therefore we need to reduce this factor as much as possible. Time at risk does
not distinguish between rooms which have failed and are awaiting maintenance, and
failed rooms which have not been detected.
Simulated Results
The first experiments were run under NS-2 and set to simulate 1/2 a years worth of
runtime. This duration was chosen so a full experiment would run in 34 minutes of run-
time. Tests were repeated 10 times for each of the three HM types. Table 3.8 lists the
average of all 10 repeated runs.
Node Type Time At Risk (Min) # Maintenance Requests # Messages
HB 15 58 61275
RTA 7955 16 43916
DA 2198 23 46700
Table 3.8: Overview of the three HM systems in the simulated deployment showing the
time rooms were at risk, the amount of maintenance and the number of failures.
These results show that the lowest time at risk was the HB approach, however this is
because it also had the highest number of maintenance requests with 3.6x and 2.5x more
requests than RTA and DA. This is due to HB tolerating no failures, and therefore having
the largest number of active devices at a given time. This is a limitation of HB as the
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lack of application knowledge means that tolerances to a set number of failures cannot be
easily added whilst keeping coverage within given rooms. As RTA only replaces devices
once a room can no longer be monitored it has a highest time at risk, as the room must be
at risk before replacements can be made. HB also uses 31%-40% more messages than the
other two approaches due to the repeated broadcasting of messages to assess the health of
the neighbouring devices. RTA and DA are similar in number of messages, however DA
takes 44% more maintenance requests for a 262% reduction in time at risk. This higher
number of maintenance requests is due to early call for maintenance before the room is at
risk, causing the reduction in the time at risk.
Physical Results
To verify the trends identified in the simulations, physical experiments were conducted
on the same scenario. As 1/2 a year’s worth of run-time is unreasonable, time acceleration
has been used on the physical devices. Reducing the times between executing events by 800
times reduces the period of HM tests from 6 hours to every 27 seconds, and maintenance
from weekly to every 12.6 minutes. This acceleration allows all tests to be completed in 5.5
hours, removing any battery power issues. A disadvantage of acceleration is the increased
likelihood of collisions between packets, as devices may transmit at similar times. This
introduces pessimism into the system, however with dependability it is prudent to be
conservative rather than optimistic. Table 3.9 shows the results of the experiment for each
of the HM modes.
Time at risk (Min) # Maintenance requests # Total Failures
HB 23806 72 47
RTA 63996 52 45
DA 31532 65 45
Table 3.9: Overview of the three HM systems in the physical deployment, showing the
time rooms were at risk, the amount of maintenance and the number of failures.
These results clearly show that the physical experiments dropped substantially more
messages across the board, however the same trend between the three approaches from
the simulations still holds. This higher level of time at risk is most likely due to the
increased interference experienced in the physical deployment which in turn causes more
HM messages to be dropped, creating a higher time at risk. A higher density deployment
with multiple paths to the sink may help to reduce the high rate of dropped messages. In
these results it can be seen that HB takes the highest number of maintenance requests for
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the lowest time at risk as it maintains the highest number of active devices. RTA and DA
perform less maintenance requests but with higher times at risk. RTA takes 103% more
time at risk than DA with only a 25% less maintenance, similar to the simulated results.
Parameter Tests
To assess how changes in the failure rate of nodes and the HM frequency affect the
ability of the application to detect fires, a number of tests were performed. To avoid
penalising applications which may fail for a large number of small periods, which may
be safer than an application which fails for one large period of time, it was decided to
introduce the notion of an undetected fire. An undetected fire is when a randomly selected
room experiences a fire event, which occurs for a duration of 10 minutes. All nodes sample
their sensors every 5 minutes, and if a fire is detected the fire event is removed. If any
fires remain active after their 10 minutes they are simply removed and recorded as an
undetected fire. Each experiment is run for 2 simulation years.
Mean Time Between Failures
To assess the affect of the mean time between failures on the detection rate the mean
time between failures was varied from 0 to 24 months in 1 week increments. HM is per-
formed every week and maintenance performed directly afterwards.
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Figure 3.8: Failure Mean vs Time at risk
Figure 3.8 shows how DA performs closer to HB than RTA, with this trend getting
stronger as the number of failures is reduced. The performance of the two approaches is
almost identical when the mean time between failures is greater than 10 months. Figure
3.9 shows the number of maintenance requests for the same experiments in Figure 3.8.
This figure shows that where HB and DA are similar in detection rate, DA is performing
with substantially less maintenance requests. Therefore we can deduce that if the failure
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rate is relatively low DA can dominate both HB in terms of efficiency and RTA in terms
of detection rate.
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Figure 3.9: Node failure mean vs Maintenance Requests
Length of HM period
In these experiments the monitoring period is varied between 1 to 35 hours in increments
of half hours , with the mean time between failures fixed to 6 months, with the experiment
simulating 2 years. Figure 3.10 shows the results of these experiments.
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Figure 3.10: Time At Risk vs Monitoring period
As the HM period increases failed nodes are detected less quickly, causing the time
at which there may be a fire in a room to increase, and thus the number of potentially
undetected fires increases. The graph shows that DA performs in a similar way when
compared to HB, with this similarity becoming increasingly clear as mean failure times
increase. Figure 3.11 shows how the number of requests drastically drops as the monitoring
period is increased.
To check that the identified trends were correct a large simulation was performed. The
HM period was chosen to be 24 hours, with maintenance occurring 24 hours later. A larger
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Figure 3.11: Maintenance request vs Maintenance period
mean lifetime between the mote failures was chosen, with the inverse survival function being
used with a mean of 3 months and a deviation of 2 months. These values were chosen to be
more realistic whilst still being suitably pessimistic. From these parameters a simulation
was run for over a day of real-time, providing 100,000 years of simulation time, with the
results being shown in Figure 3.12.
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Figure 3.12: Long term simulation of failures.
This diagram gives an overview as to the three HM systems and how they compare
when looking at the probability of entering set states. Throughout the entire experiment
HB never entered the At-Risk state, in which a fire, if it occured, would not be detected.
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DA only had a 0.37% chance of being at-risk, due to the risk assessment performed within
the DA, to reduce the number of maintenance requests. RTA on the other hand always
enters the at-risk state.
3.3.3.2 DSR2
DSR2 is concerned with the timeliness of messages and assumes that the timeliness of
messages generated by DT1 will be checked when they arrive at the base node. Dropped
packets are not a concern for this DSR, as dropped packets are checked by DSR1, however
if a packet took longer to arrive than 1 minute then this DSR would be invalidated. For
this reason a number of experiments were created which measure the maximum delay that
can occur, in order to assess the timeliness of messages in the presence of the underlying
radio stack, including the Routing layer and the MAC layer. One main issue with the
transmission of packets is collisions, which causes backoff at the radio layer.
To assess the maximal delay a number of tests were conducted using NS-2, configured
the same way as in the previous simulations however with all nodes being located in the
same room. The number of nodes in the room was increased from 1-256, with all nodes
attempting to send a packet to the base station simultaneously. This instance, when all
nodes attempt to communicate at once, is referred to herein as the critical instant. Figure
3.13 shows the results of this experiment. From the graph it can be seen that the packet
delay increases as the number of devices increases, with a maximal delay of 22 seconds
occurring with 128 devices. However, as the number of nodes increases further, the packet
delay is reduced, down to 13 seconds with 256 devices.
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Figure 3.13: Number of Nodes vs Packet Delay
The reason behind this behaviour can be seen in Figure 3.14 which shows the number
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of packets successfully received at the base station. As the packet delay is increasing some
nodes are failing to transmit, resulting in packets being dropped, which in turn allows
messages from other nodes to be received which reduces delay. From these results it can
be seen that timeliness is not an issue, as the maximal delay was well below the accepted
delay for the application, and where packets were dropped, they are caught by DSR1.
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Figure 3.14: Number of Nodes Vs Successful Packet Delivery
In reality, nodes will not have perfectly synchronised times, resulting from either inaccu-
racies in the time synchronisation or clock drift within the hardware. To assess the impact
of desynchronisation on the packet delay, both packet delay and dropped packet rates were
recorded whilst the start times of nodes were chosen in a random uniform manner between
0 and maxTime, where maxTime is increased to 2 seconds in 0.2s increments.
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Figure 3.15: Time Desynchronisation Vs Packet Delay
Figure 3.15 shows that as time is desynchronised the time delay of packets gradually
decreases. Figure 3.16 completes the picture showing that the number of dropped packets
also reduces until 1.8s where all 256 packets are successfully delivered. From these results
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Figure 3.16: Time Desynchronisation vs Successful Packet Delivery
it can be seen that the timeliness of packets for our application does not need to be
monitored, as the acceptable delay is substantially larger than the maximum that can
occur. For this DSR the system can simply monitor for dropped packets, which is covered
by DSR1, requiring no additional messages.
3.3.3.3 DSR3
Should sensors fail they may return implausible values. This could either be due to the
sensors failing with full-scale deflection, or in the case of sensors returning random values,
some would be erroneous. To ensure that these errors can be detected sensor readings are
periodically intercepted when being returned from the sensors, and replaced with erroneous
readings. These readings will then be reported as normal to the sink node, which in turn
will detect the failure. As the sink node knows the DT schedule, it will know these failures
are part of the test, and thus will flag DSR3 errors as detectable. As this requirement was
systematically derived as part of the DSR process our approach is the only to specifically
check for this failure, with the other health-monitoring approaches commonly raising a
large number of false positives (a fire event when there is no fire).
To ascertain how the different approaches detect the failures and the extent to which
any false positives are raised, experiments were performed in which the sensors on the
devices fail every 24 hours, reporting random readings in the range 0-1000° C. This was
chosen over full-scale deflection as it is the most relaxed assumption, as full scale deflection
would be easier to detect, allowing DDC to perform better.
Table 3.10 shows the results of this experiment. It can be seen that both HB and RTA
raise a large number of false positives as they fail to check the plausibility of the sensor
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Node Type Sensor Failures False Positives Error Rate
HB 105 105 100%
RTA 102 102 100%
DA 106 7 6.6%
Table 3.10: False positive rate of the three HM systems in the presence of sensor failures.
readings. Since DA is a systematic approach to deriving tests, it explicitly covers this case
and correctly raises maintenance requests in response to detected failures. A small number
of false positives can occur however where the erroneous readings are plausible for a fire,
resulting in the device not being flagged as having failed.
If full scale deflection is used for the devices then the results are as seen in Table
3.11. In this mode a sensor reports its highest possible value when an error has occurred,
which would be a plausible task for digital sensors. In these results it can be seen that
the DA approach is even more effective than with random failures, as failures are detected
rapidly and maintenance is scheduled immediately. The other two approaches raise the
same number of failures as they cannot distinguish between failed devices or detected fires.
Node Type Sensor Failures False Positives Error Rate
HB 104 104 100%
RTA 109 109 100%
DA 101 0 0%
Table 3.11: False positive rate of the three HM systems in the presence of full scale deflec-
tion sensor failures.
3.3.3.4 DSR4
This DSR covers the ability of the network to perform in the presence of network anomalies.
No explicit tests are performed for this DSR as it was argued that network anomalies will
be manifested as dropped packets at higher levels of the network stack. These dropped
packets will then be covered by DSR1 as in Section 3.3.3.1.
Environmental noise will affect the network in one of two ways, either being detected
by the mote by CSMA/CA, causing back-off to occur, or interfering with the packet in-
transit. Interference en-route will either cause the reception of the packet to fail, or a
modification of the packet the contents, which will also cause the radio layer to reject the
packet as it would fail the CRC checks. Both of these events will cause the packet to be
retransmitted, either due to the back-off, or the failure of an acknowledgement causing a
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retransmission. In these circumstances the packet is becoming further delayed, however
Section 3.3.3.2 has established that should there be delays due to packet collisions, this
will manifest as dropped packets after the radio timeout, and is covered by DSR1.
3.3.3.5 DSR5
The final issue that was identified by our analysis was the complete failure of the monitoring
system. This is a possible issue as should the health-monitoring system itself fail, without
notifying the operators, then the DSRs will fail to be met. A failure of the DSRs could
cause failed devices to go unnoticed, possibly allowing the system to silently miss fires.
This DSR establishes that should the monitoring system itself fail, the operators will be
notified. To establish that this is the case, another test is defined which pauses all of the
DTs for a specific period of time, should any DTs be received in this time the appropriate
device is flagged as failed. During this period, if all devices are operating as intended, no
tests will be received (as they are explicitly paused), causing a error to be flagged on the
operator device. This error, as it was deliberately raised, will be caught, ensuring that in
practice a similar error would be detected.
Finally, as this test has the ability to suppress all network errors if it was implemented
incorrectly, it is proposed that this component of the system is implemented using tradi-
tional safety-critical software development techniques. This should ensure that there is a
basic level of service that can be guaranteed, which allows procedures to be put in place to
evacuate the building or otherwise should all communications, and thus tests, be blocked.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, it has been shown that by following the DA process: performing HAZOP,
generating the DSRs, generating and reducing to a number of DTs, and then checking
these at run-time, assurances can be made about the availability and reliability of the
system. It has been discussed how the system will interact with the operators of the
network and how the various failure modes of the WSN can be detected and reported in
a timely manner. It has been shown how changes in the health-monitoring frequency and
the failure rate of the devices affect the maintenance of the system, and ultimately the
reliability. To assess the impact of these parameters DA has been compared against two
alternative solutions, Run-time Assurance (RTA) and Heat Beat (HB). When considering
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the detection of normal events (DSR1) it has been shown that when the failure mean is less
than 8 months HB provides lower amounts of time at-risk, however with a much greater
number of maintenance requests. When the failure mean is greater than 8 months the time
at-risk is similar between HB and DA, with DA using less messages and thus lower power
consumption. RTA on the other hand uses slightly less maintenance requests then DA,
but with a much higher time at-risk over the full range of failure means and monitoring
periods used within the evaluation. It has also been shown that false positives that HB
and RTA experience can be reduced by using DA as it performs on-line tests to ensure it
can successfully detect this type of failure. Finally it has been identified that should the
assisted living application require low levels of maintenance (weekly replacements) and last
for a considerable amount of time (greater than one year), the mean failure of the devices
ideally needs to be over 10 months. These failures can be due to either hardware failure,
which was not experienced in any of the trials in this chapter, or to no remaining power
in the devices, which is to be addressed in the following Chapters.
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In Chapter 3 event-driven applications were analysed for dependability, identifying that
the lack of information in these scenarios requires a method of deriving a set of run-time
tests to ensure that they are operating as intended. In contrast to event-driven applications
there are also a large number of applications that are streaming-based, where large numbers
of messages are being continuously sent to the sink. In these applications it is easier to
deduce that the system is operating as intended, however with this increased amount of
transmitted data, battery power becomes a major issue. As failure of the battery typically
leads to failure of the network, battery failure can be identified as adversely affecting
dependability. Energy harvesting approaches can be used to extend the battery power,
however in the majority of cases this is not sufficient to permanently power the devices,
and merely delays the failure of the system.
As identified in Chapter 3 the main contributing factor to the Reliability of WSNs,
and thus Dependability, is the mean time between failure. It was shown that a mean time
between failure of 10 months is ideally required for a dependable assisted living scenario.
As identified in the literature review the major contributing factors are the processor and
the radio. As the processor can already automatically put itself into power saving states
when there is no pending processing work we instead focus on the power required when
the radio is active.
Radio power has been the focus of a large amount of literature, with the main focus
being on the lower MAC level protocols, typically aimed at providing a set level of service
with the minimal amount of disruption. The majority of these approaches use periodic
probing of the radio to achieve this goal. These approaches, as evidenced by ContikiMAC,
do perform well when the application is relatively unknown, however by taking a similar
91
Chapter 4: Dynamic Duty Control
application-centric view, as in Chapter 3, power consumption can be reduced further.
DDC takes the identified application timing requirements and further constrains the
radio allowing the radio to be turned off for longer. This is achieved by applying an
additional radio duty-cycle above the routing and MAC levels, but one layer below the
application layer. This allows current routing and MAC protocols to be used with no
modification as shown in Figure 4.1, where the normal MAC radio cycling is restricted
based upon the application. In this figure the X axis represents time, with R packets at the
Routing layer being route requests, D being data packets, and A being acknowledgements.
This application attempts to periodically send packets, this initiates a route request taking
two packets, which in turn causes the probing MAC layer to transmit data. If DDC has
information about the packet generation it can restrict the radio to just the required area
as shown, removing excess radio probing. This figure is not to scale, as in reality if the
application was of the order of 10s, with the MAC at ContikiOS’ default 8Hz probing rate,
there would be substantially more wasted radio time between transmissions. To ensure that
the timing requirements are met without needing a large amount of state information, a
feedback-based approach has been chosen. This approach measures the current timeliness
and uses this information to inform the duty-cycle accordingly.
Application
DDC Radio-On
DDC Permitted Transmissions
DDC Radio-Off
Routing R R D A
MAC
Denied Tx Allowed Tx Denied Tx
Figure 4.1: The effect of DDC upon network traffic
The objectives for this chapter are as follows:
DdcObj 1 - Given an application with a set deadline and data-generation rate, a protocol
can be derived which uses this information to further restrict the radio-on
time, saving power.
DdcObj 2 - In restricting the radio-on time the protocol must also ensure that under
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reasonable network conditions, the deadlines of the application are always
met.
DdcObj 3 - Should network conditions change, the protocol must adapt at a suitable
speed. Large changes in conditions should have rapid changes in protocol
response.
DdcObj 4 - Any such protocol must use values known, or easily derived, by the operator.
Any parameters which need to be tuned to a specific deployment should be
avoided.
Similarly, as in Chapter 3, it is important to emphasise that no guarantee can be made
about factors such as deadlines or power consumption under all environmental conditions.
We can only make guarantees when these are within a specified variance of the current
conditions.
4.1 Overview
As identified within the literature review it is common for modern MAC protocols to
periodically wake, sample the radio channel to detect if a packet is incoming, and then
receive the packet or sleep accordingly. This probing, as in the case of ContikiMAC and
LPL, is set to a specified frequency, which is dependent on the acceptable responsiveness in
sending a message. Higher frequencies allow for lower latency transmissions at the expense
of wasted power probing the radio channel.
Radio Off (Sleep)
Radio On
Cycle Length
Figure 4.2: Relationship between the sleep duration and the cycle length.
Sleep
Warmup
Active
Cooldown
Figure 4.3: Overheads incurred when powering up the radio.
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Upon initial observation it may be decided that if the data-generation rate, and thus
the message sending rate is pre-determined, then the MAC layer could be set to the same
frequency (f) to minimise wasted radio-on time. This approach however has a number of
issues, primarily, that it assumes transmissions are always successful, which in the presence
of interference, may not be true. Secondly, should the packet need to take a number of hops
towards the sink, it may experience upto hops∗f delay, which may exceed any application
deadline. Approaches such as DutyCon by Wang et al [159] attempt to solve this issue
by taking the generation rate, the number of hops, and the current interference levels, to
calculate an optimal MAC probing frequency. This however requires substantial knowledge
about the network topology, traffic levels and the background interference, requiring further
data collection and organisation.
A
Cycle Length
B C
A B C
Figure 4.4: Repeated overheads when sending each message individually.
DDC measures the delay a packet experiences through the use of timestamps, and uses
this information to wake the radio less frequently. Importantly, unlike Wang’s solution,
DDC does not assume a fixed MAC or Routing protocol and therefore DDC restricts the
radio-on time at a higher level, in effect restricting the times in which the MAC and
Routing layers can operate. Similar to Wang et al, DDC does however have the same
assumptions about interference, that interference can be modelled as a reduction in the
Packet Reception Ratio (PRR), due to the increase in required retransmissions, as also
supported by Section 3.3.3.2.
Another difference between DDC and those used by alternative approaches is that
DDC’s duty-cycle, being placed above the MAC and Routing layers, allows DDC’s awake
period to cover full end-to-end communication, whilst relying on the original MAC protocol
to efficiently use the radio during the awake period. This allows DDC to receive the
efficiencies provided by the MAC layers when it wishes to transmit, such as those given
by ContikiMAC and LPL, and save more power by disabling their use at other times.
To ensure that DDC’s awake window is of acceptable size for end-to-end transmissions,
even in the presence of varying external interference, additional awake-time called slack
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is introduced. Slack represents the main inefficiency within DDC, however it cannot be
removed as it allows DDC to handle variations in the background interference, manifested
as varying transmission durations due to the re-sending of messages as identified in Chapter
3. DDC still represents an improvement over traditional approaches as in the worst case,
where DDC has an awake window the same length as the cycle length, it is effectively the
same as the traditional approach. Should the awake window be smaller than this case then
the radio-on time is further restricted, leading to more power savings.
DDC’s only other requirement is the inclusion of timestamps on messages sent to the
sink. Typically these are already included on sense-and-send type messages as they monitor
the environment, however as their size is relatively small they add minimal overhead if they
are not already included. Timestamps can be set to either relative or absolute time, as
long as time synchronisation has been performed. This allows either the relative offset for
the specific node to be obtained, or for the specific node to be set to the current global
time. This timestamp is included with all data sent to the sink, where if necessary, it is
translated to the current global time before being used to inform the DDC algorithm.
Until this point only message-generation rates have been discussed, however as noted
in Chapter 3 there are many types of application where there are additional deadlines that
messages are required to meet. In the fire detection example analysed in Section 3.3.2, it
has been demonstrated how DDC works when messages should be sent as soon as they are
generated, however by delaying when DDC activates, the radio packets can be implicitly
queued until activation time. For this concept, the notion of relative and absolute deadlines
is used. Relative deadlines are the maximum allowed time from the generation of a message
until the message is received at the sink (i.e. temperature readings must be reported within
60 seconds). Absolute deadlines are the actual time at which the messages must arrive and
are simply the synchronised global time plus the relative deadline. By delaying the release
of packets we can effectively form a packet queue, with packets arriving at the sink node
closer to their absolute deadline as shown in Figure 4.5. In this figure the incoming arrows
are the points at which the device reads its sensors and attempts to send a packet, with
the labelled rectangles being the points where the associated packets are transmitted. The
hashed sections of the diagram are the time it takes from starting to turn the radio on or
off, to the radio being ready to send packets or being in its fully powered down mode.
It can be seen from this diagram that this can also provide further energy savings,
as the overhead of starting and stopping the radio is only incurred once for sending all
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Radio On
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Figure 4.5: Restriction of radio-on times forcing packet queueing.
three messages, whereas otherwise the overheads would have occurred four times as shown
in Figure 4.4. Therefore, when the deadline is greater than the generation rate packets
are implicitly batched up, saving power. It is important to make the distinction between
purely batching transmissions, as in DDC, and batching data into the same packet, or data
compression. Whilst DDC clearly provides an opportunity to batch and compress data,
compression is outside the scope of this work, instead this work focuses on the savings
obtained from purely transmitting a number of packets in rapid succession.
There are three main categories of overhead that may be incurred when transmitting
a packet, physical layer delay, MAC layer delay, and routing layer delay. The physical
layer delay is caused by the time it takes to turn on the radio circuit on the device, for
the radio to become stable and ready to accept packets for transmittal. The MAC layer
adds a variable amount of delay depending on the MAC protocol used. Should MAC
protocols such as nullMAC be used then any delays experienced due to CSMA/CA will
be experienced by all packets regardless of batching. However should MAC protocols
such as LPL or ContikiMAC be used, where the radio is cycled in a periodic manner,
with selective send and receive times, these delays may be incurred when attempting to
send a packet. These MAC protocols have a number of additions to help alleviate this
issue, with the main addition being the ability to transmit successive packets immediately,
whilst the sender and the receiver are synchronised and communicating. DDC clearly
benefits from the addition of this feature. Finally the routing layer can also add overheads,
commonly in the form of creating and maintaining routes. These overheads are especially
true in adaptive routing protocols such as AODV, where routes are formed on-demand,
with timeouts specified to indicate when a route should be discarded. In this case it is
clear that DDC, by transmitting multiple packets in succession can use the same route,
incurring only one set-up cost, whilst also having possibly more chance of success due to
the small amount of time between the route being established and the packets being sent.
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A B C
Sleep Time Awake Time
Slack
Delay
Figure 4.6: Flow of control between Slack, Awake, Delay and Sleep values.
As the need has been established for controlling the awake period in both frequency and
duration, two controlling variables are introduced, Sleep Time and Awake Time, as shown
in Figure 4.6. The frequency of transmissions is controlled by the Sleep Time, which in
combination with the Awake time defines the number of messages that have been delayed,
and thus the resulting batch size (the number of packets sent in the transmission window).
The combination of the Awake and Sleep times is referred to as the Cycle Length. This
can be used to increase the batch size by increasing the cycle length, or reducing the batch
size by reducing the cycle length. As overheads are reduced as the batch size increases,
it is clear that some limiting factor is required to restrict the size of the data batches. In
DDC this is Max(delay). The second variable, the Awake Time, must be large enough to
ensure that all pending messages are sent in this transmission window, as required to meet
the deadlines.
A B C
A B C
Message A Generated Message A Received
Delay
Figure 4.7: Calculation of the delay for a given transmission window.
The delay of an individual packet is defined to be the amount of time from a packet
being generated, to the time of it being received at the base station as shown in Figure
4.7. This delay is a product of a variety of factors from packet orderings, routing layer
decisions, MAC layer protocols and environmental interference, all of which are abstracted
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away into a single delay factor, meeting objective 4. The programmer must specify the
maximum acceptable deadline for generated messages, which is a relatively easy number
for the operator to provide, which in turn will be used as the delay limit. In the previous
fire detection system the deadline would be 5 minutes, this being the maximal acceptable
time between a fire being detected and it being reported to the operators (note the delay
is measured from the event being detected, not the event occurring, and thus may need to
take into account the detection time).
A B C
Last Message Time
A B C A
Slack
Awake End
Figure 4.8: Calculation of the slack time for a given transmission window.
The slack factor is the amount of time left at the end of a transmission window after all
messages have been sent. This value can be calculated by subtracting the end of the awake
window from the time at which the last message was received, as shown in Figure 4.8. The
least power-costly value for this factor is 0, indicating no excess time, however this means
that if the transmission times of any packets were to be delayed or extended then the
transmission window would be missed, forcing these messages to wait for the next window.
As delays can be incurred due to external noise or collisions, which are relatively common,
some packets will fail to be transmitted. As objective 2 states that deadlines must always
be met under reasonable conditions, this slack needs to be increased to accommodate any
delay that may occur under these conditions. This increased slack is referred to as the
targetSlack.
Variable Increase Decrease
Cycle Length More packets per batch Less packets
Awake Length More slack per batch Less slack
Table 4.1: Effect of changes on cycle and awake length on packet count and slack
There are a number of approaches that could be used to select the appropriate cycle
length and awake length for a set target frequency and duration, but to minimise the ex-
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Listing 4.1: Conditional Controller
1 void updateValue(pid* in_var ,int error) {
2 if (error > 0) {
3 in_var -= dV;
4 } else if (error < 0) {
5 in_var += dV;
6 }
7 }
ecution time and the power consumption required by the processor, the solution must be
computationally cheap to run on the motes and therefore can’t be overly complex. This
rules out any simulation-based approaches, such as search based solutions, and instead
creates a requirement for an on-line approach. Initially, for this analysis, a simple condi-
tional approach was used, as shown in Listing 4.1, with the error being the Target Slack
- Current Slack. Whilst this approach works to a degree, one important issue is choosing
dV , the amount by which the variables are modified. If this value is set too large, the
algorithm repeatedly overshoots, oscillating by a large amount around the desired value.
If the value is too small, the algorithm is too unresponsive to changes, taking a long time
to approach the target value. To resolve this issue, PID loops were chosen as they make
smaller corrections to the necessary variables as the desired setpoint is approached, and
larger corrections when the target is far away.
Figure 4.9 shows the final set-up for the DDC approach. Two PID loops are used
simultaneously to control both the number of packets in each batch and the amount of
slack that is present. This allows the system to adapt slowly with small changes in the
environment (such as weather), but more rapidly when the environment suddenly changes
(if a large source of interference such as a microwave were to occur), thereby meeting
objective 3 for DDC.
PID loops consist of three main components, Proportional, Integral, and Derivative
components. When working with continuous signals the Integral and Derivative compo-
nents would be expensive to compute on mote-class hardware, however as the rate of PID
loop updates is relatively infrequent, on the order of minutes, the discrete version of the
algorithm can be used as shown in Listing 4.2. To further reduce the computational com-
plexity of the algorithm, dt is set to 1, removing the need to divide for the Derivative
component. This change allows the PID algorithm to be implemented without any inter-
nal divisions, which are expensive, and removing the need for floating point operations,
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Figure 4.9: DDC PID controllers with input, setpoint and output variables.
which are prohibitively expensive. This allows multiple updates to be performed with low
overheads, however the return value is especially large, requiring a final reduction step
when reading back the PID values. Even when ignoring the removal of floating point op-
erations, this arrangement is in the worst case equal to the original algorithm, and when
considering that more updates may occur than reads, resulting in savings. The resultant
updateP id function is given in Listing 4.3.
As these PID loops are based on the network’s performance when gathering data at
the sink from all source devices, the PID loops themselves will be located only on the
sink device. The sink will update the PID loops at the end of each transmission window,
when the delay and slack values are available, with the resulting awake and sleep sizes being
broadcast across the network if they deviate by a set value from the previously transmitted
value. This centralised approach is necessary as all devices must be online at the same
time instant to ensure messages can traverse the span of the network, and as such all the
periods and durations must be consistent. Secondly as the sink device is the destination
for all the data packets, any attempt to distribute the PID loops to obtain redundancy is
fruitless, as with a failed sink the application cannot function.
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Listing 4.2: PID Loop
1 typedef pid {
2 int p = 0, i = 0, d = 0, dt = 10;
3 int pVal = 0, iVal = 0, dVal = 0;
4 int last_val = 0;
5 };
6 void updatePid(pid* in_pid , int in_val) {
7 in_pid.pVal = in_val * in_pid.p;
8 in_pid.iVal += in_val * in_pid.I * dT;
9 in_pid.dVal = (in_val - last_val) / dT;
10 in_pid.last_val = in_val;
11 }
12 int readVal(pid* in_pid , int in_val) {
13 return in_pid.pVal + in_pid.iVal + in_pid.dVal;
14 }
Listing 4.3: PID Optimised C
1 void updatePid(pid* in_pid , int in_val) {
2 in_pid.pVal = in_val * in_pid.p;
3 in_pid.iVal += in_val * in_pid.I;
4 in_pid.dVal = in_val - last_val;
5 in_pid.last_val = in_val;
6 }
4.2 Method
As the DDC algorithm has been described it must be evaluated to ensure that it meets
all of the objectives for this chapter. For this reason a number of experiments will be
performed which show the following:
1. Feedback Stability - As the two feedback loops are not completely isolated, due to
them operating on variables which affect each other, it needs to be shown that the
solution is stable and free from side-effects caused by the cooperating feedback loops.
2. Handles Network Variance - Feedback loops are used due to their adaptive nature. It
needs to be shown that this feedback-based approach provides resilience to variance
in both the reliability of network transmissions and also in the presence of node
failures.
3. Reduces Power - The main purpose of DDC is to use the application parameters to
realise additional power savings over alternative approaches. It needs to be shown
that when compared to other feedback approaches DDC performs equally or better
than the alternatives.
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4. MAC and Routing Agnosticism - One of the claims of DDC is that its design makes
it MAC and Routing agnostic. DDC must be shown that with real MAC protocols it
maintains the same level of performance and also still saves power, and also within
Multi-Hop routing scenarios.
To assess the DDC approach the application used needs to be changed as the previous
event-driven fire detection generates very few packets. For this reason a climate monitor-
ing application has been chosen, which in a similar manner to the previous application
repeatedly monitors the temperature. In contrast to the event-driven application the raw
readings are sent directly to the sink, instead of assessing the readings on-line. This allows
for a different class of applications, such as ensuring rooms are sufficiently warm in an
assisted living facility, detecting when windows may possibly have been left open. The
classification of the data is outside the scope of this work, instead it is focused on deliver-
ing all the data in a timely manner to the sink, whilst also attempting to keep the energy
consumption of the network as low as possible.
DDC will be evaluated in a number of ways so as to meet the objectives stated above.
Preliminary results are gathered through numerical simulation to assess the effect of dif-
ferent P, I and D parameters on the responsiveness of the application without the Routing
or MAC layers affecting the results and to compare against alternative approaches. Simu-
lations using real WSN operating systems are undertaken to assess the impact of the MAC
and Routing layers on the approach. And final results from real devices are gathered for
verification of the simulations.
Simulations were undertaken using the Cooja simulator. This was chosen over NS-2
as it allows the real binaries to be run on the simulator using emulated hardware. This
allows for greater accuracy of the simulation, as the algorithms under the simulator and
the real hardware are the same implementation and all OS overheads are also included.
However, the Cooja simulator is substantially slower than NS-2, with simulations of 10
devices running in almost real-time, as opposed to NS-2 which can run years of simulation
time in a few hours. A slow simulation speed is acceptable for this application where
events are happening on the scale of minutes, and the overall outcome is avaliable in no
greater than a few hours, unlike failures which occur over months. More detail about the
environments are given in the following sections.
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4.3 Numerical Simulation
Initial evaluation is performed using numerical simulation, with this form of simulation
being specifically chosen over other simulators such as TOSSIM or Cooja for a number
of reasons. The main reason is to provide a fair platform to compare DDC to alternative
approaches, such as that proposed by Wang et al. This is due to Wang’s approach requiring
global information about the routing paths and interference experienced at every node in
the network, which a custom simulation easily provides. Another advantage of a custom
simulator is the ability to introduce interference, in the form of changes in Packet Reception
Rate, which allows the reactivity of the algorithms to changes in the environment to be
measured. Within the numerical simulator, each node is modelled individually, but the
communications are abstracted to simple message queues and formulae which are used for
testing successful delivery. This is done so that the following three main objectives could
be achieved.
1. Evaluation of P, I, and D settings It is important to obtain insight into how
the different input parameters affect the performance of DDC, and so evaluation of
different P, I, and D settings is required. The custom numerical simulator allows
large-scale testing of different P, I, and D settings to be performed. Ideally this
evaluation should show that our approach, whilst obtaining better performance with
optimal settings, does not require specific values for good performance, simplifying
the process for application developers.
2. Testing the reactivity of the approach Any solution should ensure that the
application requirements are met even when changes in the environment occur, es-
pecially for dynamic approaches. The custom numerical simulator allows the Packet
Reception Rate (PRR) to be varied at run-time, allowing for the speed and accuracy
of the feedback in response to changes in the environment, to be tested. The popu-
lation count of the network can also be varied, with nodes being removed or added
to the network throughout the experiment to assess the response of the algorithms.
3. Power consumption evaluation against other approaches To ensure that the
network lifetime objectives as outlined in the conclusion of Chapter 3 are met, an
estimation as to the lifetime of the approaches is required. This requires a transforma-
tion from the target-independent duty-cycle values from the previous objective, into
target-specific power consumptions using values obtained from within the literature.
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These power consumptions can then be combined with typical battery capacities to
obtain a network lifetime, to evaluate against objective 1.
Figure 4.10: Numerical Simulator with simple communications
The implementation of the custom simulation can be summarised by Figure 4.10, with
individual motes realised as instances of the mote class, and communications modelled by
TX and RX FIFOs in each class. All motes share the same duty-cycle, with all devices
attempting to send once the radio is activated. When a pending transmission is completed,
the packet is moved from the TX queue to the corresponding RX, once two conditions
have been met. Firstly, the transmission duration must have elapsed, this indicates that
the radio was on long enough to transmit the appropriate packet. Secondly, once the
transmission duration has elapsed, the packet is probabilistically moved from the TX to
RX queue, based on the PRR. Should the radio be deactivated whilst there is a pending
transmission, the transmission attempt is aborted and the packet remains at the head of
the TX queue for the next transmission attempt. The transmission times in the simulator
are obtained from measured transmission times for real devices within the literature.
For all of the following experiments, the same device layout is used, with 4 source
devices and a single sink device. Each of the source devices are directly connected to the
sink, using single-hop communication. Single-hop is used to avoid choosing a particular
routing protocol for multi-hop communications, thereby focusing the analysis more directly
on the timeliness of packets being received at the sink in the presence of radio contention.
4.3.1 PID Tuning Theory
This section will be split into two parts. The initial section focuses on showing how
DDC, given no prior knowledge, converges on an optimal solution. This section will also
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study how changes to the P, I, and D values, in conjunction with the setpoint, affect
the convergence rate of DDC. The second section will study how in practice, with basic
application knowledge, the PID loops can be primed in order to perform better in the
initial instance. The second section will also search for optimal PID values, and show how
these differ in performance to naive values.
Initial testing was undertaken with a singular PID loop with a setpoint of 1000. At
each update round the return value from the PID loop is divided by 10 and then fed into
the PID loop to calculate the next step. This division modification of the output values is
to ensure similarity with the DDC PID loops, where the output values are correlated, but
are not on the same scale as the input values. This is especially the case when considering
the slack in the transmission window, where the slack is much smaller than the overall
transmission window size specified by the PID loop. The implementation of the PID loop
also follows that described earlier, avoiding divisions within the main controller and thus
treating all values as integers. For this reason any input values to the PID controller are
truncated to avoid floating point arithmetic, keeping the implementation efficient for WSN
class devices. Finally all internal state of the PID loops are naively set to 0, where later in
Section 4.3.2 it is shown how a basic estimate can be used to provide better initialisation
values.
From initial experimentation a number of observations can be made, as shown in Figure
4.11, which correlates with the literature from Section 2.6.1. In this figure only a subset of
all analysed results is shown, with each line showing a separate PID run, with different P,
I and D values as identified in the key. The value is the output value from the PID loop,
with the input value being this number divided by 10.
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Figure 4.11: Four different effects of PID setting on results
The first observation is that any set of parameters which do not include an integral
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component fail to reach the setpoint of 1000. This is due to the static nature of the P
and D values, requiring that they be set perfectly correctly to map from input values to
correct output values (a P of 10 in this case would counteract the division by 10, but in
practice we do not know this correlation directly). Secondly it is identified that D values
greater than the P values cause instability in the output, as the derivative factor, which
aims to dampen the proportional factor, over-compensates causing oscillations. Finally we
can see the ideal behaviour of our PID loop in settings 0-8-0, where the progress towards
the setpoint is consistent and relatively rapid, however without the P or the I parameters
the response time is slower than otherwise possible.
4.3.2 PID Tuning Experiments & Results
The initial objective is to assess how different P, I and D values affect the convergence of
the PID controller towards the setpoint. Where two controllers are used, this is especially
important as this solution has two controlled parameters that are correlated, possibly
leading to competition between the two controllers. As identified in Section 2.6.1 of the
literature review there are a number of methods that can be employed in order to tune
the PID controller, however traditional approaches do not consider simulation. When
simulations can be conducted search based methods can be used. As simulation allows
for running multiple experiments simultaneously an exhaustive search over a range of
possible P, I, and D values is performed, with the results being automatically pruned
to leave a selection of candidates for manual review. Pruning is simple to implement
as the two erroneous cases identified in Section 4.3.1 can be easily identified: constant
oscillation, easily detectable by counting the magnitude of overshoots as they occur; or
flat-lining, where the output variables become fixed at a value away from the set-point.
The resulting candidates are then automatically graphed for easy assessment of convergence
speed and stability. An additional advantage to performing such a search is that the effect
from varying from the optimal solution can be assessed and conclusions drawn about the
importance of obtaining precise P, I, and D values.
To more accurately represent the WSN scenario the setpoint for the delay is 60 seconds,
with the setpoint for the slack being 200ms (57 packets). These values have been chosen
to be representative of an environmental monitoring application, with 4 devices sampling
readings every second, with readings being sent every minute. The slack has been chosen
to allow for 24% more packets to be re-transmitted. It is important to note that this does
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not represent a minimum PRR of 76%, as this slack represents the deviation in PRR over
a single transmission window, and thus represents a reduction in PRR of 24% from 100%
in one minute, for example. The experiments were also modified so that any runs taking
more than 1000 PID update cycles are terminated, as this is commonly caused by poor PID
settings, causing the output to always be 0, (PID of 0,0,0), and thus repeatedly updating
the loop with meaningless values. Simulations are run for 1,000,000ms (16.7 mins), which
represents 17 PID update cycles at the optimal PID settings.
Experiments are conducted with P, I and D values in the range of 0 - 20, in increments
of 4. To assess the PID loops it is necessary to define when the PID loop will be classified
as stable. This is due to the fact that the PID loops rarely settle on a singular value,
normally fluctuating slightly around the setpoint. For this reason delay has been defined
as stable when it is within 300ms of the 60 second deadline, with the slack being stable
when it is within 50ms of the 200ms target. Using this term of stability the convergence
time for each PID run is easily calculated by recording the time at which the controller was
last unstable. The number of times that the setpoint has been exceeded is also recorded,
with the value needing to exceed the stable region before it is recorded. Finally the sum of
the absolute error between the setpoint and the current PID value is recorded, indicating
how rapidly the current solution converged on the correct value. To find the absolute error
for a pair of PID loops the magnitude of the errors must be similar, otherwise the result
will be biased towards one loop, the delay in this example. The bias applied is based on
the difference between the setpoints, with the slack error being multiplied by 300 to be the
same magnitude as the delay.
Table 4.2 shows the top 10 ranking results from the exhaustive search, rated by sum
errors.
From these experiments it can be seen that the optimal P, I and D values for each of
the loops are 0-12-0 for the awake and 8-4-0 for the sleep. It can also be seen from these
results that the correct operation of the system does not depend heavily on these values,
as local deviations also perform well, just with a slower convergence speed. This indicates
that there may be a recommended set of good values which could be used in the default
case, with more tuning of the parameters should more performance be required.
Investigating more of the poorer solutions shows why some of these values are not
obvious, as Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show competition between the slack and the delay PID
loops. In this case the initial start-up causes severe competition between the loops, and so
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Results Awake Length Sleep Period
Total Error Settle Time Overshoots P I D P I D
369802 195428 4 0 12 0 8 4 0
376665 194840 4 4 12 0 4 4 4
381488 194552 4 0 8 0 8 4 0
381968 195191 4 0 12 0 4 4 0
389958 199715 4 0 16 0 8 4 0
391807 198271 4 0 16 0 4 4 4
392669 194261 4 4 12 0 8 4 0
394578 195164 4 4 8 0 8 4 0
395876 198538 4 0 12 4 8 4 0
396092 196534 4 0 12 0 0 4 4
Table 4.2: Top 10 ranking results from the exhaustive search
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Figure 4.12: Competing slack over time with poor PID loops
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Figure 4.13: Competing delay over time with poor PID loops
in this case the delay, being orders of magnitude larger than the slack, causes many more
packets to be generated than the slack can handle. This reflects the information discovered
within the literature review in Section 2.6.1, stating that the initial start-up of the PID may
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be erratic due to the large differences between the current error and the standard errors
expected once the PID is running, causing an issue known as windup. Some of the same
solutions identified in the literature review such as changing the PID values throughout
the experiment could be used. The case presented sofar is the extreme case where no
preliminary information is provided to the PID loops, however by providing an estimate of
appropriate awake and sleep lengths it is possible to achieve much more optimal start-up
performance. For the following tests the initial values for the Sleep and Awake periods are
deduced from the packet generation rate and packet deadline. The Awake length and Sleep
period are set to the values in Equations 4.1 and 4.2 accordingly. These initial values are
not intended to be accurate, merely a value that should be easily estimated by the network
operators. Unlike traditional approaches, DDC is an adaptive scheme which should not
rely on well-informed initial values.
AwakeLength =
deadline
generationRate
× txT ime (4.1)
SleepPeriod = deadline−Awake (4.2)
Using these initial values it can be seen in Figures 4.14 and 4.15 how the convergence
speed is greatly reduced from the original 3 PID rounds to 1 PID round. Another side-effect
of providing the initial values is that the sum total error is no-longer dominated by the need
to get to the setpoint as fast as possible, and instead some of the focus is transferred to
ensuring stable operation later in the experiment. This is due to small oscillations causing
a noticeable error, where a non-oscillating solution may take longer to converge, but it will
incur less error during the stable phase.
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Figure 4.14: Slack over time with primed PID loops
As shown in Figure 4.15 the PID loops oscillate around the specific set-point, in this
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Figure 4.15: Delay over time with primed PID loops
case the 60s deadline. To ensure that this deadline is not commonly exceeded the variance
in the delay will be measured. This variance is defined as the maximum absolute difference
between the delay measurement and its associated set-point. The preceding 10 PID rounds
will be measured, as it has been shown that oscillations occur on a scale smaller than this
value, and the resultant variance subtracted from the set-point. This has the effect that
the maximum oscillation may exceed the deadline, but in the majority of cases this will
not occur.
4.3.3 Reactivity Theory
Tests need to be undertaken to assess the performance of DDCs reaction to changes in
the environmental noise and the population count. To ascertain if the performance of
DDC is acceptable it is also compared to two other approaches, DutyCon by Wang et al,
and X-MAC. DutyCon was chosen as it represents one of the few reactive schemes that
adapts to environmental changes, network traffic, and population changes, with X-MAC
being chosen as a representative of traditional static schemes. In order to provide a fair
comparison this section will use a version of DDC with default un-tuned parameters. This
lack of tuning should only affect the time for DDC to adjust to new parameters, however
the initial reaction should be the same regardless of the parameters (any deadline misses
would happen regardless of the speed of the reaction, the only effect is how fast DDC will
return to an acceptable level of performance). Deviations from the defaults could cause
instability depending on the individual P, I, and D values, however this is outside of the
scope of this section and is covered in Section 4.3.1.
To fairly evaluate the performance of the three approaches the same two factors will
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be measured as an assessment of their reactivity, the delay and the duty-cycle. The delay
is measured as it is the main application requirement that the approaches must meet, as
should the delay exceed the deadline specified by the operator by a large amount then
the system is operating outside of acceptable operating limits, effectively being a failure of
the application. Duty cycle is the secondary factor as it directly correlates to the power
consumption of the network, with the minimisation of this factor being requirement 1
as identified at the end of Chapter 3.4. The ideal solution is the one which manages to
minimise the duty-cycle whilst meeting the application deadline.
4.3.4 Reactivity Experiments & Results - Packet Reception Rate
The first experiments assess the reactivity of the three approaches in relation to changes
in the interference, from background interference, to sudden strong interference. To test
changes in the environmental noise PRR is used, as it is the same approach that is used in
DutyCon, and as such represents a fair comparison between the algorithms. The rate of
change in interference is modelled as rate of change in the PRR (∆PRR/∆T ), with sudden
strong background interference being a rapid change in the PRR. For these experiments the
rate of change of PRR is the main variable under scrutiny, with the reactions of the three
approaches being monitored as the delay and the duty-cycle. This section will begin with
a comparison of the three approaches followed by detailed analysis of the DDC approach.
Tests begin with a ∆PRR/∆T of 5%, incrementing by 5% every day to the maximum
level of 80%. In each test the PRR begins at 100%, decreasing down by ∆PRR/∆T and
then increasing back to 100% before the next ∆PRR/∆T change. The pseudocode for
this test is given in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Interference Testing
PRR = 100
∆PRR = 5
while ∆PRR < 100 do
while PRR > ∆PRR do
PRR = PRR−∆PRR;
wait();
end while
while PRR ≤ 100 do
PRR = PRR+ ∆PRR;
wait();
end while
∆PRR+ = 5
end while
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Figure 4.16: Delay over PRR for the two adaptive approaches
As the graphs for each step of ∆PRR/∆T are similar, Figure 4.16 only shows the
results for a ∆PRR/∆T of 5%. It can be seen that DDC performs well throughout the
experiment, due to the slack never reaching 0. It can however be seen that DutyCon
misses deadlines each time the PRR is decreased, even at high values of PRR. This is
due to DutyCon requiring time to obtain information from the network about all PRR
links and traffic flows before a new period can be decided, in which time messages are
starting to be delayed. DutyCon’s main setback is the time which it takes to acquire the
global state, with faster acquisition allowing for faster response to network changes. X-
MAC has been omitted from this graph as it constantly has delays upto a maximum of
200ms, well below 60s, at high PRRs, and so always meeting the deadlines. However at low
PRRs deadlines are missed. This is due to X-MAC having no information about the PRR,
instead periodically waking up every 200ms and delivering any pending packets. In high
PRR scenarios X-MAC successfully sends all pending messages. However at low PRRs it
does not have enough time to send all the messages, creating a backlog, missing deadlines.
With higher values of ∆PRR/∆T DutyCon performs even more poorly, due to the time
required to obtain the network state. DDC however takes into account the variance in the
PRR, which is higher with larger ∆PRR/∆T values, and so meets the deadline by using
more slack.
Figure 4.17 shows the duty cycle of DutyCon and DDC. DutyCon performs well, with
relatively low power consumption throughout the experiment, increasing the duty cycle
over time to compensate for the poor PRR. DDC however performs best, as unlike DutyCon
it does not send each packet in their own transmission window, instead batching all readings
and sending them close to the deadline. X-MAC, the approach which best meets the
deadlines, has a fixed duty cycle of 8% when the PRR is at 100%, which is substantially
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Figure 4.17: Duty cycle over PRR for both of the two adaptive approaches
larger than the other two solutions, wasting power. As X-MAC misses deadlines it is not
shown in this figure.
By studying the internals of DDC we can see why the Delay is met at lower PRRs,
including the performance of the PID loops. The following four figures show the input and
output for each of the PID loops.
The first of these PID loops is the slack controller which aims to keep the slack constant
by varying the awake window according to the number of packets transmitted. The slack
can be seen in Figure 4.18, with the slack varying more as the PRR decreases, due to the
increased randomisation in successful packet delivery. This graph also shows how as the
variance in the slack increases, the set-point of the PID loop is adjusted accordingly so
that the chance of the slack being exhausted is minimised. Without this adjustment it can
be clearly seen that as the PRR is decreased, and the variance increases, the slack would
frequently be exhausted. Figure 4.19 is the output of this PID loop, which clearly shows
that to maintain this constant slack the awake window is increased as the PRR reduces,
requiring more time to successfully transmit packets, with a reduction in the transmission
window as the PRR is increased.
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Figure 4.18: Slack over PRR
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Figure 4.19: Awake over PRR
The second PID loop controls the sleep period to regulate the delay, with Figure 4.20
showing this delay. It can be seen that the delay is relatively constant when the PRR is
small, however as the PRR increases, and the variance starts to increase, the delay starts
to be reduced as the feedback loop assumes the worst-case PRR from the variance, creating
more slack, and thus making it more likely that packets are successfully delivered earlier.
Figure 4.21 shows how the sleep period is regulated to allow for the size of the awake
window. It can be seen that whilst the awake window is being enlarged, the sleep period
is being reduced to ensure that packets sent near the end of the transmission window will
not exceed the 60s deadline.
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Figure 4.20: Delay over PRR
This section has shown how DDC successfully ensures that the deadline is met over a
large range of PRR values. It demonstrates that the feedback-based approach to sizing
the awake window and the sleep period allows DDC to accommodate these changes in the
environment with no additional external information. Finally it has been demonstrated
that by considering the variance in the PRR the slack can be adjusted such that it is
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Figure 4.21: Sleep over PRR
unlikely to become exhausted, ensuring that application deadlines are met.
4.3.5 Reactivity Experiments & Results - Population Count
One of the longer-term issues that a WSN must handle is the failure of nodes as discussed
in Chapter 3, and as such it is important that any reactive protocols can handle these
failures. Secondly it provides an additional opportunity to save power as the reduced
number of devices also reduces the amount of radio traffic, which in turn should allow for
more energy savings.
As all devices are within one hop of the sink, there are no issues with specific nodes
being on a critical communications path needing to relay messages. With no dependency
between source devices, there are no requirements as to the ordering in which devices
fail, and therefore the focus is purely on how many nodes are alive when a device fails or
joins the network. To test the full range of values nodes will be failed individually from a
population of 5 until 1 device remains, at which point devices will be added individually
until the population reaches the original value. The reason for the low number of devices is
due to the ratio of dying nodes as the effect of one node dying upon the network is greatest
at low population counts. This is due to 1 device failure in a population of 2 causing half of
the traffic to cease, and the traffic to double when it re-joins the network. As the number
of devices approaches 5 this effect is smaller, and thus larger values should not reveal
any more information. Therefore the maximum population is set to 5 devices, whilst still
providing meaningful results. The algorithm for these tests is given in Algorithm 2. During
these experiments the same parameters as in Section 4.3.4 will be measured throughout
the experiment.
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Algorithm 2 Population Testing
ψ = RootNode
Ω = AllNodes
Ω = Ω \ ψ
while Ω 6= ∅ do
x = random(x) ∈ Ω;
failNode(x);
Ω = Ω \ x
Wait()
end while
Ω = Ω + ψ
while Ω 6= AllNodes do
x = random(x) ∈ (AllNodes 6 Ω);
wakeNode(x);
Ω = Ω + x
Wait()
end while
Figure 4.22 shows the delay that both DDC and DutyCon experience as changes in
the population count occur. X-MAC is not shown on this figure as it meets the deadlines
in all possible cases due to its high duty cycle. It can be seen that during the failure of
any devices the deadlines are always met. This is due to the traffic decreasing, allowing
transmissions to occur as scheduled.
As nodes are added, DutyCon has issues due to the ratio of new nodes to existing nodes
being high. This means that large changes to the sending schedule within DutyCon are
needed, which in turn requires the network state to be gathered before the new schedule
can be calculated. At lower ratios DutyCon correctly handles the inclusion of new devices
due to the smaller changes in the number of new messages added. DDC on the other hand
has no issues with devices being added as the slack provided can accommodate the increase
in traffic.
Figure 4.23 shows the duty-cycle of the two approaches as the population is decreased
and increased. As with the previous section the step-like behaviour of DutyCon can be
easily seen. Each time a node has failed, and DutyCon has global information which reflects
this, the appropriate duty cycle is calculated and then used. DDC on the other hand can
be seen to smoothly reduce the duty cycle as nodes fail, and as nodes are added to the
network the duty cycle increases as more messages are generated. It can be seen that in
all but the lowest of node counts DDC performs using a lower duty cycle than DutyCon,
which is a direct result of the larger number of messages in the network, and thus the
higher efficiencies gained by batching.
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Figure 4.22: Delay over population for the two adaptive approaches
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Figure 4.23: Duty cycle over population for the two adaptive approaches
To assess the outcome when DDC slack is too small, further tests were performed. In
these tests the slack setpoint was changed from 200ms as in the previous case to 50ms.
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Figure 4.24: Delay over population with changes in node count
Figure 4.24 shows the results of this experiment. In this figure we can clearly see that
the deadline is exceeded as more nodes are added to the population. The reason for this
is shown in the following figure.
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Figure 4.25: Slack over population with changes in node count
Figure 4.25 shows the slack for the same time period. From this figure it can be clearly
seen that as nodes die more slack is created, with the PID loop reducing the slack before
the next node fails. As nodes are added to the network the number of packets they are
generating is larger than the allocated slack, therefore it can be seen that the slack reaches
0, causing packets to miss their deadlines.
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Figure 4.26: Sleep over population with changes in node count
The sudden response by the sleep PID loop can be seen in Figure 4.26, with the sleep
period being rapidly reduced in order to reduce the delay experienced. Finally, Figure
4.27 shows how the awake period is adjusted to the initially decreasing number of packets,
reducing the awake time, and then increasing the awake time as more devices send data.
This section has shown that during the failure of single motes and the addition of single
devices DDC correctly meets the application deadlines though the use of the slack. This
slack also allows DDC to meet deadlines in cases where the alternative DutyCon fails,
such as the initial case where one additional node is added to a network consisting of only
one node. It has also been shown how, in more extreme cases, where the addition of a
device (or multiple devices) exhausts the slack, DDC rapidly responds to correct the missed
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Figure 4.27: Awake over population with changes in node count
deadlines.
4.3.6 Reactivity Experiments & Results - Power Estimate
The previous two sections have evaluated the performance of the three approaches in terms
of delay and duty-cycle, however whilst duty-cycle provides us with a relative comparison
between the approaches, it does not give us an accurate indication if the network lifetime
requirements from Chapter 3 are being met. To solve this issue the results from the three
approaches can be analysed, in conjunction with accurate power readings from real devices,
to obtain a power consumption estimate. This consumption estimate can then be used to
calculate the expected network lifetime. As the sink is assumed to be hard-wired to a
power source, a source node is analysed.
As identified within the literature review radio state transitions take a non-zero amount
of time to switch between power off and on states, during which time a higher level of power
is being consumed when compared to the radio being off, but no radio transmission can
be achieved. In addition to this the literature review identified that power consumptions
in the radio-on mode also vary depending upon whether the radio is in a receive or send
state. For these reasons power evaluation not only requires the amount of time spent with
the radio off and on, but also the number of state changes of the radio, further enforcing
the idea that duty-cycle alone cannot be used. As the numerical simulator already records
the full sequence of actions, this information is already available.
Finally as the power consumption of an idle node is also non-zero, two additional
approaches are also evaluated, radio fully off, and radio fully on. These two modes will
be used to provide a power baseline for both the minimal amount of power that can be
possibly consumed, and also the maximal amount of power that can be consumed (as
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radio-on in RX mode is the highest power state in the system).
Approach Radio off-on # Radio tx (s) Radio rx (s) Power (mAh)
Radio-On 1 86 86400 22.02
LPL 777600 1123 14774 4.01
X-MAC 518400 1123 5702 1.70
ContikiMac 696774 432 929 0.33
DutyCon 172800 432 440 0.21
DDC 26105 432 390 0.19
Radio-Off 0 0 0 0.00
Table 4.3: Power consumption for the 5 approaches under numerical simulation.
It can be seen in Table 4.3 how DDC consumes a lower amount of power than DutyCon
and X-MAC. The main reasoning that DDC consumes less power than DutyCon, whilst
having similar duty-cycles, is the lower number of transitions that DDC performs. This
reduction in the number of transitions is a direct result of DDC’s transmission approach,
using a single transmission window to send all the data, with the oldest packet being
close to its deadline, maximising batching. DutyCon on the other hand sends each packet
individually, spaced out over the acceptable tx window, leading to a greater number of
radio cycles per deadline period.
When considering the power consumptions it is important to note that all non-DDC
approaches have the same power consumptions if the deadline is changed. For most of the
protocols this is due to them being unaware of the deadline, or in the case of DutyCon
whilst it is only used in the calculation of the transmission period, but as one packet
is sent per period, the same power is consumed. DDC however, due to its batching of
packets based on the deadline, reduces the power consumption if the deadline is longer,
and increases it as the deadline is reduced.
4.4 Cooja Simulation
As Section 4.3 validates the basic theory behind the DDC approach, demonstrating its
performance in relation to alternative approaches, it remains to be proven with real Rout-
ing, MAC layers, and operating systems. In addition a method of monitoring the actual
radio-on time, including the radio states under these conditions is required as DDC’s main
goal is to constrain the radio-on time. For these reasons Cooja has been chosen based
on the review of simulators in Section 2.9, as it can output a log of radio events, and is
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one of the few simulators that can run TelosB binaries. Cooja also has one of the most
advanced radio models out of the simulators under review. The decision to use the appli-
cation binaries in the simulator aims to ensure the maximal level of consistency between
the simulations and the any future physical deployments. Another advantage to this ap-
proach is that it removes the need to re-implement the algorithm for a specific simulator
which would raise concerns about the accuracy of the implementation. It was decided to
deviate from TinyOS as the operating system and use Contiki for all further experiments,
primarily due to its close integration with Cooja, but also due to the higher performance
of ContikiMAC when compared to other approaches.
The first tests are run with only single-hop communications so direct comparison with
the numerical simulations can be performed, assessing only the effects arising from the
introduction of the new Physical and MAC layers. Tests on PRR and Population Count
are performed identically to that from Section 4.3 to allow direct comparisons between the
obtained results in both numerical simulation and Cooja. Tests with multi-hop communi-
cations are performed later in Section 4.4.4 to assess DDC under more typical operating
conditions, including the effect of the routing layer upon DDC.
4.4.1 Packet Reception Rate
Initial tests are undertaken to assess the similarity of the simulator results to those obtained
under numerical simulation in Section 4.3. The method used remains the same, varying
the PRR from 100% to 5% and back in increments of 5%. Throughout the experiment the
delay experienced by the packets is recorded, with Figure 4.28 showing the results of this
experiment.
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Figure 4.28: Packet Reception Rate over Delay
From Figure 4.28 it can be seen that the delay experienced is similar to that obtained
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under simulation, with the delay being close, but importantly less than 60 second deadline
throughout all PRR levels. One interesting difference is that the slight reduction in delay at
high PRRs experienced in the PRR is not demonstrated within Cooja. Upon inspection of
the radio details this lack of variation is due to the simplified assumption in the numerical
simulator that all packets from all nodes are simply interleaved and transmitted in rapid
succession. In the Cooja simulator this is not the case as the MAC protocol, including
backoff, does not fully saturate the channel, allowing fluctuations in transmission timings
to be smoothed out, increasing the delay, but importantly not the variance.
As in the simulations the performance of DDC can be evaluated by looking at the duty
cycle of the devices as shown in Figure 4.29. This Figure shows the increase in the awake
period and the respective decrease in the sleep period in response to the PRR decreasing.
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Figure 4.29: Packet Reception Rate over Duty Cycle
The trend in these results matches those shown in the numerical simulation, however
the duty cycle is much higher, indicating that the efficiency may be lower than expected.
This duty is the awake time imposed by DDC over the sleep period imposed by DDC,
however as DDC operated on top of the MAC layer the duty cycling performed beneath is
not represented. To analyse this further a single transmission window from within Cooja is
analysed. During the awake period, the radio is additionally cycled according to the MAC
algorithm, helping reduce wasted power in the transmission and importantly in the slack
phase. Cooja also shows that ContikiMAC supports further power savings when a device
wishes to send multiple packets, with the synchronisation phase being performed only
once, and with multiple packets being sent back-to-back from the source. This indicates
that the CSMA/CA causes excess slack, however once transmission begins between nodes
more packets can be transmitted at low cost. As shown in the numerical simulation section
DDC does not rely on these additional MAC features to save power, however their inclusion
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further enhances performance.
This section has shown that not only does DDC exhibit the same trends as shown in
the numerical simulator, but that the inclusion of a real MAC protocol does not adversely
impact the performance of the algorithm.
4.4.2 Population Count
The second test ran under numerical simulation in Section 4.3.5 measured the response
of DDC to changes in the population count of the network. The same experiment is also
performed under Cooja simulation, with the 5 devices in the network, with 4 source nodes
sending packets to the sink node. The population is reduced to 1 alive source node, before
being increased back to the original 4 source devices. Figure 4.30 shows the results of this
experiment.
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Figure 4.30: Population Count over Delay
This figure shows that the changes in population have no affect on the packet delay, as
also shown in the numerical simulation. This is due to the slack handing the number of
packets either removed or added to the network as a device is removed or added respectively.
In Figure 4.31 the Duty Cycle can be seen to change in a similar manner to that from the
numerical simulations, with lower duties as the number of devices, and thus number of
packets, decreases.
From these experiments we can see that the numerical simulations are similar to that
shown in the Cooja simulator, which in turn is running the same binary which will be
executed on real hardware. This reduces the chance of discrepancies between the experi-
ments, allowing for a more accurate validation of the simulated results. Finally the power
consumption of these devices is analysed, followed by the additional complications added
by using a real MAC and Routing protocol that was evaluated in Section 4.4.4.
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Figure 4.31: Population Count over Duty
4.4.3 Power Estimations
As the Cooja simulation is executing the real Routing and MAC algorithms, the power
estimations obtained in Section 4.3.6 can be refined accordingly. Routing adds overheads
to the power estimation as additional packets need to be sent to discover routes to the
sink before data can be transmitted. The MAC layer, in this case ContikiMAC, will
however reduce power consumption by cycling the radio during the transmission window if
a specific node cannot transmit the packet. This could be due to simply having no packets
to transmit, or other nodes currently transmitting on the same channel. .
To support analysis of the radio duty cycling Cooja provides a log of all radio state
transitions for all nodes within the simulation. These state transitions not only include on
and off states, but also transmit and receive, which as shown in the literature review, also
have different power consumptions. Using these traces allows the same approach used in
Section 4.3.6 to be performed, combining both the state and transition information, with
power consumptions from real devices, to obtain a power consumption for the simulation.
The ContikiMAC case represents the typical use-case, where only the MAC layer cycles
the radio to obtain power savings.
Approach Radio off-on # Power (mA)
Radio-On (nullMac) 1 22.23
LPL 814942 4.37
X-MAC 527287 1.81
ContikiMac 720130 0.36
DDC 34026 0.22
Radio-Off 0 0
Table 4.4: Power consumption for the 5 approaches within Cooja.
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Table 4.4 shows the results of the power analysis from the Cooja simulations. These
figures show that there is not a substantial difference between both DDC with real MAC
protocols, and with the figures obtained within the numerical simulation in Section 4.3.
Across all the protocols the figures acquired are similar to the numerical simulation, how-
ever all are larger. This is possibly due to the lack of collisions in the numerical simulator,
whereas within Cooja packet collisions require the re-transmission of packets, reducing the
effective duty cycle.
4.4.4 Multi-Hop
All the experiments up until this point have been run under single-hop conditions, where
the source and sink are within radio range, with no nodes providing message relaying.
Whilst this may be true in small-scale scenarios, and is useful to compare against the
numerical simulations, typically WSN devices must communicate over multiple-hops to
reach the sink, and therefore investigation as to the effects of hop-distance upon DDC
need to be conducted. Unlike the previous scenarios this introduces an additional class of
node to the previous source or sink nodes, the relay nodes. Relay nodes are devices which
can communicate with other devices, but do not sample information from the environment
and are not the destination for any messages. They may be used as either reserve devices
should others fail, or to pass on messages on behalf of other source devices in the system.
This class can be further broken down into two distinct types, active relays and idle relays.
Active relays are nodes which are on a current data transmission route from a source to a
sink, requiring that the node transmits and receives messages for other nodes. Idle relays
are not on a current transmission route, and therefore do not need to forward any messages.
As all idle relays behave similarly, only one is monitored for the experiment. Assuming a
single sender and a single sink, all active relays also behave similarly, and therefore only one
such device will be monitored for this experiment. If more than one sender was included
then there would be multiple levels of relay node depending on the number of upstream
sources.
Both the delay, slack, and duty-cycle of the devices will be monitored, with the hop
count of the source device being increased and decreased throughout the experiment. The
layout for this experiment will be 10 nodes arranged in an oval, with the sink at one tip of
the oval. Initially the source will be adjacent to the sink, before being moved around the
oval, until the mid point, at which time it returns the same way back to the sink. This
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ensures that there is one edge of the oval that experiences no traffic, providing a baseline
comparison for the active relay nodes.
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Figure 4.32: Packet Hop Count over Delay
The delay remains constant throughout the experiment, never exceeding the 60s dead-
line as the slack never reaches zero. The reasoning for this can be seen in Figure 4.32 as the
the hop count increases the duty cycle is increased. This is due to the awake period needing
to be extended to accommodate the additional delay in the packets being transmitted by
the intermediate relay nodes.
As in the previous power consumption testing within the Cooja simulator, the radio
logs can again be analysed to obtain an accurate estimate of power consumption for the
devices. As there are 4 classes of device, each one of these is shown in Table 4.5.
Node Radio off-on # Power (mA)
Source Node 37284 0.24
Sink Node 37284 0.21
Active Relay 37284 0.26
Idle Relay 37284 0.19
Table 4.5: Power consumption for the 4 node types
This table shows that whilst all nodes within the network are using the same DDC
duty cycle, those on the idle transmission path, and hence not relaying packets, do not
consume much power. Ideally these nodes could be powered down further if knowledge
existed about the active routes, however as one of the primary goals of DDC is to have
no additional information about the network other than that gathered by the feedback, no
further savings can be obtained. In addition the routing behaviour may change between
transmission windows depending on the background interference and the routing protocol
that is used, making any predictions about the routing topology difficult.
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This section has shown that DDC performs in a similar way to that experienced un-
der numerical simulation and that even with the inclusion of MAC and Routing layers,
including multi-hop communications, DDC continues to perform as expected.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has defined an adaptive protocol called Dynamic Duty Control which takes a
set application deadline, and reduces power consumption whilst ensuring this deadline is
met in the majority of scenarios. Unlike alternative approaches, DDC requires no global
knowledge, instead using feedback from the application itself to ensure the requirements
are met. It has been shown in numerical experimentation and simulation how the DDC
adapts to changes in the PRR of the network, and the number of active nodes, ensuring
that the deadline is met in all but the most extreme circumstances. From these simu-
lations power consumption has been analysed, showing that DDC consumes lower power
than alternative adaptive schemes when the generation rate of packets is greater than the
deadline, allowing packets to be batched. In all circumstances DDC performs better than
traditional approaches, as the worst-case performance is bound by the best-case of the
underlying MAC protocols.
DDC aims to be independent of the underlying Routing and MAC protocols, but due
to DDC enforcing that the radio remains of during its sleep period some protocols may
work less effectively, however these can be mitigated by using MCWs as defined in Chapter
5. Protocols that require periodic messages to be sent in order to maintain network state,
such as proactive routing algorithms, will fail to send these messages during the DDC
sleep period. If the algorithm cannot handle such failures then the routing algorithm
can be presented to MCW as an application with a specific application deadline. These
messages must be extended to include the required DDC timestamps and DDC must be
explicitly notified when a routing protocol message arrives to allow the processing of its
feedback loops. Modelling the routing protocol as an application ensures that DDC, in
combination with MCW, will periodically schedule a transmission window of the correct
size for the routing protocol. A drawback of this method is that all transmission windows,
regardless of their size, will have a constant overhead in the form of the slack, and as this
slack is the same for all transmissions, even with a single routing message, considerable
radio-on time is wasted.
As the MAC layer also provides additional duty cycling there is typically a number of
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additional parameters that can be tuned to tailor the MAC layer performance. Normally it
is assumed that the MAC protocol will never be disabled, and therefore a trade-off between
lifetime of the network and the responsiveness of the MAC protocol can be achieved through
the notion of a polling frequency. The higher this frequency the more responsive the MAC
protocol, however at the expense of more power. When DDC is used the radio-on time
is automatically restricted and therefore energy expenditure can be a lower priority for
the MAC protocol. With DDC more power savings can be realised if the data can be
transmitted to the sink sooner, allowing DDC to turn off the radio sooner, and therefore
the priority for the MAC protocol should be speed of transmission to the sink with only
minimal focus on efficiency. When performing online tuning of the MAC protocol the
polling frequency should be increased, which in turn will cause the DDC awake window to
decrease. At the point where the awake window remains constant or begins to increase, the
polling frequency is either successfully saturating the transmission window, or the higher
frequency is causing more collisions, reducing efficiency, taking more time to successfully
transmit messages, and a local optimum has been reached.
DDC may also provide an opportunity to perform data aggregation and compression
due to the implicit batching of packets. This may allow for further power reductions in a
manner that is adaptive to the application deadline and the environmental conditions. A
limitation with the current system is that it is assumed that the application will always
have a single specified deadline, however there are a number of multi-modal applications
which may require different deadlines under different circumstances. In addition this work
has only focused on a single application existing within the network, whereas it may be
desirable to support multiple applications simultaneously, each with different deadlines.
Both modes and multiple applications will be investigated in Chapter 5.
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Mode Change Windows
Chapter 3 analysed the dependability of a data-sensing WSN, and presented Dependability
Assurance, a method to ensure that any dependability requirements are met at run-time.
DA however raises concerns over the run-time of WSNs, identifying that the mean lifetime
of WSN devices needs to be over 10 months to provide a maintainable deployment. Chapter
4 addressed this concern by presenting DDC, optimising network lifetime for a specific
application by using a deadline provided by the operator, reflecting the maximum delay
that the application can tolerate. DDC however assumes that there is only one application
within the network, and that the deadline specified for any application remains the same
throughout. The application designer may choose to change the deadline, however doing so
invalidates DDC’s prerequisite that these remain fixed, removing the guarantee that under
reasonable conditions the deadline will not be missed. DDC also only considers a single
application running within the network at any given time, and therefore further work must
be performed to support the multiple application use case. The set of possible deadlines
that an application may choose to use, in combination with a specific data-generation rate,
are herein referred to as modes.
Depending on the application, the impact of an application missing its deadlines may
vary. In some circumstances such as monitoring the movement of occupants, the data may
need to be acted upon quickly, requiring that the deadline is met as much as possible. Other
scenarios such as environment monitoring may have more relaxed deadlines, where missing
a small number of deadlines may be acceptable. In all of these cases the justification for
ensuring missed deadlines is not only that one deadline may be missed, but that more
than one deadline may be missed. In the case where we move from a low criticality mode
with a deadline of 1 hour (to report room temperatures), to a high criticality mode with
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a deadline of one minute (when an individual device detects a fire and wishes to report
readings rapidly), there may be up to 60 deadline misses before the mode change is enacted.
In this case missing multiple deadlines is clearly unacceptable, and therefore a mechanism
needs to be provided which allows these deadlines to be met.
This chapter presents Mode Change Windows (MCWs) to ensure that deadlines are
met when multiple applications are run within the same network, with each application
having multiple modes. This is especially important as some applications may move from
large deadline mode (low criticality) to a small deadline mode (high criticality), requiring
that data be delivered sooner than it otherwise would have been. Early delivery of data is
problematic as the decision to change mode may be on a device which currently may be
unable to communicate due to the network being in a radio-sleep mode. The objectives
for this chapter are as follows:
McwObj1 - Given an application with a set of modes, with each mode specifying a dead-
line and data-generation rate, a policy can be defined which ensures deadlines
are met in an energy efficient manner.
McwObj2 - Within the same deployment multiple applications must be able to run si-
multaneously. These applications must still meet their deadlines and be able
to change modes at will.
Section 5.1 provides an overview of the problem in more detail, followed by the proposed
MCW solution. Section 5.2 provides model checking of the basic MCWmechanics to ensure
that the desired properties hold over all possible scenarios. Section 5.3 implements MCW
for the same target hardware as Chapter 3 and similarly evaluates the solution under
cycle-accurate simulation. Finally Section 5.4 draws conclusions from this work.
5.1 Overview
Within WSNs multiple applications may run simultaneously on the same device, each with
a distinct mode which defines its deadline and packet-sending rate. An extended version of
this is where a single application may change modes at-will, not only changing the current
deadline, but also the data-generation rate. When using only traditional MAC protocols
such as ContikiMAC, where the radio is cycled several times per second, deadlines and
data rates are less of a concern. Fast radio cycling allows delays to be minimised, allowing
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deadlines to be easily met. In addition to timing fast duty cycling also removes the need for
large data buffers as packets can be sent with minimal delay, requiring only small queues.
In cases where the radio is cycled much more slowly, with sleep periods on the scale of
minutes, the time delay to inform the sink of the new mode may be considerable, during
which data may be generated at a new, faster rate than that seen initially. This raises
important concerns, as not only must deadlines be met in all circumstances, but with
increased amounts of queued data come greater transmission times, possibly exceeding
the transmission window size. To address this issue it is proposed that before data is
sent the mode-changing device alerts the sink at the first possible opportunity, which in
turn broadcasts appropriate information (such as new duty cycles) across the network to
support the new mode. This section will analyse what information is required to support
such mode changes, whilst meeting the deadlines for the new mode, which may possibly
be shorter than the previous mode.
Clearly, within Wireless Sensor Networks, no hard deadlines can be completely guaran-
teed in all circumstances as ultimately the communications can be interrupted by external
events. Within this section it is assumed that deadlines are guaranteed to be met under
the condition that the external interference, either caused by internal network communi-
cation or external sources, does not vary by a large amount over time (radio jamming)
and no abnormal external events occur (large numbers of devices simultaneously failing).
Another assumption that must be made in order to guarantee that deadlines are met is
that the deadlines themselves are known ahead-of-time. This does not indicate when the
deadline will be used, just that the application may require this deadline to be met at some
point during its execution. This assumption is required, as without prior knowledge of the
operating modes it is easy to construct a case where the system is in deep sleep state, and
an application may decide that it has a deadline before the network wakes, with no other
devices being awake notified, making any such deadline unachievable.
To motivate this work an example of an assisted living facility will be used, where
residents are monitored through a series of static devices placed around the environment,
and a number of mobile devices attached to the individuals.
It is noted that whilst the mobile device may send data at a lower rate when the
occupant is stationary (as the actual data in this mode may not have much variance),
this does not indicate that the device samples outputs from its sensors at a lower rate.
Instead the sensors can still be sampled to monitor for movement, triggering a move into
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a higher power mode should movement occur (producing readings that may be of interest
to the sink device), but this mode change should occur quickly to meet the tight deadline.
This chapter is motivated by the classification techniques identified in the literature review
Section 2.6.2, where raw data from moving occupants can be used to classify events such
as changes in location, but delivering such data is expensive from a communication aspect,
with the value of the data being low when the occupant is stationary. This chapter assumes
that there are user-provided methods for detecting the current mode, and therefore mode
changes can be derived. Despite this detection of the current mode, it is also assumed
that the raw data is important to the sink node, and therefore that all readings should be
reported. These assumptions are met by methods such as classification algorithms, where
running a trained classifier is computationally cheap, and can be performed on the motes
to detect the current mode. However training such a classifier requires a large amount
of computational power, possibly including a large amount of historical readings from all
devices in the network, and therefore should be conducted by the hard-wired sink node.
One such example would be location tracking as discussed in Section 2.6.2.
An overview of the proposed applications and their modes, with associated data-
generation rates and deadlines is given in Table 5.1. These values are not taken from
real deployments, however we believe that they accurately represent a standard assisted
living scenario. As identified earlier a special case may occur as some applications may not
be operating in the network at a given time. These absent applications are represented by
defining a special absent mode, in which the generation rate is 0 and the deadline is ∞,
with a mode change to this state should the application cease operating. This allows all
possible conditions to be captured in the mode table.
Application Mode Sample Rate (Hz) Deadline (S)
Environment Monitoring Off 0 ∞
Low 0.1 60
High 0.5 10
Occupant Tracking Off 0 ∞
Low 0.01 60
Medium 0.5 10
High 2 2
Table 5.1: Both assisted living applications, the respective modes, and their settings
Transitions between events can occur at any time in the network between any two
modes. When a mode is changed the data-generation rate of the devices may change, with
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more or less messages being generated than in the previous mode.
To conduct analysis into the worst-case scenario for the above modes a number of
initial assumptions must be made. Firstly it is assumed that modes with a large number
of packets to transmit to the sink will take longer to transmit than others with less data.
Secondly the round-trip-time for a mode change is known, this is the time that it takes to
inform the base station of the intent to change mode and the time that it takes for the base
station to inform the network of the change. These assumptions are relaxed in Section 5.3.
If the worst-case scenario for deadlines is assumed, where data is transmitted just before
the respective deadline, then the deadline and the generation rates can be used to calculate
the amount of data that is queued for sending as shown in Equation 5.1.
PacketsGenerated = Deadline/GenerationRate (5.1)
Using this formula the worst-case sleep time can be derived as shown in Equation 5.2.
SleepT ime = Deadline− Tx(PacketsGenerated) (5.2)
If it is assumed that the mode change occurs as soon as the radio is turned on, then in
the worst case scenario a mode change may occur as soon as the sleep period has been
entered. If the SleepT ime of the new mode is smaller than the SleepT ime of the old mode
then the deadline will be exceeded. This scenario is shown in Figure 5.1, with Figure 5.2
showing the best-case scenario where the deadlines are met. In these figures the transmit
slot labelled M is the mode change request, with M ′ being the broadcast mode change.
The labelled arrows are the generation times of the associated messages, with the respective
boxes containing the labels being the transmission of the messages.
A B C D
DeadlineChange
M M’ A B . .
B C D A B C D E F G H I J
Delay = 50s
Figure 5.1: Application running without MCW, with a worst-case mode change occurring
causing missed deadlines.
133
Chapter 5: Mode Change Windows
A B C D M M’ E A B . .
A B C D E A B C D E F G
DeadlineChange
Delay = 28s
Figure 5.2: Application running without MCW, with a best-case mode change occurring
allowing deadlines to be met.
One simple solution would be to fix the sleep time for all modes to one set value, the
minimum sleep time of all possible modes, however this would cause all modes to awaken
and send data early, defeating any benefits that may arise from batching transmissions
(power savings, data aggregation, etc.). Therefore a new transmission window is intro-
duced, the MCW, which allows mode changes to occur if necessary, but otherwise is not
used, as shown in Figure 5.3. Only if a node needs to request a mode change should this
window be used, initiating a mode change, sending the old data, and then sending the new
data, as shown in Figure 5.4.
| | | | |A B C D A B
A B C D A B C D
Figure 5.3: Application running with MCW without a mode change occurring.
| | |A B C D
DeadlineChange
MCW Used
M M’ A B . .
A B C D A B C D E F G
Delay = 25s
Figure 5.4: Application running with MCW, with a mode change occurring early in the
sequence.
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The frequency of these windows must be calculated to ensure that all deadlines of all
modes can be met, and therefore it is derived as shown in the following formulae. Any
such mode change needs to ensure that in the worst case, all deadlines are met. The worst
case is the entering of a new mode just as the sleep period begins. Therefore mode changes
must be complete before that shown in Equation 5.1.
modeChangeDeadline = min(sleepPeriod) (5.3)
As a mode change involves sending a mode change notification, followed by other devices
sending all queued packets if any are available. The maximum time for a mode change
to take place is therefore shown in Equation 5.4. In this equation the maximum awake
time is taken as the worst case time to send all possible queued messages. This factor
could be reduced further, as the awake period is based upon the sleep period, which is
min(sleepPeriod), however as these factors cannot be simply scaled due to the interaction
with other components such as batching at the Routing layer, max(awakePeriod) is used
as a worst-case starting value. This scaling is due to Routing and MAC issues meaning
that half the number of generated packets may not necessarily take half the transmit time.
modeChangeT ime = max(awakePeriod)− informTime (5.4)
These two factors can be combined to calculate the required period as shown in Equation
5.5.
MCWperiod = modeChangeDeadline−modeChangeT ime (5.5)
Scheduling a MCW at the period ofMCWperiod, assuming that the awake time informTime
is set to a sufficiently large value such that the mode change can be enacted in time, ensures
that all deadlines are met even in the presence of mode changes.
As stated within MCW Objective 2, multiple applications running on the same network
must be supported, either multiple copies of the same application or completely distinct
applications. As the same application has the same deadline, all devices running the same
application are scheduled to awake at the same time and all use the same transmission
window to communicate with the sink. This allows for maximal aggregation opportunities
and also avoids the need for the motes to wake up numerous times for the same application.
Other applications however do not share the same deadline, and thus, depending on the
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start time, may have a transmission window that collides with another application. In these
circumstances, as it is known which applications run at which times, window avoidance
must be performed.
Window avoidance takes the window with the latest absolute deadline as the baseline,
and moves all other transmission windows earlier until they no longer collide. Once the
window with the latest absolute deadline has been successfully scheduled that it no longer
collides with any others, the process is repeated with the remaining windows until all
collisions are avoided. Offsets must be applied so that the windows occur earlier than
scheduled, as this will not cause deadlines to be exceeded, whereas transmission occurring
later than intended could cause deadline misses. It is also noted that it is not just this
one instance that is advanced earlier, all future instances must be offset by the same
amount. This global offset to a window period ensures that no delay is propagated into later
transmission windows, as if the original schedule was returned to without careful thought,
it would occur later in time and thus has the potential to cause missed deadlines. To avoid
the constant drifting backwards in time of all colliding windows, the original schedule
time is used when sorting windows by their absolute deadlines. Once a single window has
been moved, its previously used deadline is evaluated to check if the windows have been
effectively moved earlier in time, and if so a MCW is additionally scheduled at the original
time. The algorithm used to implement this is outlined in Listing 3, and whilst it may
appear computationally expensive, for the majority of the time there should be no collisions
and thus most of the algorithm is avoided. When avoiding collisions by performing re-
scheduling of transmission windows there may be a scenario where no collision-free schedule
exists. In this case the number of messages, and thus the transmission time, has exceeded
the available transmission time. In this scenario there is no solution which will meet the
required deadlines, even without the use of MCWs, and thus deadlines will be missed.
This section has outlined how MCW handles the single application mode change sce-
nario by introducing MCWs. These MCWs ensure that should a mode change be required
there is suitable time to inform the network, flush any pending data from the old appli-
cation, and then send any messages generated from the new application. Importantly the
timing of these MCWs ensures that the deadlines of both the old and the new modes are
not violated due to the mode change. Secondly this section has described how multiple
applications can be handled with respect to colliding transmission windows, ensuring that
the deadlines of either applications are not adversely affected by the other applications.
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Algorithm 3 MCW Collision Avoidance
toSchedule = currentEventItem
currentScheduleOffset = 0
while toSchedule 6= ∅ do
sortByDeadline(toSchedule)
X = toSchedule.pop()
collisions = calculateCollisions(X,currentSchedule)
if collisions = ∅ then
addToSchedule(X,getNextTime(X) + currentScheduleOffset)
if currentScheduleOffset < getPrevOffset(X) then
addToSchedule(MCW,getNextTime(X) + getPrevOffset(X))
currentScheduleOffset = currentScheduleOffset - MCW.duration
end if
currentScheduleOffset = currentScheduleOffset - getDuration(X)
else
removeFromSchedule(collisions)
toSchedule = toSchedule + collisions + X
end if
end while
To ensure the correctness of these solutions the following sections will check that deadlines
are met using both model checking and real experiments.
5.2 UPPAAL Model Checking
To verify that the proposed solution to scheduling MCWs is correct, the UPPAAL model
checker [17] is used to ensure that in no circumstances can the deadline of any mode be
missed during a mode change. By using a model checker an exhaustive but efficient search
can be conducted over the search space which would be expensive to perform in simulation.
Simulation also does not guarantee that all the edge cases will be exercised, and therefore
does not guarantee that in our scenario deadlines will never be missed.
For MCWs model checking provides assurance that in the given scenario the deadline
is guaranteed to be met and that buffers will not overflow. This guarantee is not strictly
required as in some circumstances a deadline miss might be acceptable, however this guar-
antee ensures that the more critical case of multiple deadline misses in succession, which
may happen without MCWs, will not occur. Buffer overflows are also important to avoid
as it indicates that the transmission buffers have not been fully cleared in the appropriate
time. This failure to clear the transmission buffers means that the backlog might continue
to grow, eventually filling the available buffer size and begin to drop packets. This packet
overflow, and thus the dropping of packets, is therefore presented as an error state within
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the model to ensure that it will not occur.
The drawbacks of using model-checking to explore these issues is that the accuracy of
the model checking relies on the accuracy of the underlying model. As this model is a
generalisation of the physical scenario, any results from the model may not fully represent
the behaviour in the physical deployment. In addition to the fidelity of the model there are
many possible sets of parameters that could be used, however exploration of all possible
states would take prohibitively long to explore, and therefore only a limited number of all
possible parameter sets can be explored.
UPPAAL is a model checker based upon the concept of timed automata, which includes
a model simulator, allowing for quick and easy verification that the implementation behaves
as desired. Checking that the model is deadlock-free is performed internally by UPPAAL
by performing reachability analysis on the deadlock states, ensuring that from the initial
state there are no possible transitions that allow us to enter the deadlock state. This model
however must make a small number of simplifications which will be revisited in Section
5.3. These simplifications are as follows:
1. The time that it takes for all devices within the network to be informed of a mode
change is bounded by a known value.
2. The time that it takes to successfully transmit a single data packet to the sink is
bounded by a known value.
3. In all nodes the radio must be on for the full time that it takes to inform the network
of a mode change, otherwise the mode change will not succeed.
Figure 5.5: Mode triggering based on events, in this case a set time.
The model in Figure 5.5 shows how at a set period t1 a mode change event occurs. This
mode change event triggers a sendChanged event, which is representative of the system-
wide mode change broadcast message. As the mode has now changed the the generation
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rate of packets, current deadline, and the pending sleep time are updated to the new values
in the new mode. The new values for these parameters are immediately used. The sleep
time however is a pending sleep time, meaning that only at the next transmit window the
pending sleep time will become the current sleep time. This pending status is due to the
delay between the mode change occurring at the source node and the point at which it
would have informed the network, which in turn would cause a new sleep period to be
used.
Figure 5.6: Sensor periodically sampling the environment generating packets, transmitting
the data when possible.
Figure 5.6 shows the constant generation of packets at periodic time sendInt, with the
timestamp of the oldest packet being recorded. Should the radio have just switched into
the transmit state the awake time is recorded, with the deadline correctness being checked
at the end of transmission followed by a check that the transmission time was large enough
for all the queued messages. The transmit time check is necessary as with a mode change
taking place, changing the deadline and the packet-generation rate, a situation could occur
where the transmit window is not large enough, causing some packets to be undelivered.
Figure 5.7 shows the simple cyclic behaviour of the MCWs, requesting that the radio
be turned on and off cyclically. Should there be a pending mode change, signalled by an
event detection, a mode change event is signalled to the rest of the software components.
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Figure 5.7: Mode change windows periodically cycling the radio and initiating pending
mode changes.
Figure 5.8: Radio’s true state based upon requests from other software components.
Figure 5.8 tracks the individual radio state requests and ensures that if there are any
outstanding radio-on requests, the radio is kept on until all requests are satisfied.
Figure 5.9: Transmission of packets and enacting of mode changes.
Figure 5.9 handles the duty cycle of the radio when mode changes occur, including the
signalling of the start and end of the transmit window to the other software components.
In order to ensure that in no case the system can enter an erroneous state, such as the
deadline being exceeded, these erroneous states have been modelled with no exiting edges
140
5.3 Evaluation
as shown in Figure 5.6. This allows for the system as a whole to be checked in a single
deadlock-free pass, with the state in any found deadlock being the error that occurred.
These states are either a deadline being missed, where the current timestamp on a packet
is greater than the value of the absolute deadline, or a buffer overflow, where more packets
have been generated than the mote can hold.
Figure 5.10: The results from checking the presented model for deadlocks.
The results from deadlock-checking the system can be seen in Figure 5.10 and this
demonstrates that a deadlock cannot occur. This provides assurance that none of the issues
above can arise. To ensure that it is MCW which allows this deadlock-free behaviour to
exist MCW was removed from the model and the deadlock check ran again. This second
run failed to be deadlock-free, showing that the deadlock may occur by the application
entering the DeadlineMiss state.
This section has shown that the application of MCW ensures that under the assump-
tions stated, the system can never miss a deadline when transitioning between two modes,
as the MCW provides an opportunity for old readings to be flushed from the sources and
the new mode started, meeting the primary MCW objective 1 for this chapter. As there
are three outstanding assumptions from this section these will be analysed in the following
section, showing how they can be removed through a combination of feedback from the
network and the application of real MAC protocols.
5.3 Evaluation
Section 5.2 demonstrated that the underling MCW approach allows transitions between
any two modes whilst ensuring that the deadlines of both modes are met. This section
however made a number of simplifications about the properties of the network with respect
to the radio. These simplifications are used to ensure that the radio is active for enough
time for these events to complete and that the deadline has been met. Within the real
environment these values can be estimated, however external factors such as environmental
noise and radio collisions may cause messages to be retransmitted, invalidating or making
any timing estimates pessimistic. To solve this issue the timing requirements for the
transmission and sleep windows could be greatly relaxed, accounting for the worst-case
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interference, however obtaining an estimate for these windows is still an issue. Another
approach is to use adaptive protocols that measure the interference on-line and use this to
inform the network layer, reducing waste.
As in the UPPAAL model, the evaluation will initially use a fixed size for the MCWs
to demonstrate that it is not dependent upon any other solutions. Later in the evaluation
it will be demonstrated that by using DDC to size the MCWs, further power savings can
be achieved. DDC has been chosen due to the low power requirements, and because its
one requirement, the provision of application deadlines, is available in this scenario. This
protocol ensures that the radio is on for the minimum amount of time possible to meet the
deadlines. MCW does not depend on DDC, however as shown in Chapter 4 DDC provides
the highest amount of power savings possible when the application’s deadline is available.
By using DDC it can be ensured that within a specific mode the data is received by the sink
before the appropriate deadline, however DDC, being a feedback-based approach cannot,
without some modification to the application, be used for sizing the MCWs, as typically
no mode changes occur, and thus there is no data to operate the feedback. For this reason
an approach similar to DA in Chapter 3 is used, with mode change events being simulated,
allowing feedback to occur and DDC to operate correctly.
As both transmission of normal data and the MCWs are periodic, commonly using
different periods, at some points these windows may collide. In this circumstance we
require that the normal transmissions do not block any required mode changes, as it is
assumed that only a single MCW is required for a successful mode change. Secondly
collisions between transmission windows of separate applications may also occur (only
the same applications use the same window). To alleviate this issue, as all periods and
durations are known at run-time, should a collision be due to occur, window-avoidance is
performed as outlined in Section 5.1.
As applications can be dynamically added or removed from the network, we cannot rely
upon all devices having global information about all the possible applications and their
possible modes. For this reason we only have this information on the device which starts
the application or initiates the mode change, with this one device knowing the deadline
and the data-generation rate. At the earliest opportunity this requesting device informs
the sink, which in turn broadcasts the mode across the network to be cached by all the
devices. This scenario relies heavily on the dynamic nature of the feedback to quickly
adapt to the new mode, to obtain optimal duty cycle settings. Once a mode has been
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experienced the appropriate PID settings will be cached, allowing for future mode changes
between previously-known modes to be performed quickly. This ensures that no prior
information is required, however at the expense that the initial mode change may occur
late, missing deadlines, and that the initial time in the new mode may also miss deadlines
whilst the network adapts to meet the application requirements. This is not a limitation
of our approach, as if the typical approach of providing prior information to the devices is
chosen then these deadline misses would not occur.
5.3.1 Cooja Simulations
To verify that the conditions experienced within the model checker still hold when used
with real applications, simulations are performed. Simulations were specifically chosen as
they provide detailed traces of the radio behaviour, allowing communications at each hop
in the network to be analysed in detail.
To assess that the objectives for this chapter are being met, a number of experiments
will be conducted:
1. Assess mode changes without MCWs. Based on the original analysis some deadlines
may be missed when undertaking the mode changes.
2. Assess mode changes with MCWs. Monitoring of the deadlines should show that
deadlines are met at all times.
3. The overheads that MCWs incur should be evaluated. This should be observable
in the difference between the effective duty cycle of both the non-MCW and MCW
experiments.
4. Demonstrate that the addition of multiple distinct applications does not affect the
meeting of the application deadlines.
5. Show how the inclusion of DDC to size the MCWs provides some power savings.
Within these experiments the application that will be tested is the Occupant Tracking
application. To begin the experiments a warm-up phase is conducted whereby all modes
are cycled though, with 20 transmission rounds occurring in each mode. This is necessary
so that the awake and sleep periods for each mode can be learnt by the network. After this
warm-up period the results are recorded, with the current active mode switching between
the Low and Medium modes at a random time interval between 0 and the deadline, after
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every 4th transmission window. This ensures that a large spread of possible interleavings
between modes is explored. When a mode switch is initiated the internal PID loops for
each of the modes are swapped, ensuring a rapid change between the modes whilst still
allowing the network to adapt to external interference unlike the case where fixed values
are used.
5.3.1.1 Single Application, No MCW
The first experiment is to demonstrate that there is an issue with deadlines when changing
between two modes. Within previous chapters applications have always remained within
a singular mode, and therefore the feedback mechanism has been relied upon to provide
changes in behaviour. This has ensured that in previous cases, as long as the environmental
changes are gradual, the network can adapt. In this scenario mode changes are sudden,
with large changes in deadlines, making a feedback approach infeasible.
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Figure 5.11: Deadline and Delay over time with MCW off
Figure 5.11 shows how an application with no MCWs constantly fails to meet its dead-
lines when moving from a large sleep mode to a smaller sleep mode. To avoid skewing the
figure the X axis is not shown in terms of runtime, as this would cause all the small period
modes to be compressed, instead showing the number of awake periods that have elapsed.
In this figure the blue line shows the relevant deadline at that point in time, with the red
line showing the maximum delay experienced in that transmission window. If at any point
the red line is above the blue line then a deadline miss has occurred, which can be clearly
seen in the majority of high to low period transitions. The reasoning for these deadline
misses is that as the mode is changed from the 60s deadline mode to the 10s deadline
mode, the node must still wait for the next alive period from the 60s mode before it can
inform the sink of the mode change. This wait is required as all devices use these periods
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to turn off their radio, and thus cannot be contacted outside of these periods.
5.3.1.2 Single Application, With MCW
As shown in Section 5.3.1.1 deadlines can be exceeded if the mode changes before the sink
can be informed, and the new mode requires a shorter response time from the sink than
the previous mode. As outlined in Section 5.1 MCW provides a method for scheduling
mode changes which can be used to inform the sink as to changes in the network state,
allowing data to be flushed from the sender, and the new mode entered. This has been
shown to hold through the use of model checking, however this section verifies that this is
correct in the presence of real MAC and Routing layers.
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Figure 5.12: Deadline and Delay over time with MCW on
Figure 5.12 shows the results of this experiment. As shown in these results the deadline
is never exceeded by the delay, with the delay being reduced before the new deadline is
enforced. The reasoning for the reduction in delay before the new deadline is enforced is
that MCW allows the sensing node to request a mode change from the sink at the next
MCW interval after it has performed a local mode change. At this MCW interval the
old packets are flushed from the source node, which by definition is before the normal
transmission window, which in turn leads to a reduction in delay, before the new mode is
then enacted. One side effect of scheduling MCWs is that less time is spent in the radio-
off state, as all devices must be ready to relay messages in this period. For this reason
concerns about efficiency are raised which will be addressed in the next section.
5.3.1.3 MCW Overheads
As MCW adds additional transmission windows to mote schedules, the effective duty cycle
of the motes is reduced, representing higher power consumption. This section takes the
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same application as in Section 5.3.1.1, both without MCW and with MCW, and records
the duty cycle of the two approaches.
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Figure 5.13: Duty cycle with and without MCW
Figure 5.13 shows the results of this experiment. It can be seen that the overheads
associated with MCW are larger in larger deadline modes. This is due to larger deadline
modes experiencing more MCWs than smaller modes. These overheads are a direct conse-
quence of both the time to inform the sink of a mode change, and the frequency difference
between the current mode and the smallest mode. As the time to inform the sink has
been statically chosen, any pessimism in the duration will be wasted radio-on time. How-
ever should the MCW be set too small, changes may be unable to be performed, allowing
deadlines to be missed.
5.3.1.4 Multiple Applications
To demonstrate that MCW works when multiple applications are present further tests
need to be performed. As these tests should demonstrate that collision avoidance works
effectively to ensure that deadlines of either application are not missed, collisions between
transmission windows must occur in the experiment. To ensure that this is the case the
periods of the two tested applications should not have any common factors, ensuring that
both cycles do not become in-phase with each other, avoiding collisions. For this reason
the periods of the applications deviate from those shown in Table 5.1, with the Low mode
having a deadline of 61 seconds and the Medium mode having a deadline of 59 seconds.
These periods are both prime to ensure no common factors and are both very close to one
another so that multiple collisions will occur in successions. Within these experiments no
mode changes will occur, instead the two applications will simply co-exist in the network,
with MCWs still being scheduled in case a mode change should be required.
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Figure 5.14: Delay of two applications over time with MCW
Figure 5.14 shows the results of the delay measurements for both applications. It can
be seen that for the majority of the time the delay is always less than the respective
deadline, however at one point in the figure the delay temporarily drops further, first for
the larger deadline application, then the smaller. The reasoning for this is that collision
avoidance moves transmission windows earlier in time if a collision occurs, causing the
delay for that window to be reduced. Initially the frequent window collides with the end
of an infrequent window, causing the infrequent window to be moved earlier. Eventually
it is the infrequent window that collides with the end of the frequent window, causing the
frequent one to move.
To ensure that this is the effect of MCW’s collision avoidance, the same experiments
were conducted with no collision avoidance.
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Figure 5.15: Delay of two applications over time without MCW
The results of this experiment can be seen in Figure 5.15. In this figure it can be
seen that the delay is periodically exceeded, first in the high frequency application then in
the lower frequency application. This is due to the collision causing the other application
to delay transmission until the first application has completed its transmissions. As the
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applications are out of phase this affects the highest frequency first, followed by the lowest.
5.3.1.5 Dynamic Sizing of MCWs
For these experiments the MCW size has been set to a fixed size of 20ms. This was in
order to demonstrate that in the case where the maximum time to send a message to
the sink from any node is followed by a subsequent network-wide broadcast of the new
mode, then this value can be used. In the majority of cases a pessimistic estimate can
be calculated, however this pessimism leads to wasted radio-on time, and thus wasted
power. For these reasons this experiment shows that by using a feedback-based approach
as shown within DDC, this value can be directly measured, reducing the pessimism and
thus increasing efficiency. To measure this value simulated mode changes are randomly
sent within MCWs, with the resultant broadcast across the network informing nodes that
a simulated event has occurred. When source nodes next send information to the sink
the slack at each individual node is reported, with the maximum value being taken as the
input to the MCW controller to calculate the MCW size.
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Figure 5.16: Duty cycle with and without DDC sizing the MCW
The results of this are shown in Figure 5.16. This figure shows that a MCW with
a dynamically-sized window is more efficient than a fixed size window. This however is
only the case as the fixed window size is pessimistic, and should some method exist for
calculating a tight worst-case size it may be more efficient, however such a method would
be deployment-specific.
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5.4 Summary
Previous chapters have assumed that a network has only one application and that this
application has a singular mode which specifies the deadline and packet-generation rate.
This chapter aims to remove these assumptions and has shown that through the use of
MCWs the original objectives for this chapter can be met.
The first objective states that deadlines for an application must be met even in the
presence of mode changes. It has been shown through the use of model checking that
MCW ensures that deadlines will always be met whenever mode changes occur. Further
evaluation of this objective has been performed under the Cooja simulator. This has shown
that under real MAC and Routing layers MCW still ensures that deadlines are met, with
the removal of MCW showing how delays exceed the specified deadlines. The overheads
that MCW places on the network in terms of reduced duty-cycle has also been shown.
The second objective states that multiple applications should be supported. This ob-
jective has been met by the inclusion of transmission window collision avoidance to MCW.
This ensures that should two transmission windows collide they are rescheduled such that
the delays are only reduced, and thus the deadlines are never exceeded. This has been eval-
uated in the Cooja simulator, showing that the lack of collision avoidance causes deadlines
to be exceeded should two application transmission windows collide.
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Conclusion
The performance of WSNs is highly variable as their deployments are typically ad-hoc
in nature, their hardware is low cost, and there is limited battery power available. This
variable performance, along with proposals that WSNs may be a viable solution within
assisted living scenarios, raises concerns about the underlying reliability of such systems.
This thesis presents a structured approach to analysing and increasing the super-class of
reliability, Dependability, which includes other factors such as availability, safety, integrity,
and maintenance. Importantly dependability introduces the concept that some level of
failures may be acceptable, acknowledging that failures cannot be completely removed and
instead must be mitigated.
This thesis presents three complementary sections, all of which can be either used
independently or jointly. These sections provide the following benefits: assurance in the
run-time correctness of the system; reduction in the power needed to provide the service;
and maintaining correctness when changing service requirements at runtime. They are
summarised as follows:
6.1 Contribution 1 - Dependability Assurance
Dependability Assurance provides a systematic method for ensuring that an application is
dependable at run-time. This is performed by decomposing an application into a number
of Dependability Tests, some of which must be periodically checked at run-time. This
approach provides the following benefits:
• It ensures that the application will be supported when required, either under low
traffic event-driven applications, or under high traffic sense-and-send approaches.
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• It provides confidence that should any failure occur with a WSN mote that affects
the application, it will be reported to the operators in a timely manner.
• The operators will be informed if the monitoring system itself has failed, and thus
the status of the network is unknown.
• It provides information about the current state of the network which can be used to
inform maintenance policies or other algorithms such as DDC.
This contribution meets Objective 1, allowing the dependability of the WSN to be verified
over the lifetime of the system. This includes the first application of SHARD to a WSN,
and the derivation of tests from these results.
6.2 Contribution 2 - Dynamic Duty Control
Dynamic Duty Control takes any timing requirements from the application, in combination
with feedback from the network, and uses these to reduce the duty-cycle accordingly. This
approach reduces the power consumption by minimising the radio-on time and additionally
batching packets. This provides the following:
• Power is saved by using the application deadlines to minimise radio-on time and to
reduce overheads by maximising batching.
• Deadlines are met by using a feedback based approach which monitors the delay
at run-time, requiring no external information such as the MAC protocol used or
routing topology.
• Fluctuations in the surrounding environment are handled by the introduction of slack,
variance in slack, and the use of feedback.
• In event-driven systems, DDC can use the status information provided by DA to
support low activity applications.
Dynamic Duty Control meets thesis Objective 2, providing power savings by taking into
account the specified application. This has also been shown to work with some typical
MAC and Routing protocols.
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6.3 Contribution 3 - Mode Change Windows
Mode changes may cause changes in the deadline, which in turn may lead to deadlines
being missed. Mode Change Windows are used to ensure that deadlines are not missed in
this case. These are small transmission windows inserted into the normal duty-cycle of the
mote and are used exclusively for transmitting messages when mode changes are required.
MCWs provide the following:
• They allow modes to be switched earlier than normal, sending all messages immedi-
ately after the mode change, reducing mode change latency.
• They ensure deadlines are met across all possible mode changes by scheduling the
minimal number of MCWs to meet a specific deadline.
• They provide a method for scheduling multiple transmission windows which may
occupy the same radio-on time.
• They show how DDC can be used to inform MCW, allowing the mode change window
size to be reduced, saving power, including analysis of the overheads that MCWs
impose on the system.
The last contribution meets Objective 3 by introducing Mode Change Windows. This
ensures that the timing requirements for the applications are met across modes, and with
coexisting applications.
These contributions validate the hypothesis presented within section 1.2, that by using
a systematic analysis of the application, and that by using the application requirements
with feedback, dependability can be increased and further improvements to reliability and
availably can be made.
6.4 Summary
As identified in the introduction dependability consists of 5 attributes, Availability, Relia-
bility, Safety, Integrity, and Maintainability. DA focuses mainly on monitoring the avail-
ability of the network, which informs maintainability, leading to an increase in the network
reliability. DA identified that without larger run-times maintenance would become an issue
with large numbers of devices. For this reason DDC was introduced to take the timing
requirements identified from DA, and use these to inform the duty-cycling of the network,
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increasing availability and reliability. In addition DDC takes into account the variance in
the surrounding environment to ensure that even in severe environments deadlines are met,
at the expense of power. Finally MCW was introduced to ensure that applications can
change mode and coexist with other applications without adversely affecting the timing
requirements.
The two dependability attributes which have not been addressed by these solutions
are Safety and Integrity. Safety has not been considered as there are no actuators on
the devices studied in this thesis, and therefore the WSN itself cannot cause any harm.
Integrity has been assumed to be handled by the lower levels of the protocol stack, exposing
any loss of integrity as dropped packets at the upper levels. These will be discussed in
more detail within the further work in Section 6.5.
6.5 Further Work
To expand on the work presented within this thesis Dependability Assurance should be ap-
plied to more scenarios to evaluate if the process can be easily applied to other applications.
This would validate that the process is suitably generic to apply to any WSN scenario,
yet detailed enough to generate appropriate dependability attributes and the respective
dependability tests.
To aid this process it would be ideal to model the application using a more formal
specification, such as that performed by Wu et al [163]. This would then allow for more
automated processing of the application, possibly allowing for the automatic generation of
Derived Safety Requirements and the respective Dependability Tests. The issue with this
approach is that the consequences of failure may require human intervention in order to
analyse them.
The last improvement to Dependability Assurance would be an analysis into the optimal
frequency to execute the run-time tests. Currently the tests run very frequently to ensure
that all network changes are detected, however analysis using the failure rate of the devices
for this period could be used to inform the frequency of the run-time tests. This could be
extended to include the current level of network degradation, with more degraded networks
requiring higher levels of monitoring.
Dynamic Duty Control can be extended to provide more recommendations on tuning
the PID parameters of the feedback loops. As specific tunings would be deployment-specific
then these tunings may need to be performed on-line. This may involve off-line testing
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within the simulator if the behaviour is accurate enough.
More experiments could be performed with other MAC and Routing protocols. The
behaviour of more statefull protocols such as 6lowpan [101], which require periodic messages
to be sent around the network to maintain state information, may be adversely affected by
DDC. To solve this issue the Routing messages could be modelled as another application,
thus creating dedicated transmission windows for the routing messages.
As mentioned in Section 2.4.2 in-network data aggregation can be used to reduce the
volume of data that arrives at the sink. As DDC can optimise the network based upon
the amount of data that is received at the sink it would be interesting to measure the
benefit this combined approach can provide to the lifetime of the network. This could be
combined with investigations into the trade-off between the accuracy of the data, which
in turn reduces the data size, and thus allowing DDC to increase the availability though
deeper duty cycles.
Finally more research could be conducted into the appropriate size of the slack window
(before variation handling), as it may be beneficial to size this based upon the expected
dPRR/dT. This derives from the fact that a greater sudden change in PRR would require
a greater amount of slack to allow the PID loops time to react, with guarantees that the
PRR will never change abruptly allowing for small levels of slack.
Mode change windows could have more extended model checking to ensure that the
window collision avoidance is correct under all circumstances, as currently this only covers
the mode change windows themselves.
More work needs to be conducted to reduce the worst case period for the mode change
windows, as currently the maximum transmission time is used. In practice this value can
be reduced as the sleep time is much smaller, thus generating less packets, however the
number of packets to transmission time calculation is complex as it involves MAC and
Routing issues.
Outside of the protocols presented in this thesis the safety and integrity attributes
of dependability need to be investigated. These would involve allowing actuators on the
WSN devices, possibly requiring HAZOP analysis in conjunction with the SHARD analysis.
Currently the integrity of the WSN has been assumed to be one of two simplified states,
either successful or failed sending of packets, however more information in the form of
Received Signal Strength Indication and Link Quality Indication values could be used to
further inform Dependability Assurance and Dynamic Duty Control.
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Chapters 4 and 5 have been evaluated within both low and high fidelity simulations,
however detailed evaluation of these systems within a physical environment would be ideal,
but would also be difficult to achieve. The difficulty in performing a similar evaluation
due to that performed in the simulations is due to the high level of variance in the en-
vironment as experienced in the physical experimentation in Section 3.3.3.1. Unlike the
DA experiments, the DDC evaluations require a much larger runtime to perform the eval-
uation, allowing large variations in the environment to occur. A simple example of such
variations is the larger number of dropped packets during working hours, most likely due
to the increased number of wireless devices operating in the 2.4Ghz band as more people
are present within the building along with their associated laptops and mobile phones. For
this reason physical experiments should be performed for DDC, however these can only
validate that DDC operates correctly within a real environment, but due to the variations
in the environment direct comparisons between the simulation results and the physical
results cannot be drawn. Primarily this would be shown as a larger awake period, required
to handle the dropped packets, which in turn would give a lower than expected energy
saving.
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Abbreviations and Nomenclature
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
BLE Bluetooth Low Energy
CA Collision Avoidance
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSMA Carrier Sense Multiple Access
DA Dependability Assurance
DAG Directed Acyclic Graphs
DAO Destination Advertisement Object
DDC Dynamic Duty Control
DSR Derived Safety Requirements
DT Dependability Test
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
HAZOP Hazard And Operability Study
HB Heartbeat
HM Health Monitoring
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit
IP Internet Protocol
LQI Link Quality Indication
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MAC Media Access Control
MCW Mode Change Window
MEMS Microelectromechanical Systems
NN Neural Network
NS Network-Simulator
OS Operating System
PHY Physical
PRR Packet Reception Rate
QOS Quality Of Service
RAM Random Access Memory
RF Radio Frequency
ROM Read-only Memory
RPL Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks
RSSI Received Signal Strength Indication
RTA Run-Time Assurance
RTT Round-Trip Time
RX Receive
SHARD Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution in Design
SNEDL Sensor Network Event Description Language
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access
TTL Time To Live
TX Transmit
WPAN Wireless personal area network
WSN Wireless Sensor Network
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